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Introduction
Modal logic has been mostly developed from a semantic perspective. Although the
adjective “semantic” can be interpreted in various ways, in the standard literature
on modal logic it is usually a synonymous of “model-theoretic” (see Blackburn et al.
2001). The model theory of modal logic studies the interplay between the modal
language and the models for that language. Thus, modal logic is considered an
useful tool designed for talking about a certain kind of mathematical structures
by means of which many concrete situations can be formally described. Flows
of time, states of knowledge, transitions between computational states can be all
represented as relational structures, that is, non-empty sets together with an
accessibility relation on their members. From this perspective, modal logic is a lan-
guage equipped with a suitable relational semantics, rather than a set of axioms
and inference rules. Even when modal logics are presented in an axiomatic style,
formal derivations have a little role to play. On the other hand, when the purpose
is to find derivations or the analysis of their structural properties, sequent cal-
culi have been preferred to the axiomatic Hilbert-style approach. However, the
traditional sequent systems for modal logic fail to satisfy most of the properties
usually required on sequent calculi and the difficulties of finding cut-free sequent
systems are encountered already for quite simple modal systems such as S5. The
problem of a satisfactory proof-theoretic account to modal logic can be partially
solved by generalizing the notion of sequent in a more rich and complex syntax,
and various attempts will be reviewed in the later chapters. Nevertheless, the con-
v
ceptual unification made possible by the relational semantics for modal logics has
been not achieved yet at the corresponding syntactic level. In the present work
that unification is obtained through the direct internalization of the relational se-
mantic into the syntax of sequent rules, following the labelled approach to modal
logic of Negri (2005). The internalization of the semantics makes it possible to
talk about relational structures in proof-theoretic terms. Our attention will focus
mainly on epistemic modal logic (see Fagin et. al. 1995) and, more generally,
on the large variety of problems concerning the logical notions of knowledge and
belief. Sequent systems for epistemic logic are obtained as modular extensions of a
basic modal calculus, through the addition of appropriate mathematical rules that
correspond to the properties of epistemic frames. All the calculi enjoy remarkable
structural properties, in particular they are contraction and cut free.
The first chapter provides a general background on labelled sequent systems and
offers an inferentialist justification of the logical rules through a system of natural
deduction with general elimination rules. The chapter can also be read as a general
introduction to the problems that structural proof theory generally deals with,
in particular the admissibility of the structural rules and cut elimination.
The second chapter is entirely devoted to the cut-elimination theorem, and the
complexity of cut-elimination methods are discussed: a numerical bound on cut-
free derivations is calculated following the pattern of the proof of the same theorem
for first-order logic. The aim is to provide a labelled sequent system in which all
the structural rules are admissible, the logical rules are invertible, and the cut rule
can be dispensed with. The system so obtained allows a systematic proof-search
procedure and can be effectively used for finding derivation in basic modal logic.
In the third chapter is shown how to extend the techniques and results of the
previous parts in order to get sequent systems for logics that extend basic modal
logic. The problem of how to treat axioms in sequent calculus is introduced and
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the solution of Negri and von Plato (2001, 2011) is applied to the multi-modal
logic of knowledge and belief. Sequent systems for epistemic and doxastic logic
are obtained by adding suitable inference rules for the accessibility relation that
express the properties of the corresponding relations in Kripke frames.
The last two chapters constitute the core of the research project on the proof theory
of modal epistemic logic. The fourth chapter presents a labelled sequent system
for the logic of public announcements (see Plaza 1989 and van Ditmarsch et.
al. 2007). The formal study of the dynamics of knowledge and of process of infor-
mation are nowadays among the most prominent developments of epistemic modal
logic. Nevertheless, model-theoretic aspects have been dominant and an adequate
proof-theoretic treatment is still an open question. Most of the material of this
chapter has been presented in Maffezioli and Negri (2010, 2011).
The last chapter consists in a proof-theoretic analysis of the Church-Fitch para-
dox of knowability (see Fitch 1963). By exploiting the semantic features of a
labelled sequent system it is shown how to give a cut-free reconstruction of the
Fitch derivation and to isolate the semantic frame condition that correspond to
the principle at the base of the paradox. The aim of this analysis is to provide an
adequate proof theory governing the interaction among the modalities involved in
Fitch’s proof and to give a logical framework for dealing with the Fitch paradox
(knowability logic). Moreover, it is argued in favor of the use of intuitionsitic logic
as a solution of the paradox and it is shown that the paradoxical conclusion is
only classically derivable, but neither intuitionistically derivable nor intuitionisti-
cally admissible. The material presented in this chapter can be found, with minor
modifications, in Maffezioli et al. (2011).
We conclude this introduction by recalling the fundamentals of the language and
of the semantics of epistemic logic, and we briefly discuss the basic notions we will
deal with in what follows.
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The language
The language of epistemic logic consists of a countable set of atomic formulas P
and a finite set of (names for) agents A. From P it is possible to form compound
formulas by the usual propositional connectives: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction),
⊃ (implication), so that if A and B are formulas, so are A ∧ B, A ∨ B, A ⊃ B. The
language contains also the symbol ⊥ which stands for any contradiction. In addi-
tion, there is a knowledge operator Ka for each agent a in A. Intuitively, KaA
means: “the agent a knows that A”. In the following we shall use some notational
conventions: ¬A will be an abbreviation for A ⊃ ⊥ and A ⊃⊂ B a shorthand for
implication in both directions, that is, (A ⊃ B) ∧ (B ⊃ A). We omit the outer-
most parentheses when this does not lead to confusion. Despite its simplicity, this
language permits to express rather complex information about what agents know
about other agents’ knowledge. For instance, the formula P ∧ ¬KaP says that P is
true but a doesn’t know it, whereas ¬KbKcP ∧ ¬Kb¬KcP says that b does not know
whether c knows P.
The formal semantics
The most influential model of knowledge is the well-known possible-world se-
mantics or, relational semantics. The idea is that besides the actual state of
affairs there are a number of other possible states which describe the world as it
could be, if the things were different. An agent may have access to some possible
state, whereas some others are inaccessible. Among the accessible states, an agent
a may not be able to tell the difference with respect to the actual one, since in both
the same proposition P holds. When P holds in every state that a considers possible
it is said that a knows that P. Thus, the basic components of the formal semantics
for knowledge are a set of possible states and a collection of arrows between states.
Definition (Epistemic Frame). An epistemic frame is a structure F = 〈X,Ra〉where
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X is a non-empty set and Ra is a collection of binary relations on X, one for each
a ∈ A. Furthermore, each Ra is an equivalence relation. The standard notation for
〈x, y〉 ∈ Ra is xRay.
In an epistemic frame, the elements in X may be intuitively interpreted as possible
worlds. However, there is no reason for limiting oneself to a specific interpretation
and in the following we shall generally speak of possible states. In the standard
mono-modal logic the binary relation gets interpreted as an accessibility relation
between states, but, in the field of multi-modal epistemic logic, relations are bet-
ter understood when they are interpreted as indistinguishability relations: an
agent a cannot distinguish between two states x and y when they are related by
Ra. Thus, xRay can be read as: “as far as a concerns, the state x might be y as well”.
The idea is that the fewer states an agent considers possible, the less is his uncer-
tainty, and more he knows. Finally, in order to describe formally the properties of
Ka it is assumed that each relation is an equivalence relation, that is, it is reflex-
ive, symmetric and transitive. In fact, no agent is supposed to distinguish a state
x from itself, and if x is indistinguishable from y so is y from x; finally, if x and y
cannot be distinguished and also y cannot be distinguished from z then x cannot be
distinguished from z. However, weaker notions of knowledge are possible and in
the last chapter we shall assume only the reflexivity of the accessibilities relations.
An epistemic frame becomes an epistemic model when atomic formulas receive an
evaluation. This can be obtained by adding a new relation, indicated by  and
called forcing, between possible states and atoms. Intuitively, x  P says that the
formula P is true at the state x.
Definition (Epistemic Model). An epistemic model is a structureM = 〈F,〉where
F is an epistemic frame and  is a binary relation between elements in X and
atomic formulas P. The standard notation for 〈x, P〉 ∈  is x  P.
The relation  is extended in a unique way to arbitrary formulas by means of the
ix
following inductive clauses.
x  ⊥ for no x
x  A ∧ B if and only if x  A and x  B
x  A ∨ B if and only if x  A or x  B
x  A ⊃ B if and only if x  A implies x  B
x  KaA if and only if for all y, xRay implies y  A
Epistemic models get easily represented with diagrams. In the picture below,
agent b considers possible at x the state x itself and the state y. However, while he
knows that P, since P is true at all states Rb-accessible, he does not not know Q,
since y is Rb-accessible but the atom Q is not forced at y.
x
P Q
y
P ¬Q
Rb
Rb
Rb
A similar semantics can be given for the belief operator BaA: “the agent a be-
lieves that A”. In contrast with knowledge, a belief is not necessarily true and we
must modify the semantics accordingly. In fact, knowledge is supposed to imply
truth, whereas it is natural to think that agents may believe something even if
it is false. In other words, although we may believe something false, if we know
something then it must be true. Given that what is known is true semantically
corresponds to the reflexivity of the accessibility relations, in a frame for belief
the reflexivity of the accessibility relations will not be assumed. Despite believing
something is weaker than knowing we still assume that our beliefs are consistent,
x
so that contradictions are not believed. Semantically, this is equivalent to impos-
ing seriality of the accessibility relation Ra, for each agent a: for each state x there
is a state y such that xRay.
Properties of knowledge
The properties of knowledge are described in terms of validity in an epistemic
frame. A formula A is valid in an epistemic frame F when it is forced at every
state x in every model M based on F. An important property of knowledge is the
distributivity of the Ka operator over implicative formulas, that is, the validity
of the formula Ka(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (KaA ⊃ KaB). This suggests that agents are very
powerful reasoners since distributivity implies that agents know all the logical
consequences of their knowledge: if an agent a knows both A ⊃ B and A, then A ⊃
B and A hold in all possible states he considers possible, so also B must holds in all
these states. But if B holds in every possible state then B is known by the agent.
Another important property is expressed by the knowledge generalization rule (or,
necessitation): if A is valid then KaA is valid too. This is not to say that the
formula A ⊃ KaA is valid. Agents do not necessarily know all the true facts, and
in the last chapter we will consider this formula as a form of paradox. Conversely,
it is instead the case that if an agent knows something that this fact must be true,
a principle expressed by the formula KaA ⊃ A. As we have already said, this
formula has been taken to be characteristic of knowledge as distinguished from
belief. The property of factivity follows from the reflexivity of each accessibility
relation in an epistemic frame: since the actual state is always accessible from
itself, if A holds at every state accessible then, in particular, it holds at the actual
one. Finally, the agents have complete introspection concerning their knowledge,
that is, they know what they know and what they do not know. In terms of validity,
positive and negative introspection correspond to the formulas KaA ⊃ KaKaA
xi
and ¬KaA ⊃ Ka¬KaA. Validity of positive introspection follows from transitivity of
Ra, whereas the negative introspection follows from transitivity and symmetry.
Historically, the modern epistemic modal logic originated with the work of the
Finnish logicians H.G. von Wright and J. Hintikka, especially with the pioneering
contributions von Wright (1951) and Hintikka (1962). The former is one of the
earliest attempt to formalize the properties of knowledge and belief in terms of ax-
iomatic systems. The latter is the most influential treatment of the modal logic of
knowledge and helped to carry the subject of epistemic logic into mainstream epis-
temology, game theory, economics, and computer science. Since Hintikka’s book
epistemic notions have been strictly connected with the familiar possible-world se-
mantics. The applications of epistemic logic to computer science (see Meyer and
van der Hoek 2004) and the modern extensions of it with dynamic modal operators
(see van Ditmarsch et. al. 2007) are still in the tradition of that early studies.
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Chapter1
Labelled Sequent Systems
In this chapter, basic modal logic is formulated as a labelled sequent system
through an internalization of Kripke semantics within the syntax of the rules. In
a labelled system, each formula A receives a label x, and this is indicated by x : A.
The labels are interpreted as possible states and the labeling specifies the state
at which a formula is true. Moreover, labels may occur also in expressions for ac-
cessibility relation as xRy. The rules of a labelled system operate on the labels
and on the relations between them. More specifically, the language of sequents
in enriched in such a way that in a sequent Γ → ∆ two kinds of expression may
occur: labelled formulas x : A and relational atom xRy. A labelled formula corre-
sponds to forcing relation x  A, whereas xRy is the accessibility relation between
worlds. As usual, Γ and ∆ are multisets (lists without order) of labelled formulas
or relational atoms. The sequent rules are found from (and justified by) the corre-
sponding rules of natural deduction: the introduction rules get translated directly
into right sequent rules, whereas the elimination rules, written in the manner of
disjunction elimination, are converted into a left sequent rules by cut.
In this chapter, and also in the next one, we take into account the case of basic
mono-modal logic: the language contain only two modal operators  and ♦, inter-
preted as necessity and possibility operators, respectively. Intuitively, a formula as
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A means that A is necessarily true, whereas ♦A means that A is possibly true.
The semantics is modified accordingly, and we assume that there just a single ac-
cessibility relation R.
1.1 Labelled natural deduction
The sequent rules for each connective and for the modalities and ♦ are presented
as a formalization of the derivability relation of their corresponding natural deduc-
tion rules, following the pattern of Negri and von Plato (2001). In turn, the rules
of natural deduction are found from the meaning explanation of connectives and
modalities in terms of Kripke semantics and an inversion principle. First, we con-
sider the inductive definition of forcing for a modal formula A
x  A if and only if for all y, xRy implies y  A
This equivalence gives at once the sufficient and necessary conditions for A to be
forced at an arbitrary state x. By considering only the if-direction of this definition,
the sufficient condition is found:
If for all y, xRy implies y  A then x  A
In terms of proof system, this part corresponds to a derivability condition of the
form
If for all y, xRy derives y : A then x : A can be derived
The latter gives an introduction rule of natural deduction for the  operator (see
also Simpson 1994, p.66 and Viganò 2000, p. 20). If on the assumption that y is
an arbitrary world accessible from x, we can show that A holds at y then we can
conclude that A holds at x. Formally,
2
[
1
xRy]....
y : A
x : A I1
Note that in this formulation of rule I only the active assumption xRy is dis-
played. I combines the features of introduction rules for ∀ and ⊃. As the intro-
duction rule for universal quantifier of first order logic,I must meet the condition
that the label y is different from x. Moreover, for implication introduction, the as-
sumption xRy is discharged. The introduction rules for propositional connectives
are found similarly. As a conjunction A ∧ B is forced at x when both A and B are
forced at x, we find
x : A x : B
x : A ∧ B ∧I
A disjunction A ∨ B is forced at x if either A or B is forced at x, so we have two
introduction rules for x : A ∨ B
x : A
x : A ∨ B ∨I1
x : B
x : A ∨ B ∨I2
Finally, the rule for introducing an implication is
[
1
x : A]....
x : B
x : A ⊃ B ⊃I1
Elimination rules are found from introduction rules. The idea of a justification
of elimination rules in terms of the introduction rules was already present in the
work of Gentzen (see Gentzen 1969, p. 80), when he noted that
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It should be possible to display the E-inferences [elimination rules] as
unique functions of their corresponding I-inferences [introduction rules],
on the basis of certain requirements.
The requirement was made explicit by D. Prawitz in his monograph on natural
deduction (see Prawitz 1965), and it is nowadays known as inversion principle.
This idea is that nothing is gained if an introduction rule is followed by an elimi-
nation rule, or more precisely
Inversion Principle (Prawitz). The conclusion of an elimination rule R with major
premise A ? B is already contained in the assumptions used to derive A ? B from
?-introduction rules, together with the minor premises of the rule.
However, Gentzen’s and Prawitz’s principle justifies but does not uniquely deter-
mine the elimination rules. We consider here a generalization of the inversion
principle, one that leads to elimination rules that are more general than the usual
ones. The general inversion principle and general elimination rules were intro-
duced to obtain a simpler proof of normalization theorem and to achieve a full
correspondence between natural deduction and sequent calculus. However, we use
them here only to justify the sequent calculus rules. In an elimination rule, the
formula x : A occurs as major premise and we ask what conditions are needed to
satisfy the following (see Negri and von Plato 2001, p. 6).
Inversion Principle (General). Whatever follows from the direct grounds for deriv-
ing a proposition must follows from that proposition.
The elimination rules for propositional connectives are the general elimination
rules of von Plato (2001), with the exception that here formulas are labelled. How-
ever, in systems for classical logic, propositional rules do not change the labels,
when applied on formulas with a propositional connective as principal connective.
Thus, the general elimination rule for conjunction is
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x : A ∧ B
[
1
x : A, x : B]....
u : C
u : C
∧E1
The standard rules of conjunction elimination are special cases of the general one,
when u is x and C is either A or B.
x : A ∧ B
x : A ∧E1
x : A ∧ B
x : B ∧E2
The general elimination of disjunction was found already by Gentzen. The labelled
version of the rule is as follows
x : A ∨ B
[
1
x : A]....
u : C
[
1
x : B]....
u : C
u : C
∨E1
The elimination of an implication is more complicated because the direct ground
for deriving x : A ⊃ B is not a formula, but, in turn, a derivation of x : B from
the assumption x : A. In fact, in Schroeder-Heister (1984, 2010) the rule gets
formulated as an higher-level unlabelled rule
A ⊃ B
[
1
A ` B]....
C
C
⊃E′1
where the symbol ` denotes the derivability relation and expresses the fact that
B is derivable from A. However, the existence of this derivation can be expressed
by saying that if C follows from B then it already follows from A. In the labelled
formalism, this gives the following elimination rule for x : A ⊃ B
5
x : A ⊃ B x : A
[
1
x : B]....
u : C
u : C
⊃E1
When u is x and B is C, the special elimination rule obtained is the labelled version
rule of modus ponens
x : A ⊃ B x : A
x : B ⊃E
Finally, the zero-ary connective ⊥ has only an elimination rule. Given that there
is no ground for deriving ⊥, from the inversion principle we obtain an elimination
rule that has only the major premise x : ⊥. The rule is also known as rule of ex
falso quodlibet
x : ⊥
u : C
EFQ
The same reasoning of general elimination of ⊃ holds for the general elimination
rule of . In Read (2008) is proposed the heigher-level general elimination rule for

x : A
[
1
xRy ` y : A]....
u : C
u : C
E′1
Analogously to the case of implication elimination, the direct ground for deriving
x : A is the existence of a hypothetical derivation of y : A from xRy. However, our
rule E is justified, as above, by the fact that the existence of such derivation can
be expressed by saying that if u : C follows from y : A, then it already follows from
xRy. Thus,
6
x : A xRy
[
1
y : A]....
u : C
u : C
E1
The rule specializes in the standard elimination rule of Simpson (1994) when u is
y and C is A
x : A xRy
y : A E
The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to the possibility operator ♦.
From the semantic clause we get the sufficient condition for a formula as ♦A to be
forced, that is,
If for some y, xRy and y  A then x  ♦A
In the labelled system, this condition is expressed in terms of derivability and we
have that
If for some y, xRy and y : A can be derived then x : ♦A can be derived
Thus, the same introduction rule for ♦ of Simpson (1994) is found
xRy y : A
x : ♦A ♦I
The corresponding elimination rule is obtained through the inversion principle
x : ♦A
[
1
xRy, y : A]....
u : C
u : C
♦E1
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where again y must be different form x and u and must not appear in any assump-
tion other than xRy and y : A.
1.2 From natural deduction to sequent calculus
Sequent calculus is designed for keeping track locally of open assumptions, a fea-
ture that natural deduction lacks: in natural deduction only active formulas are
shown, leaving implicit the other assumptions. Sequent calculus can be under-
stood as a formal theory of derivability relation ` in the corresponding system of
natural deduction. As usual, we use two different symbols ` and → in order to
keep separated the metalevel expressions as Γ ` u : C in natural deduction from
the sequent Γ→ u : C which is part of object language of sequent calculus. In this
way, a sequent
Γ→ u : C
is interpreted as the assertion in natural deduction
Γ ` u : C
where formulas in Γ are the assumptions u : C on which depends. In a sequent
Γ → u : C the multiset Γ is called the antecedent and the formula u : C the
succedent. A translation from natural deduction to sequent calculus was already
present in Gentzen’s original work and it is discussed deeply in the context of gen-
eral elimination rules in von Plato (2001, 2003). Each introduction rule is trans-
lated into a sequent rule that introduces the principal formula in the antecedent.
The elimination rules are translated in two phases and a left sequent rule for each
elimination rule in natural deduction is found by cut.
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Translation of propositional rules
In natural deduction, a derivation can start with any formula A as assumption
and assumptions, in general, can be discharged. However, it may happen that
the formula assumed is the same formula that is discharged. In other words, the
same formula can be an assumption and conclusion in a derivation. For instance,
the law of identity needs that x : A can act as both assumption and conclusion
of an application of L ⊃. The same behavior is encountered in a labelled natural
deduction system, so we have
[
1
x : A]
x : A ⊃ A ⊃I1
In sequent calculus, the fact that the same formula can be assumed and derived at
the same time gives initial sequents A→ A. In labelled systems, initial sequents
are of the form
x : A→ x : A xRy→ xRy
Often, initial sequents are called logical axioms, and the derivation of the law of
identity is immediate
x : A→ x : A
→ x : A ⊃ A R⊃
Thus, discharge in natural deduction corresponds to the application of a sequent
calculus rule that has an active formula in the antecedent of a premise.
The introduction rules of natural deduction get translated into right rules in
sequent calculus, where the comma replaces the set-theoretic union. Conjunction
introduction can be written with the assumptions made explicit as
9
Γ....
x : A
∆....
x : B
x : A ∧ B ∧I
and it is converted to the following sequent calculus rule
Γ→ x : A ∆→ x : B
Γ,∆→ x : A ∧ B R∧
Note that the rule has independent contexts, that is, Γ and ∆ need not be the same
multiset. On the other hand, from general elimination rules of natural deduction,
left rules of sequent calculus are found. With explicit assumptions, the general
elimination rule for ∧ becomes
Γ....
x : A ∧ B
[
1
x : A, x : B],∆....
u : C
u : C
∧E1
We want to translate it into a left sequent rule of the form
x : A, x : B, Γ,∆→ u : C
x : A ∧ B, Γ,∆→ u : C L∧
The translation is in two steps. The general elimination rule is immediately
rewritten into
Γ→ x : A ∧ B x : A, x : B,∆→ u : C
Γ,∆→ u : C L∧′
Then, it is shown that L∧′ is derivable from L∧ by cut.
Γ→ x : A ∧ B
x : A, x : B,∆→ u : C
x : A ∧ B,∆→ u : C L∧
Γ,∆→ u : C CUT
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As to disjunction introduction we consider only one of the two cases. The rule
Γ....
x : A
x : A ∨ B ∨I1
is immediately converted into a sequent calculus right rule
Γ→ x : A
Γ→ x : A ∨ B R∨
The corresponding elimination rule, that is,
Γ....
x : A ∨ B
[
1
x : A],∆....
u : C
[
1
x : B],Θ....
u : C
u : C
∨E1
is first translated in sequent calculus
Γ→ x : A ∨ B x : A,∆→ u : C x : B,Θ→ u : C
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C L∨′
Then, the labelled version of the standard context-independent left rule for dis-
junction is considered:
x : A, Γ→ u : C x : B,∆→ u : C
x : A ∨ B, Γ,∆→ u : C L∨
Finally, L∨′ is proved to be derivable in presence of the latter as follows
Γ→ x : A ∨ B
x : A,∆→ u : C x : B,Θ→ u : C
x : A ∨ B,∆,Θ→ u : C L∨
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C CUT
Now, the case of implication. Its introduction rule with explicit assumptions is
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[
1
x : A], Γ....
x : B
x : A ⊃ B ⊃I
and gets translated immediately into a right sequent calculus rule
Γ→ x : A ⊃ B
x : A, Γ→ x : B R⊃
Consider now the corresponding elimination, that is,
Γ....
x : A ⊃ B
∆....
x : A
[
1
x : B],Θ....
u : C
u : C
⊃E1
The immediate translation gives
Γ→ x : A ⊃ B ∆→ x : A x : B,Θ→ u : C
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C L⊃′
Once again, the latter is shown to be derivable from the following L ⊃, by cut
Γ→ x : A x : B,∆→ u : C
x : A ⊃ B, Γ,∆→ u : C L⊃
In fact,
Γ→ x : A ⊃ B
∆→ x : A x : B,Θ→ u : C
x : A ⊃ B,∆,Θ→ u : C L⊃
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C CUT
As we already said, the logical symbol ⊥ has no introduction rule because there
are no grounds for asserting ⊥. Thus, ⊥ has only an elimination rule, known as
rule of ex falso quodlibet, and written with explicit assumptions
12
Γ....
x : ⊥
u : C
EFQ
First, it is translated into
Γ→ x : ⊥
Γ→ u : C L⊥′
Then, it is shown that this rule in derivable in presence of the following zero-ary
rule L⊥
x : ⊥ → u : C L⊥
Again, using cut,
Γ→ x : ⊥ x : ⊥ → u : C L⊥
Γ→ u : C CUT
Observation. Along with initial sequents, also sequents x : ⊥ → u : C are con-
sidered as initial rather than a zero-ary inference rule. However, such sequents
cannot be properly taken as initial from the perspective of the translation from
natural deduction because L⊥, being a translation of an inference rule, must be,
in turn, an inference rule. Thus, they are considered here as a zero-ary inference
rules as in Negri and von Plato (2001) and in Negri (2005).
Negation is not primitive, but it is defined in terms of ⊃ and ⊥ so that x : ¬A
stands for x : A ⊃ ⊥. In this way, the rules for negation are derived from those for
⊃, accordingly. For negation introduction we have
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[
1
x : A], Γ....
x : ⊥
x : ¬A ¬I1
An immediate translation into a sequent rule gives
x : A, Γ→ x : ⊥
Γ→ x : ¬A R¬′
The general elimination rule for negation takes the form
Γ....
x : ¬A
∆....
x : A
[
1
x : ⊥],Θ....
u : C
u : C
¬E1
The direct translation into sequent calculus gives
Γ→ x : ¬A ∆→ x : A x : ⊥,Θ→ u : C
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C L¬′
Now, consider the left rule for negation
Γ→ x : A
x : ¬A, Γ→ L¬
Thus, L¬′ is derivable in presence of L¬ as follows
Γ→ x : ¬A
∆→ x : A
∆→ x : A, x : ⊥ R-W
x : ¬A,∆→ x : ⊥ L¬
Γ,∆→ x : ⊥ CUT x : ⊥,Θ→ u : C
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C CUT
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Translation of modal rules
We turn now to the translation from natural deduction to sequent calculus for
modal rules. The rule I with explicit assumptions
[
1
xRy], Γ....
y : A
x : A I
corresponds to the right sequent rule
xRy, Γ→ y : A
Γ→ x : A R0
Rmust meet the usual condition that the label y is different from x and must not
occur in Γ, that is, y must not be in the conclusion of the rule. It is said that y is
the eigenvariable of the rule. The general elimination rule is
Γ....
x : A
∆....
xRy
[
1
y : A],Θ....
u : C
u : C E
It is translated into a left sequent rule of the form
Γ→ x : A ∆→ xRy y : A,Θ→ u : C
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C L′
Consider the left sequent rule with independent contexts
Γ→ xRy y : A,∆→ u : C
x : A, Γ,∆→ u : C L0
As above, L′ can be derived from L0 by cut
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Γ→ x : A
∆→ xRy y : A,Θ→ u : C
x : A,∆,Θ→ u : C L0
Γ,∆,Θ→ u : C CUT
Finally, we deal with the ♦ operator. The rule of ♦ introduction is
Γ....
xRy
∆....
y : A
x : ♦A ♦I
It is translated into a right sequent rule straightforwardly
Γ→ xRy ∆→ y : A
Γ,∆→ x : ♦A R♦0
The ♦-elimination with explicit contexts gets formulated as
Γ....
x : ♦A
[
1
xRy, y : A],∆....
u : C
u : C
♦E1
where y is different from x and u and it does not appear in Γ,∆. Its immediate
translation is
Γ→ x : ♦A xRy, y : A,∆→ u : C
Γ,∆→ u : C L♦′
L♦′ is derivable in presence of the standard left rule
xRy, y : A, Γ,∆→ u : C
x : ♦A, Γ,∆→ u : C L♦
by cut as follows
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Γ→ x : ♦A
xRy, y : A,∆→ u : C
x : ♦A,∆→ u : C L♦
Γ,∆→ u : C CUT
Structural rules
Strictly speaking, natural deduction has no structural rules. This means that in
natural deduction no structural rule is explicitly assumed, but it does not mean
that it is not possible to manage assumptions. Assumptions can be discharged
and the discharge is optional: it is possible to leave an assumption open, even if
it could be discharged. The way in which assumptions are managed in natural
deduction has a correspondence in the usual structural rules of sequent calculus.
In particular, it is possible to discharge assumptions which have been not made as
in the derivation of the a fortiori law,
[
1
x : A]
x : B ⊃ A ⊃I
x : A ⊃ (B ⊃ A) ⊃I1
In sequent calculus, the vacuous discharge corresponds to the structural rule of
weakening, that is,
Γ→ u : C
x : A, Γ→ u : C L-W
In fact, by weakening, we obtain a sequent calculus derivation of the a fortiori law
as follows
x : A→ x : A
x : A, x : B→ x : A L-W
x : A→ x : B ⊃ A R⊃
→ x : A ⊃ (B ⊃ A) R⊃
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However, in some cases we may also need to discharge more than one occurrence
of the same assumption, as in the following derivation
[
2
x : A ⊃ (A ⊃ B)] [
1
x : A]
x : A ⊃ B ⊃E [
1
x : A]
x : B ⊃E
x : A ⊃ B ⊃I1
x : (A ⊃ (A ⊃ B)) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) ⊃I2
The multiple discharge of the assumption x : A corresponds, in sequent calculus,
to the rule of contraction
x : A, x : A, Γ→ u : C
x : A, Γ→ u : C L-C
In fact, the above formula is derivable in the presence of contraction.
x : A→ x : A
x : A→ x : A x : B→ x : B
x : A ⊃ B, x : A→ x : B L⊃
x : A ⊃ (A ⊃ B), x : A, x : A→ x : B L⊃
x : A ⊃ (A ⊃ B), x : A→ x : B L-C
x : A ⊃ (A ⊃ B)→ x : A ⊃ B R⊃
→ x : (A ⊃ (A ⊃ B)) ⊃ (A ⊃ B) R⊃
The rule of exchange was primitive in the original Gentzen’s systems LK and LJ,
but the use of multisets of formulas instead of lists makes it superfluous. Finally,
in natural deduction, derivations can be composed. If x : A has been derived from
the open assumptions Γ and u : C has been derived from x : A along with the open
assumptions ∆ then u : C can be derived from the open assumptions Γ,∆. This
corresponds, in sequent calculus, to the rule of cut
Γ→ x : A x : A,∆→ u : C
Γ,∆→ u : C CUT
Cut is the only rule that makes a formula disappear in a derivation. This feature
18
has the consequence that when we want to determine whether a sequent Γ→ u : C
is derivable we could always try to reduce the task into Γ → v : A and v : A,∆ →
u : C, where v : A is an arbitrary new formula, with no end. Because of this lack of
determinism introduced by cut, the main task of structural proof theory is to prove
that the rule of cut is redundant in a given system of rules. The redundancy of
the cut rule is expressed formally in terms of rule admissibility: for every cut-free
derivation of the premises of cut there exists a derivation of its conclusion that uses
only primitive rules or rules already proved to be admissible. Moreover, the proof
of cut admissibility we shall give in the following is constructive: we effectively
show how to find a derivation of the conclusion of cut from all derivations of its
premises. In this sense, we can also say that the redundancy of cut for a system
of rules means that the system is closed under cut in a strong sense. Else, it can
be also said that cut is eliminable: if cut is considered as a primitive inference
rule, cut admissibility reduces to the proof of cut elimination. The latter version
corresponds to the celebrated main theorem, or Hauptsatz, of Gerhard Gentzen
who gave its first proof for systems LJ and LK of intuitionistic and classical logic.
Subformula property
Among the consequences of cut elimination is the subformula property: every
formula in a derivation is subformula of the formulas in the endsequent. As al-
ready noted by Gentzen (see Gentzen 1934, p. 88)
Intuitively speaking, these properties of derivations without cuts may
be expressed as follows: the S–formulas [formulas in sequents] become
longer as we descend lower down in derivation, never shorter. The final
result is, as it were, gradually built up from its constituent elements.
The proof represented by the derivation is not round-about in that it
contains only concepts which recur in the final result.
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Here, the notion of subformula is generalized in order to match the setting of la-
belled formulas. In particular, we consider for an arbitrary label y, a formula such
a y : A as a (proper) subformula of x : A.
Definition (Subformula Set). Let L be the set of labels. The subformula set SF of a
formula x : B is defined inductively.
SF(x : P) = {x : P};
SF(xRy) = {xRy};
SF(x : ¬B) = SF(x : B) ∪ {x : ¬B};
SF(x : B ◦ C) = SF(x : B) ∪ SF(x : C) ∪ {x : B ◦ C}, if ◦ is ∧, ∨, ⊃;
SF(x : B) = ⋃
y∈L
SF(y : A) ∪ {x : B}.
Consequently, x : A is a subformula of x : B when x : A ∈ SF(x : B). Finally, proper
subformulas of a formula x : B are all the subformulas of x : B, except x : B itself.
The subformula property is usually the main consequence of cut elimination. How-
ever, in labelled systems is not any longer so. In fact, the modal rules do not satisfy
subformula property, since the relational atom xRy occurring in the premise of R
and L♦ disappears in the conclusion. The lack of the subformula property is surely
an unpleasant feature because it constitutes a serious obstacle to the possibility of
ensuring decidability. Nevertheless, a closer inspection of the modal rules reveals
that when a relational atom as xRy disappears by an application of R or L♦, what
is irremediably lost is the eigenvariable y, whereas x still occurs in the conclusion
as the label of principal formula x : A or x : ♦A. The same happens with the rules
R∀ and L∃ of LK. Therefore, no variable, except for eigenvariables, disappears and
a more refined result can be given in the form of the subterm property: all labels
in a derivation are either eigenvariables or labels in the endsequent.
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1.3 A system for basic modal logic
Modal logic is mostly presented as based on classical logic. More precisely, ax-
iomatic systems of modal logic consist of the axioms of the classical propositional
calculus together with specific axioms concerning the modal operators. However,
all sequent rules we have considered so far have at most one formula in the succe-
dent of the sequent, so they give a system which is weaker than classical logic. In
natural deduction, classical logic can be obtained by adding the rule of excluded
middle, or rule of tertium non datur.
[
1
x : A], Γ....
u : C
[
1
x : ¬A],∆....
u : C
u : C
EM1
In the presence of EM, the law of excluded middle is derivable as follows
[
1
x : A]
x : A ∨ ¬A ∨I1
[
1
x : ¬A]
x : A ∨ ¬A ∨I1
x : A ∨ ¬A EM1
EM generalizes the rule of indirect proof, or rule of reductio ad absurdum, consid-
ered in Prawitz (1965)
[
1
x : ¬A]....
u : ⊥
x : A
RAA1
The translation of EM in sequent calculus gives the rule
x : A, Γ→ u : C x : ¬A,∆→ u : C
Γ,∆→ u : C LR¬
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The rules for negation we considered so far do not give a derivation of the law of
excluded middle, whereas LR¬ does.
x : A→ x : A
x : A→ x : A ∨ ¬A R∨
x : A→ x : A
x : ¬A→ x : A ∨ ¬A R∨
→ x : A ∨ ¬A LR¬
However, rule LR¬ is not the only way to get classical logic in sequent calculus.
Alternatively, we may extend the notion of sequent so that a sequent can have an
arbitrary multiset ∆ as succedent, instead of a single formula u : C. By allowing
multi-succedent sequents, the rules for negation become the labelled version of the
rules already considered in Gentzen’s original work, that is,
Γ→ ∆, x : A
x : ¬A, Γ→ ∆ L¬
x : A, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x : ¬A R¬
Using contraction, the law of excluded middle can now be derived
x : A→ x : A
→ x : A, x : ¬A R¬
→ x : A ∨ ¬A, x : ¬A R∨
→ x : A ∨ ¬A, x : A ∨ ¬A R∨
→ x : A ∨ ¬A R-C
With multi-succedent sequents, we obtain a labelled sequent calculus with the
same propositional rules of G0c (without quantifiers) of Negri and von Plato (2001),
p. 95. In addition, here we have rules for  and ♦. We shall refer to this system as
G0K, where K stands for Kripke. G0K is a labelled sequent calculus for the basic
modal logic K. All the two-premise rules of G0K have independent contexts be-
cause they are translated from the rules of natural deduction. This feature makes
G0K not suitable for the systematic search of derivations, since two-premise rules
are not invertible and they cannot be applied backwards. Later, only context shar-
ing two-premise rules will be used, in order to have contraction admissible.
22
Logical rules of G0K
x : A→ x : A xRy→ xRy
x : A, x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ∧ B, Γ→ ∆ L∧
Γ→ ∆, x : A Γ′ → ∆′, x : B
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆, x : A ∧ B R∧
x : A, Γ→ ∆ x : B, Γ′ → ∆′
x : A ∨ B, Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ L∨
Γ→ ∆, x : A
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∨ B R∨1
Γ→ ∆, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∨ B R∨2
Γ→ ∆, x : A x : B, Γ′ → ∆′
x : A ⊃ B, Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ L⊃
x : A, Γ→ ∆, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ⊃ B R⊃
x : ⊥ → ∆ L⊥
xRy, Γ→ ∆, y : A
Γ→ ∆, x : A R0
Γ→ ∆, xRy y : A, Γ′ → ∆′
x : A, Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ L0
Γ→ ∆, xRy Γ′ → ∆′, y : A
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆, x : ♦A R♦0
xRy, y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : ♦A, Γ→ ∆ L♦0
With negation defined in terms of ⊃ and ⊥, the corresponding rules are derived
from those for ⊃, and will be used only to shorten derivations. Note that initial se-
quent have an arbitrary labelled formula x : A as principal. As in G0c of Negri and
von Plato (2001), weakening and contraction are primitive, and not admissible, in-
ference rules of G0K. They can have as active formulas either labelled formulas or
relational atoms.
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Structural rules of G0K
Γ→ ∆
x : A, Γ→ ∆ L-W
Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x : A R-W
Γ→ ∆
xRy, Γ→ ∆ L-W
Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, xRy R-W
x : A, x : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, Γ→ ∆ L-C
Γ→ ∆, x : A, x : A
Γ→ ∆, x : A R-C
xRy, xRy, Γ→ ∆
xRy, Γ→ ∆ L-C
Γ→ ∆, xRy, xRy,
Γ→ ∆, xRy R-C
As we already said, the rule of cut
Γ→ ∆, x : C x : C, Γ′ → ∆′
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ CUT
is not assumed as a primitive rule, but it can be proved to be admissible in G0K.
In general, a rule R with premises S1, . . . , Sn and conclusion S is admissible in a
system G if, whenever an istance of S1, . . . , Sn is derivable in G, the corresponding
istance of S is derivable in G. The presence of contraction complicates the proof
of cut admissibility. Already Gentzen met the problem of finding a suitable per-
mutation of cut and contraction in the proof of the Hauptsatz for LK. If the right
premise of cut is derived by contraction, the permutation of cut and contraction
does not guarantees that the istance of cut is admissible by the inductive hypoth-
esis. The solution proposed by Gentzen is to consider a version of cut that permits
to eliminate m > 1 occurrences of the cut formula. Then it is proved that the calcu-
lus with multicut is equivalent to the calculus with cut, that is, they derive exactly
the same sequents. For details of the Hauptsatz with multicut see Takeuti (1987)
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and for a proof without multicut see von Plato (2001a). The system G0K is strictly
similar to the unlabelled system G0c of Negri and von Plato 2001. The translation
of natural deduction rules into sequent calculus rules are discussed at length in
the introductory chapter of Negri and von Plato (2011).
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Chapter2
Cut Elimination
The aim of this chapter is to find a labelled sequent calculus in which all the struc-
tural rules (weakening and contraction) are admissible and cut is eliminable. Se-
quent systems in which cut is eliminable permit to find derivations in a systematic
way and to check whether a sequent Γ→ ∆ is derivable by a root-first proof search
procedure: given Γ → ∆, we can decompose its formulas and get simpler sequents
until we arrive at sequents in which there is nothing to decompose left. However,
the possibility of building a derivation starting from the sequent to be derived rests
not only on cut elimination, but also on the possibility to apply logical rules back-
wards. This is to say that the logical rules must be invertible: from the derivabil-
ity of the conclusion of an inference rule, the derivability of its premises follows.
The property of inversion has been first isolated by Ketonen (see Ketonen 1944
and von Plato 2009 for historical backgrounds) and can be achieved for classical
propositional logic by considering all the two-premise rule in their context-sharing
formulation. The rules with independent context are similar to (and derived di-
rectly from) those of natural deduction but they do not support proof search. The
context-independent rules impose that we know how the contexts in the conclusion
should be divided in the premises. However, when we search for a derivation we
do not divide the context at all but repeat it fully in both premises. Therefore rules
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R∧, L∨ and L ⊃ become:
Γ→ ∆, x : B Γ→ ∆, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∧ B R∧
x : A, Γ→ ∆ x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ∨ B, Γ→ ∆ L∨
Γ→ ∆, x : A x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆ L⊃
Also for the two-premise modal rules L0 and R♦0 a context-sharing formulation
is possible.
Γ→ ∆, xRy y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, Γ→ ∆ L0
Γ→ ∆, xRy Γ→ ∆, y : A
Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A R♦0
Moreover, instead of two rules for right disjunction we can consider a single rule,
which restores the duality between ∧ and ∨
Γ→ ∆, x : A, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∨ B R∨
In the presence of weakening, contraction, and the rules of G0K, these new rules
are derivable. For instance, the new R∨ is derivable by contraction and the previ-
ous R∨, indicated as R∨′′.
→ x : A, x : B
→ x : A ∨ B, x : B R∨′′
→ x : A ∨ B, x : A ∨ B R∨′′
→ x : A ∨ B R-C
The latter derivation is similar to that of the law of excluded middle given in the
previous chapter, but using R∨, the law of excluded middle can be derived without
any application of contraction and, more importantly, a systematic proof-search
procedure from the conclusion becomes possible
x : A→ x : A
→ x : A, x : ¬A R¬
→ x : A ∨ ¬A R∨
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In fact, contraction can be as “bad” as cut as for as the problem of finding deriva-
tions as concerned: reading contraction bottom-up (from the conclusion to the
premise), formulas in the antecedent are multiplied with no end. Proof search
is irremediably lost as long as contraction is primitive and not admissible in our
system. The rules of weakening become admissible when initial sequents and L⊥
are formulated in a form that allows both left and right contexts.
x : A, Γ→ ∆, x : A xRy, Γ→ ∆, xRy
x : ⊥, Γ→ ∆ L⊥
In this way, weakening is built into initial sequents: consider the derivation of the
a fortiori law of the previous chapter and note that the application of weakening
can be dispensed with because x : A, x : B→ x : A is an initial sequent and should
not be derived from x : A → x : A. However, initial sequents should be modified
further. Note that in the formulation above initial sequents can have x : A and
xRy as principal formulas, where x : A is an arbitrary labelled formula and xRy a
relational atom. Actually, the latter can be left out, provided that the modal rules
with xRy in the succedent are replaced by rules in which xRy appears only in the
antecedent. This can be achieved by considering the following rule L1 (resp. R♦1)
instead of L0 (resp. R♦0)
y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L1
Γ→ ∆, y : A
xRy, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A R♦1
It easy to show that L1 is derivable in the presence of L0 and initial sequents
with xRy as principal formulas, as follows
xRy, Γ→ ∆, xRy y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L0
Analogously, R♦1 is derivable in the presence of R♦0 and relational initial sequents
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xRy, Γ→ ∆, xRy Γ→ ∆, y : A
xRy, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A R♦0
Viceversa, L0 is derivable in the presence of L1 and cut
Γ→ ∆, xRy
y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L1
x : A, Γ→ ∆ CUT
Analogously, R♦0 is derivable in presence of R♦1 and cut
Γ→ ∆, xRy
Γ→ ∆, y : A
xRy, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A R♦1
Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A CUT
When L0 is replaced with L1 and R♦0 with R♦1, no rule of G0K removes a
relational atom xRy from the succedent and initial sequents with xRy as principal
formulas can be left out. Moreover, there is no need to impose that initial sequents
x : A, Γ → ∆, x : A have an arbitrary labelled formula as principal: we can limit
ourselves to atomic initial sequents and prove that arbitrary ones are derivable
(Lemma 2.1.1). Thus, from now on the only initial sequents we will consider are
those of the form x : P, Γ → ∆, x : P, where x : P is a labelled atom. With such
sequents as initial we will able to prove a stronger result concerning invertibil-
ity: not only the inverse rules are admissible but also their application does not
increase the height of the derivation.
Contraction is more complicated to build in. Its admissibility requires the invert-
ibility of the logical rules. Although explained in greater details in the following
Lemma 2.1.5, the proof of contraction admissibility consists in showing that every
application of contraction can be reduced to an application on smaller formulas,
until it acts only on atoms. In order to see how invertibility permits the admissibil-
ity of contraction, consider a derivation in which the last step is by an application
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of contraction and one of the occurrences of the contracted formula is concluded by
an invertible logical rule
....
x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆, x : A
....
x : A ⊃ B, x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ⊃ B, x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆ L⊃
x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆ L-C
Suppose that L ⊃ is invertible. Therefore, from the derivability of its premises it
follows that the sequents Γ → ∆, x : A, x : A and x : B, x : B, Γ → ∆ are derivable,
and contraction can be applied on the smaller formulas x : A and x : B. Then, an
application of L ⊃ gives x : A ⊃ B, Γ → ∆. However, not every rule considered so
far is invertible. In particular, L1 and R♦1 are not invertible. Thus, we follow the
method adopted in Kleene (1952) for intuitionistic logic where L ⊃ is not invert-
ible with respect to its left premise, and we repeat the principal formulas in the
premise. In this way, from L1 and R♦1 we obtain the rules L and R♦ of Negri
(2005)
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L
xRy, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A, y : A
xRy, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A R♦
Thus, L are and R♦ are strictly cumulative and their invertibility follows triv-
ially from admissibility of weakening. Following the terminology of Troelstra and
Schwichtenberg (2000), we shall call the system just outlined G3K. Although both
G3K and the system of Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000, pp. 284–8) are G3-
systems for modal logic, G3K is labelled.
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Logical rules of G3K
x : P, Γ→ ∆, x : P x : ⊥, Γ→ ∆ L⊥
x : A, x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ∧ B, Γ→ ∆ L∧
Γ→ ∆, x : B Γ→ ∆, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∧ B R∧
x : A, Γ→ ∆ x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ∨ B, Γ→ ∆ L∨
Γ→ ∆, x : A, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∨ B R∨
Γ→ ∆, x : A x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆ L⊃
x : A, Γ→ ∆, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ⊃ B R⊃
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L
xRy, Γ→ ∆, y : A
Γ→ ∆, x : A R
xRy, y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : ♦A, Γ→ ∆ L♦
xRy, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A, y : A
xRy, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A R♦
G3K has no structural rule as primitive because they are built in the logical rules.
Therefore we do not assume any structural rule but we prove their admissibility
in G3K. Given that relational atoms xRy can occur only in the antecedent, we
need not take into account the structural rules with such atom as principal in the
succedent, but only the following
Γ→ ∆
x : A, Γ→ ∆ L-W
Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x : A R-W
Γ→ ∆
xRy, Γ→ ∆ L-W
x : A, x : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, Γ→ ∆ L-C
Γ→ ∆, x : A, x : A
Γ→ ∆, x : A R-C
xRy, xRy, Γ→ ∆
xRy, Γ→ ∆ L-C
In contrast with G0K, we assume cut as a primitive rule in G3K and we shall
give a proof of cut elimination, rather than cut admissibility. Consequently, in
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the proof of the cut-elimination theorem we do not assume that in a given deriva-
tion there is at most one istance of cut, but we permit that the derivations of the
premises of cut can contain, in turn, other applications of cut. When cut is explic-
itly present in the system, it can be formulated as the other two-premise rule, that
is, with shared contexts.
Cut rule of G0K
Γ→ ∆, x : C x : C, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ CUT
2.1 Admissibility of the structural rules
We said that the most important property of G3K is that all the structural rules
are admissible in it. Recall that admissibility in a system G corresponds to the
possibility of finding, for every derivation in G with some application of an infer-
ence rule R, a new derivation of the same conclusion in which all the applications
of R can be dispensed with. In addition, weakening and contraction are height-
preserving admissible, that is, whenever their premises are derivable, the conclu-
sion is also derivable with derivation height bounded by the derivation height of
the premise.
Measure of derivations
Before going into the details of the structural properties of G3K, we need to pro-
vide a precise definition of formal derivation in G3K and introduce the two main
parameters, the height and the rank, by means of which they are measured.
Definition (G3K-derivation). A derivation in G3K is either an initial sequent, or
an instance of L⊥, or an application of a logical rule to the derivation(s) concluding
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its premise(s). A sequent Γ → ∆ is derivable in G3K if there exists a derivation d
for it. This is indicated by
d ` Γ→ ∆
In some cases it is useful to reason inductively on the the height of a formula which
is the length of the longest branch of its construction tree, minus 1.
Definition (Formula-height). The height h of A is defined inductively.
h(P) = h(⊥) = 0;
h(◦A) = h(A) + 1, when ◦ is ,♦;
h(A ◦ B) = max(h(A), h(B)) + 1, when ◦ is ∧,∨,⊃.
The height of a labelled formula x : A is defined as the height of A and relational
atoms xRy have height 0.
Example. The height of ¬P ⊃ (Q ∨ ¬R) is 3 and its construction tree is
¬P ⊃ Q ∨ ¬R
¬P
P
Q ∨ ¬R
Q ¬R
R
There is another parameter that measures derivations in G3K and we call it the
rank of a derivation. Derivation rank measures the height of cut formulas and it
is defined as the smallest n ∈ N such that every cut formula x : C in d has height
< n. It follows that a derivation with rank 0 is a derivation without cuts, and
conversely. The inductive definitions of derivation height and rank are as follows:
Definition (Derivation-height). The height h of d is defined inductively.
If d is an initial sequent or a conclusion of L⊥ then h(d) = 0;
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If the last rule of d is a one-premise rule R then h(d) = h(d′) + 1, where d′ is the
derivation of the premise of R;
If the last rule of d is a two-premise rule R then h(d) = max(h(d′), h(d′′)) + 1, where
d′ and d′′ are the derivations of the premises of R.
Definition (Derivation-rank). The rank r of d is defined by induction.
If d is an initial sequent or a conclusion of L⊥ then r(d) = 0;
If the last rule of d is a one-premise rule R then r(d) = r(d′), where d′ is the deriva-
tion of the premise of R;
If the last rule of d is a two-premise rule R other than cut then r(d) = max(r(d′), r(d′′)),
where d′ and d′′ are the derivations of the permises of R;
If the last rule of d is cut then h(d) = max(r(d′), r(d′′), (h(x : C) + 1)), where d′ and
d′′ are the derivations of the premises of cut and x : C is the cut formula.
Notational convention. By writing
d ` Γ n−→
p
∆
we shall indicate that d is a derivation of Γ → ∆ and that h(d) 6 n, r(d) 6 p.
Moreover, ` Γ n−→
p
∆ (or even Γ n−→
p
∆) means that there is a derivation d such that
d ` Γ n−→
p
∆. Thus, the parameter n (resp. p) is considered as an upper bound of the
height (resp. of the rank) of d. Note that according to this notational convention
we have that for every n 6 n′ and p 6 p′, if d ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then d ` Γ n′−→
p′
∆. In what
follows we frequently make (tacit) use of this fact.
Example. Suppose ` 2−→
1
x : (P ∧Q) and recall that h(x : (P ∧Q)) = 2. Then the
following derivation has height 4 and rank 3.
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2−→
1
x : (P ∧Q)
y : P, y : Q, xRy, x : (P ∧Q) 0−→
0
y : P
y : P ∧Q, xRy, x : (P ∧Q) 1−→
0
y : P
L∧
xRy, x : (P ∧Q) 2−→
0
y : P
L
x : (P ∧Q) 3−→
0
x : P
R
4−→
3
x : P
CUT
Arbitrary initial sequents
Derivations in G3K start with initial sequents with atoms as principal formulas.
The reason why it is preferable to have atomic initial sequents is that it guaran-
tees height-preserving invertibility of all the logical rules (cf. Lemma 2.1.5) and
this is needed in order to prove that contraction is an admissible rule (cf. Theo-
rem 2.1.6). For instance, by allowing general initial sequents as primitive, height-
preserving invertibility of R would fail. However, even if we take as primitive
initial sequents with atomic formulas as principal, it is possible to prove that ini-
tial sequents with arbitrary formulas are derivable in G3K.
Lemma 2.1.1. In G3K it holds that
` x : A, Γ 2·h(A)−−−→
0
∆, x : A
for every labelled formula x : A.
Proof. By induction on h.
If h = 0 then A is P and the claim holds, since x : P, Γ → ∆, x : P is initial. Else, A
is ⊥ and again x : ⊥, Γ→ ∆, x : ⊥ is derivable because it is a conclusion of L⊥.
If h = k+ 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for h = k and
prove that it holds also for h = k+ 1. We argue by distinction of cases according to
x : A.
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If x : A is x : B ∧ C we find a derivation of x : B ∧ C, Γ→ ∆, x : B ∧ C as follows.
x : B, x : C, Γ
2·h(B)−−−→
0
∆, x : B x : B, x : C, Γ
2·h(C)−−−→
0
∆, x : C
x : B, x : C, Γ
max(2·h(B),2·h(C))+1−−−−−−−−−−−−→
0
∆, x : B ∧ C
R∧
x : B ∧ C, Γ max(2·h(B),2·h(C))+2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
0
∆, x : B ∧ C
L∧
where the topmost sequents are derivable by IH, since h(B), h(C) < h(B ∧ C).
Moreover, max(2 · h(B), 2 · h(C)) + 2 = 2 · (max(h(B), h(C)) + 1) = 2 · h(B ∧ C).
If x : A is x : B ∨ C then sequents as x : B ∨ C, Γ→ ∆, x : B ∨ C are derivable by
x : B, Γ
2·h(B)−−−→
0
∆, x : B, x : C x : C, Γ
2·h(C)−−−→
0
∆, x : B, x : C
x : x : B ∨ C, Γ max(2·h(B),2·h(C))+1−−−−−−−−−−−−→
0
∆, x : B, x : C
L∨
x : B ∨ C, Γ max(2·h(B),2·h(C))+2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
0
∆, x : B ∨ C
R∨
where the topmost sequents are derivable by IH, since h(B), h(C) < h(B ∨ C). As
above, max(2 · h(B), 2 · h(C)) + 2 = 2 · h(B ∨ C).
If x : A is x : B ⊃ C the sequent x : B ⊃ C, Γ → ∆, x : B ⊃ C has the following
derivation.
x : B, Γ
2·h(B)−−−→
0
∆, x : B, x : C x : B, x : C, Γ
2·h(C)−−−→
0
∆, x : C
x : B ⊃ C, x : B, Γ max(2·h(B),2·h(C))+1−−−−−−−−−−−−→
0
∆, x : C
L⊃
x : B ⊃ C, Γ max(2·h(B),2·h(C))+2−−−−−−−−−−−−→
0
∆, x : B ⊃ C
R⊃
where the topmost sequents are derivable by IH, since h(B), h(C) < h(B ⊃ C) and
max(2 · h(B), 2 · h(C)) + 2 = 2 · h(B ⊃ C).
If A is B we have a derivation of x : B, Γ→ ∆, x : B as follows
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y : B, xRy, x : B, Γ 2·h(B)−−−→
0
∆, y : B
xRy, x : B, Γ 2·h(B)+1−−−−−→
0
∆, y : B
L
x : B, Γ 2·h(B)+2−−−−−→
0
∆, x : B
R
where the topmost sequent is derivable by IH, since h(B) < h(B). Moreover,
2 · h(B) + 2 = 2 · (h(B) + 1) = 2 · h(B).
If A is ♦B we have a derivation of x : ♦B, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦B as follows
xRy, y : B, Γ
2·h(B)−−−→
0
∆, x : ♦B, y : B
xRy, y : B, Γ
2·h(B)+1−−−−−→
0
∆, x : ♦B
R♦
x : ♦B, Γ 2·h(B)+2−−−−−→
0
∆, x : ♦B
L♦
where the topmost sequent is derivable by IH, since h(B) < h(♦B) and, as above,
h(B) + 2 = 2 · h(♦B).

In the proof of the cut-elimination theorem we also need the following result which
states that formulas such as x : ⊥ can be freely removed when occurring in the
succedent.
Lemma 2.1.2. In G3K it holds that
If ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : ⊥ then ` Γ n−→
p
∆
Proof. By induction on n.
If n = 0 then Γ → ∆, x : ⊥ is initial or conclusion of L⊥, then either Γ and ∆ have
an atom in common, or u : ⊥ is in Γ. In either case, Γ → ∆ is initial or conclusion
of L⊥.
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If n = k+ 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for n = k and
prove that it holds also for k+ 1. Consider the rule R that concluded Γ → ∆, x : ⊥.
Apply IH on its premise(s) and the conclusion follows by an application R. Note
that x : ⊥ is never principal because no rule introduces x : ⊥ in the succedent. For
instance, when R is R,
....
uRv, Γ k−→ ∆′, x : ⊥, v : A
Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, x : ⊥, u : A
R
where v does not appear in the conclusion. By IH on the premise uRv, Γ k−→ ∆′, v : A
and by R again Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : A. The other cases are analogous.

Substitution of labels
Owing to the presence of labels in the language, there is a strong analogy between
G3K and systems for predicate logic. Labels in G3K, as well as free variables in
predicate logic, can be replaced and the replacement does not increase the height
and the rank of the derivation (cf. the analogous result Lemma 4.1.2 in Negri
and von Plato 2001). Moreover, substitution of labels is essential in the proof of
admissibility of the necessitation rule of the basic modal logic.
Definition (Substitution). The substitution of labels in relational atoms and la-
belled formulas is defined by cases:
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(xRy)[z/w] ≡ xRy if w 6= x and w 6= y
(xRy)[z/x] ≡ zRy if x 6= y
(xRy)[z/y] ≡ xRz if x 6= y
(xRx)[z/x] ≡ zRz
(x : A)[z/y] ≡ x : A if y 6= x
(x : A)[z/x] ≡ z : A
and it is extended to multisets thereof componentwise.
Lemma 2.1.3. The substitution of labels is height- and rank-preserving admissible
in G3K, i.e.
If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` Γ[y/x] n−→
p
∆[y/x]
for every label x and y.
Proof. By induction on n.
If n = 0 then Γ→ ∆ is initial or conclusion of L⊥ and so is Γ[y/x]→ ∆[y/x].
If n = k+ 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for n = k and
prove that it holds also for n = k+ 1. We distinguish the following cases, according
to the last rule R of d. First, we deal with propositional rules and modal rules
without variable condition, that is L and R♦, and then with modal rules with
eigenvariable. When R is not cut the parameter p is omitted in order to simplify
the notation. As for the propositional rules we deal only with the ∧-rules, the other
cases being analogous, and we go into all the details when R is a modal rule.
If R is a propositional rule then the lemma is proved by applying IH on the premise
of R and then R again. Suppose R is L∧ and its principal formula is labelled by u.
Then the derivation ends with
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....
u : B, u : C, Γ k−→ ∆
u : B ∧ C, Γ k+1−−→ ∆
L∧
By IH on the premise of L∧ we obtain
(u : B)[y/x], (u : C)[y/x], Γ[y/x] k−→ ∆[y/x]
An application of L∧ gives the desired conclusion. When R is R∧ and its principal
formula is labelled by u, the last step of the derivation is
....
Γ k−→ ∆, u : B
....
Γ k−→ ∆, u : C
Γ k+1−−→ ∆, u : B ∧ C
R∧
A new derivation is found by applying IH on both the premises of R∧
Γ[y/x] k−→ ∆[y/x], (u : B)[y/x] and Γ[y/x] k−→ ∆[y/x], (u : C)[y/x]
and by another application of R∧ we obtain the conclusion.
If R is a modal rule without variable condition then the case is similar to that of
propositional rules. Suppose the last step of the derivation is by L:
....
v : B, u : B, uRv, Γ′ k−→ ∆
u : B, uRv, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
L
An application of IH on the premise gives
(v : B)[y/x], (u : B)[y/x], (uRv)[y/x], Γ′[y/x] k−→ ∆[y/x]
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and the claim holds by another application of L.
When R is R or L♦, that is, a modal rule with variable condition some care is
needed in order to avoid clash of labels. If R is R we have several subcases,
according to the eigenvariable of R: it could be either x, or y, or else some z
distinct from x and y. In the first case, the principal formula cannot be labelled by
x and x does not appear in Γ and ∆ because of the variable condition: therefore the
substitution is vacuous because there is no occurrence of x. In the second case, if y
is the eigenvariable and the principal formula is labelled by x we have a derivation
the last step of which is
....
xRy, Γ k−→ ∆, y : B
Γ k+1−−→ ∆, x : B
R
where y does not appear in the conclusion. Replacing directly x with y would make
R inapplicable, therefore we need to replace by IH the eigenvariable y with a new
label z.
xRz, Γ k−→ ∆, z : B
Note that by the variable condition this substitution does not involve formulas in
Γ,∆. Now by applying IH once again:
yRz, Γ[y/x] k−→ ∆[y/x], z : B
and finally the rule R in order to conclude
Γ[y/x] k+1−−→ ∆[y/x], y : B
The case in which the principal formula is labelled by a variable other that x is
analogous. In the third case neither x nor y is the eigenvariable. Suppose the
42
principal formula is labelled by u, so the derivation is
....
uRv, Γ k−→ ∆, v : B
Γ k+1−−→ ∆, u : B
R
By IH we have
(uRv)[y/x], Γ[y/x] k−→ ∆[y/x], (v : B)[y/x]
and, consequently, by R, we obtain the desired conclusion. The case of L♦ is
similar to R.
If R is cut with u : C as principal formula and h(u : C) < p then
....
Γ k−→
p
∆, u : C
....
u : C, Γ k−→
p
∆
Γ k+1−−→
p
∆
CUT
By applying IH on its premises of cut
Γ[y/x] k−→
p
∆[y/x], (u : C)[y/x] and Γ[y/x] k−→
p
∆[y/x], (u : C)[y/x]
and the claim holds by another application of cut.
Γ[y/x] k+1−−→
p
∆[y/x]

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Admissibility of weakening
The calculus G3K is closed under weakening, that is if a sequent Γ → ∆ is deriv-
able then x : A, Γ→ ∆, Γ→ ∆, x : A, and xRy, Γ→ ∆ are derivable. In addition, the
height and the rank of the derivation are preserved.
Theorem 2.1.4. Weakening is height- and rank-preserving admissible in G3K, i.e.
i) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` x : A, Γ n−→
p
∆
ii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A
iii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆
Proof. By induction on n.
If n = 0 then Γ → ∆ is initial or conclusion of L⊥ and so are x : A, Γ → ∆ and
Γ→ ∆, x : A and xRy, Γ→ ∆.
If n = k+ 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for n = k and
prove that it holds also for k+ 1. We distinguish the following cases, according to
the last rule R applied.
If R is propositional rule or a modal rule without variable condition, apply IH on
the premise(s) of R and then R again. For instance, if R is L∧ then Γ is u : B ∧ C, Γ′
and the last step of the derivation is
....
u : B, u : C, Γ′ k−→ ∆
u : B ∧ C, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
L∧
By the IH we have
i) x : A, u : B, u : C, Γ′ k−→ ∆
ii) u : B, u : C, Γ′ k−→ ∆, x : A
iii) xRy, u : B, u : C, Γ′ k−→ ∆
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from which by L∧ conclude
i) x : A, u : B ∧ C, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
ii) u : B ∧ C, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆, x : A
iii) xRy, u : B ∧ C, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
The proof is analogous when R is one of the other one-premise propositional rule,
i.e. when it is R∨ and R ⊃.
If R is R∧ then ∆ is ∆′, u : B ∧ C and the derivation ends with
....
Γ k−→ ∆′, u : B
....
Γ k−→ ∆′, u : C
Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B ∧ C
R∧
By IH we have
i) x : A, Γ k−→ ∆′, u : B and x : A, Γ k−→ ∆′, u : C
ii) Γ k−→ ∆′, u : B, x : A and Γ k−→ ∆′, u : C, x : A
iii) xRy, Γ k−→ ∆′, u : B and xRy, Γ k−→ ∆′, u : C
and by R∧ we conclude
i) x : A, Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B ∧ C
ii) Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B ∧ C, x : A
iii) xRy, Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B ∧ C
Analogously, when R is a two-premise rule, i.e. L∨, L ⊃ and cut.
If R is a modal rule without the variable condition, say L, then Γ is u : B, uRv, Γ′
and last step of the derivation is
....
v : B, u : B, uRv, Γ′ k−→ ∆
u : B, uRv, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
L
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By IH we have
i) x : A, v : B, u : B, uRv, Γ′ k−→ ∆
ii) v : B, u : B, uRv, Γ′ k−→ ∆, x : A
iii) xRy, v : B, u : B, uRv, Γ′ k−→ ∆
and another application of L yields
i) x : A, u : B, uRv, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
ii) u : B, uRv, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆, x : A
iii) xRy, u : B, uRv, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
When R is a modal rule with variable condition then we need to replace the eigen-
variable with a label z not occurring in Γ,∆′ and distinct from x and u. Suppose
that the last step of the derivation is by R and its eigenvariable is x. Then ∆ is
∆′, u : B, and the derivation ends with
....
uRx, Γ k−→ ∆′, x : B
Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B
R
We apply Lemma 2.1.3 on the premise in order to replace x with a new variable z.
uRz, Γ k−→ ∆′, z : B
and then IH
i) x : A, uRz, Γ k−→ ∆′, z : B
ii) uRz, Γ k−→ ∆′, z : B, x : A
iii) xRy, uRz, Γ k−→ ∆′, z : B
Given that z does not appears anywhere else but in the principal formulas of R
we conclude by R
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i) x : A, Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B
ii) Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B, x : A
iii) xRy, Γ k+1−−→ ∆′, u : B

Inversion Lemma
All the rules of G3K are invertible with the preservation of height and rank. In-
vertibility is needed in order to prove admissibility of contraction and it is funda-
mental for a systematic proof-search procedure.
Lemma 2.1.5. All the rules of G3K are height- and rank-preserving invertible, i.e.
i) If ` x : A ∧ B, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` x : A, x : B, Γ n−→
p
∆
ii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A ∧ B then ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A and d ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : B
iii) If ` x : A ∨ B, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` x : A, Γ n−→
p
∆ and d ` x : B, Γ n−→
p
∆
iv) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A ∨ B then ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A, x : B
v) If ` x : B ⊃ C, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : B and ` x : C, Γ n−→
p
∆
vi) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : B ⊃ C then ` x : B, Γ n−→
p
∆, x : C
vii) If ` x : A, xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆
viii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A then ` xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆, y : A, for every y
ix) If ` xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆, x : ♦A then ` xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆, x : ♦A, y : A
x) If ` x : ♦A, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` xRy, y : A, Γ n−→
p
∆, for every y
Proof. For the propositional rules we consider in detail only case v, all the other
being analogous. The proof is by induction on n. As usual, we leave out the param-
eter p when the cut rule is not explicitly applied.
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If n = 0 then x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆ is initial or conclusion of L⊥; then both Γ→ ∆, x : A
and x : B, Γ → ∆ are initial or conclusion of L⊥. Note that the claim holds for the
base case only if initial sequents are assumed to have atoms as principal formulas.
If n = k + 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for n = k
and prove that it holds also for k + 1. If x : A ⊃ B, Γ k+1−−→ ∆ has been derived by
L ⊃ with x : A ⊃ B as principal formula then we have a derivation of Γ k−→ ∆, x : A
and x : B, Γ k−→ ∆, so the claim holds also for n = k + 1. If x : A ⊃ B, Γ k+1−−→ ∆ is
conclusion of a rule different from L ⊃ or has been concluded by L ⊃ with principal
formula distinct from the displayed occurrences of x : A ⊃ B, then we apply IH to
the premise(s) x : A ⊃ B, Γ′ k−→ ∆′ (and x : A ⊃ B, Γ′′ k−→ ∆′′) in order to obtain
Γ′ k−→ ∆′, x : A and x : B, Γ′ k−→ ∆′ (and Γ′′ k−→ ∆′′, x : A and x : B, Γ′′ k−→ ∆′′); then by
an application of R we can conclude Γ k+1−−→ ∆, x : A (and x : B, Γ k+1−−→ ∆).
For the modal cases (vii – x), we distinguish rules in which the principal formulas
are repeated in the premise from those without repetition. L (resp.R♦) of case vii
(resp. ix) is invertible because the conclusion can be derived from its premise by
an application of weakening which is admissible by Lemma 2.1.4. On the contrary,
modal rules with variable condition as R (resp. L♦) corresponding to viii (resp. x)
is proved to be height- and rank-preserving invertible by induction on n. Consider
case viii. If n = 0 then Γ → ∆, x : A is initial or conclusion of L⊥; then so is
xRy, Γ → ∆, y : A. If n = k+ 1, assume by IH that the claim holds for n = k and
prove that it holds also for k+ 1. If Γ k+1−−→ ∆, x : A is concluded by R with x : A
as principal formula then there is a label z not occurring in Γ,∆ and different from
x such that xRz, Γ k−→ ∆, z : A. By an application of the Lemma 2.1.3 we obtain that
for every y, it holds that xRy, Γ k−→ ∆, y : A and the claim holds by IH. On the other
hand, if it has been derived by a rule R or by R with principal formula different
from x : A, then we can apply IH, but some care is needed when R is in turn a
modal rule with variable condition. For instance, suppose that Γ k+1−−→ ∆, x : A
is the conclusion of L♦ with principal formula u : ♦B then we have the following
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derivation
....
uRv, v : B, Γ k−→ ∆, x : A
u : ♦B, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆, x : A
L♦
We want to prove xRy, x : ♦B, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆, y : A for every y. If v, the eigenvariable
of L♦, is different from y then we apply IH on the premise and obtain the sequent
xRy, uRv, v : B, Γ k−→ ∆, y : A and the conclusion is obtained by L♦ again. Other-
wise, if v is y we need Lemma 2.1.3 on the premise of L♦ in order to replace the
eigenvariable y with a new z
uRz, z : B, Γ′ k−→ ∆, x : A
Now, by IH we obtain
xRy, uRz, z : B, Γ′ k−→ ∆, y : A
and then by L♦ again
xRy, u : ♦B, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆, y : A

Admissibility of contraction
In this section we shall prove that contraction is admissible with the preservation
of the height and the rank of derivations. This result, as we have already said, is
fundamental for the proof-search in G3K.
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Theorem 2.1.6. Contraction is height- and rank-preserving admissible in G3K,
i.e.
i) If ` x : A, x : A, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` x : A, Γ n−→
p
∆
ii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A, x : A then ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A
iii) If ` xRy, xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` xRy, Γ n−→
p
∆
Proof. By simultaneous induction on n.
If n = 0 then x : A, x : A, Γ → ∆ (resp. Γ → ∆, x : A, x : A) is initial or conclusion of
L⊥. In both cases also x : A, Γ → ∆ (resp. Γ → ∆, x : A) is initial or conclusion of
L⊥.
If n = k + 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for n = k
and prove that it holds also for k + 1. We distinguish two cases: if none of the
contraction formulas is principal in the last rule, then both occurrences are in the
premise(s) and we apply IH to the premise(s) and then the rule. If one of the
contraction formulas is principal, we first apply Lemma 2.1.5 to the premise(s), IH
and then the rule. The latter case has three subcases: if R is a propositional rule,
say L ⊃, then x : A is x : B ⊃ C and the derivation ends with
....
x : B ⊃ C, Γ k−→ ∆, x : B
....
x : B ⊃ C, x : C, Γ k−→ ∆
x : B ⊃ C, x : B ⊃ C, Γ k+1−−→ ∆
By applying Lemma 2.1.5, item v, we obtain
Γ k−→ ∆, x : B, x : B and x : C, x : C, Γ k−→ ∆
By IH for left and right contraction simultaneously we conclude
Γ k−→ ∆, x : B and x : C, Γ k−→ ∆
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and by L ⊃ we have a derivation of the desired conclusion
x : B ⊃ C, Γ k+1−−→ ∆
In the case of right contraction we start from
....
x : B, Γ k−→ ∆, x : C, x : B ⊃ C
Γ k+1−−→ ∆, x : B ⊃ C, x : B ⊃ C
R⊃
By Lemma 2.1.5, item vi, we have
x : B, x : B, Γ k−→ ∆, x : C, x : C
from which by IH simultaneously for left and right contraction and L ⊃ we con-
clude
Γ k+1−−→ ∆, x : B ⊃ C
If R is L or R♦ the proof is straightforward because the principal formula is
repeated in the premises and IH can be applied directly without any appeal to
invertibility. For instance, suppose we have a derivation of a sequent with two
occurrences of x : A and one of them is the principal formula of an application of
L, i.e.
....
y : B, x : B, x : B, xRy, Γ′ k−→ ∆
x : B, x : B, xRy, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
L
Given that the principal formula x : B appears also in the premise we can apply
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directly IH
y : B, x : B, xRy, Γ′ k−→ ∆
from which by L again
x : B, xRy, Γ′ k+1−−→ ∆
If R is a modal rule with variable condition, i.e. R or L♦, the last step of the
derivation is
....
xRy, y : B, x : ♦B, Γ k−→ ∆
x : ♦B, x : ♦B, Γ k+1−−→ ∆
L♦
By Lemma 2.1.5, item x, on the premise of L♦ we obtain
xRy, y : B, xRy, y : B, Γ k−→ ∆
in order to make IH applicable
xRy, y : B, Γ k−→ ∆
Then, by L♦ again we get
x : ♦B, Γ k+1−−→ ∆

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2.2 Cut elimination
In this section we shall indicate the system G3K with cut as G3KC and we shall
prove that in G3KC the cut-elimination theorem holds. Furthermore, our aim is
to take into account the problem of the rate of growth of derivations during cut
elimination. In particular, this proof shows that there is a hyperexponential
upper bound on growth of derivations under the procedure of cut elimination,
that is, when a derivation is converted into a cut-free one the latter is at most
hyperexponentially heigher than the former. This bound is calculated following
the proof of cut elimination for first order logic in Schwichtenberg (1977). However,
we argue that this bound is not sharp and that a better result might be achieved
by a modification of the rule L.
Definition (Hyp2). Let 2k :N2 −→N be a function defined recursively as
20(m) = m and 2k+1(m) = 22k(m)
2k is called hyperexponential function (with base 2).
Observation. The argument k of 2k refers to the height of the “exponentiation
tower”. In fact, 2k(m) is 22
. . .
2m︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
. Moreover, it is easy to see that 2k increases fast:
20(0) = 0; 21(0) = 1; 22(0) = 2; 23(0) = 4; 24(0) = 16; 25(0) = 65.536; . . .
A property of the hyperexponential functions we shall use in the following is:
Proposition 2.2.1. For any k,m ∈N it holds that
2k+1(m) = 2k(2m)
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Main Lemma
The following lemma shows that cuts can be permuted upward in a derivation until
they reach an initial sequent or a conclusion of L⊥. The proof presents the deriva-
tion transformations that are at the core of the original Gentzen’s Hauptsatz and
in the proof of cut admissibility of Negri (2005), with two basic differences. First,
the cut here considered is context sharing, that is, the context in premises of cut is
the same. Secondly, in the proof of cut admissibility of Negri (2005) and in Negri
and von Plato (2001, 2011) the topmost cut of a given derivation is considered, and
it is shown that this choice is not restrictive. In the following proof instead we deal
with the case in which derivations of the premises of cut can in turn contain other
applications of cut.
Lemma 2.2.2 (Main Lemma). Let d1 and d2 be two derivations in G3KC such that
d1 ` Γ n−→p ∆, x : C and d2 ` x : C, Γ
m−→
p
∆
and let h(x : C) = p. Then there is a derivation d G3KC such that
d ` Γ n+m−−→
p
∆
Observation. Obviously, the conclusion Γ→ ∆ could be easily derived by cut. How-
ever, the derivation d we obtain in this way would be of height max(n,m) + 1 and
rank p+ 1, because h(x : C) = p by hypothesis. The Lemma says that the rank can
be reduced from p+ 1 to p, provided that the height increases sufficiently. In fact,
max(n,m) + 1 6 n+m for n,m 6= 0.
Proof. By induction on n+m. The proof follows the pattern:
1. Either d1 or d2 is initial or conclusion of L⊥:
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(a) d1 is initial or conclusion of L⊥;
(b) d2 is initial or conclusion of L⊥.
2. Neither d1 nor d2 is initial or conclusion of L⊥ and:
(a) x : C is not principal in d1;
(b) x : C is not principal in d2;
(c) x : C is principal both in d1 and d2.
Case 1a
Suppose that d1 is an initial sequent or a conclusion of L⊥. There are three sub-
cases:
If x : C is principal then C is an atom P and Γ is x : P, Γ′. In this case take d2
x : P, x : P, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
The two occurrences of x : P can be contracted by Theorem 2.1.6, thus
x : P, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
and so, also x : P, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆.
If x : C is not principal then Γ and ∆ have an atom in common, say x : P. Therefore,
the conclusion x : P, Γ′ → ∆′, x : P has height 0 and so x : P, Γ′ n+m−−→ ∆′, x : P.
If d1 is conclusion of L⊥ then x : ⊥ is in Γ and also the conclusion x : ⊥, Γ′ → ∆ is
derivable.
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Case 1b
Suppose that d2 is an initial sequent or a conclusion of L⊥ and consider the follow-
ing subcases.
If d2 is an initial sequent and x : C is principal then C is atomic and the atom x : P
is in ∆. In this case, from d1
Γ n−→
p
∆′x : P, x : P
we obtain
Γ n−→
p
∆′, x : P
by admissibility of contraction (Theorem 2.1.6).
If x : C is not principal then Γ and ∆ have an atom in common and also the conclu-
sion x : P, Γ′ 0−→ ∆′x : P is derivable because initial.
If d2 is conclusion of L⊥ then either x : ⊥ is in Γ or it is x : C. In the first case, the
conclusion x : ⊥, Γ′ 0−→ ∆ is derivable because it is concluded by L⊥. In the second
case take d1 which is
Γ n−→
p
∆, x : ⊥
and apply Lemma 2.1.2 in order to conclude Γ n−→
p
∆, and so also Γ n+m−−→
p
∆.
Case 2a
If d1 is neither an initial sequent nor a conclusion of L⊥, consider first of all the
case in which d1 is concluded by a rule R1 with x : C not principal. There are as
many cases as istances of R1.
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If R1 is a one-premise propositional rule, say L∧, then Γ is u : A ∧ B, Γ′ and d1 is
....
u : A, u : B, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
u : A ∧ B, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : C
L∧
First, take d2
x : C, u : A ∧ B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
and apply inversion of L∧ (Lemma 2.1.5, item i) in order to obtain
x : C, u : A, u : B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
and then find a derivation d of u : A ∧ B, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆ as follows
u : A, u : B, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C x : C, u : A, u : B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
u : A, u : B, Γ′
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
u : A ∧ B, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆
L∧
The cases of the other propositional one-premise rules, i.e. R∨ and R ⊃, are analo-
gous.
Let R1 be a two-premise rule as L ⊃. Then Γ is u : A ⊃ B, Γ′ and d1 is
....
Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, u : A, x : C
....
u : B, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
u : A ⊃ B, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : C
L⊃
Also in this case, take d2
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x : C, u : A ⊃ B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
and apply Lemma 2.1.5, item v, giving
x : C, Γ′ m−→
p
∆, u : A and x : C, u : B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
Then find a derivation d of u : A ⊃ B, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆ as follows
Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, u : A, x : C x : C, Γ′ m−→
p
∆, u : A
Γ′
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆, u : A
IH
u : B, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C x : C, u : B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
u : B, Γ′
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
u : A ⊃ B, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆
L⊃
Analogously for other two-premise rules as R∧ and L∨.
When R1 is a modal rule the proof follows the pattern of other one-premise rules.
For instance, suppose R1 is L then Γ is uRv, u : B, Γ′ and d1 is
....
v : B, uRv, u : B, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
uRv, u : B, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : C
L
Find a derivation d of uRv, u : B, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
as follows
v : B, uRv, u : B, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
x : C, uRv, u : B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
x : C, v : B, uRv, u : B, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
L-W
v : B, uRv, u : B, Γ′ (n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
uRv, u : B, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆
L
If R1 is R then ∆ is ∆′, u : B and d1 is
58
uRv, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆′, v : B, x : C
Γ n−→
p
∆′, u : B, x : C
R
with the condition that v is not in the conclusion of R. Then we find a derivation
d of Γ n+m−−→
p
∆′, u : B as follows. By INV we refer to an application of Lemma 2.1.5.
uRv, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆′, v : B, x : C
x : C, Γ m−→
p
∆′, u : B
x : C, uRv, Γ m−→
p
∆′, v : B
INV
uRv, Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆′, v : B
IH
Γ n+m−−→
p
∆′, u : B
R
The last case is when R1 is cut on a formula u : B different from the displayed x : C
and h(x : B) < p. Then d1 is
....
Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C, u : B
....
u : B, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
Γ n−→
p
∆, x : C
CUT
We find a derivation d of Γ n+m−−→
p
as follows. Consider the following two derivations.
The first one takes d2 and applies admissibility of weakening (Lemma 2.1.4) in
order to make IH applicable on the left premise of cut.
Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C, u : B
x : C, Γ m−→
p
∆
x : C, Γ m−→
p
∆, u : B
R-W
Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆, u : B
IH
The second derivation is similar. It takes d2 and applies admissibility of weakening
so that IH can be applied on the right premise of cut.
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u : B, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
x : C, Γ m−→
p
∆
u : B, x : C, Γ m−→
p
∆
L-W
u : B, Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
Finally, take the conclusion of the two derivations and apply cut in order to get the
conclusion Γ n+m−−→
p
∆.
Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆, u : B u : B, Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
Γ n+m−−→
p
∆
CUT
Case 2b
Similar to 2a.
Case 2c
When the cut formula x : C is principal in both d1 and d2 we consider what is x : C.
If x : C is x : A ∧ B then d1 and d2 are
....
Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : A
....
Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : B
Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A ∧ B
R∧
....
x : A, x : B, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : A ∧ B, Γ m−→
p
∆
L∧
Find d as follows
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Γ m−1−−→
p
∆, x : B
Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : A
x : B, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : A
L-W
x : A, x : B, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : B, Γ
max(n,m)−−−−−→
p
∆
CUT
Γ
max(m,max(n,m)+1)−−−−−−−−−−−→
p
∆
CUT
Note that max(m,max(n,m) + 1) = max(n,m) + 1 and then the height of the con-
clusion is max(n,m) + 1. As noted above, when m and n are are greater than 0 then
max(n,m) + 1 6 n+m. Therefore, we have also Γ n+m−−→ ∆. Moreover, the rank is p
because h(x : A), h(x : B) < p = h(x : A ∧ B).
If x : C is x : A ∨ B then d1 and d2 are
....
Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : A, x : B
Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A ∨ B
R∨
....
x : A, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
....
x : B, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : A ∨ B, Γ m−→
p
∆
L∨
Find d as follows
Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : A, x : B
x : A, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : A, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆, x : B
R-W
Γ
max(n,m)−−−−−→
p
∆, x : B
CUT
x : B, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
Γ
max(max(n,m)+1,m)−−−−−−−−−−−→
p
∆
CUT
As above, the height of derivation of the conclusion is max(n,m) + 1 and therefore
Γ n+m−−→
p
∆. Moreover, h(x : A), h(x : B) < p = h(x : A ∨ B) and so the rank is p.
If x : C is x : A ⊃ B then d1 and d2 are
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....
x : A, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : B
Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A ⊃ B
R⊃
....
Γ m−1−−→
p
∆, x : A
....
x : B, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : A ⊃ B, Γ m−→
p
∆
L⊃
Find d as follows
Γ m−1−−→
p
∆, x : A
x : A, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : B
x : B, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : B, x : A, Γ m−1−−→
p
∆
L-W
x : A, Γ
max(n,m)−−−−−→
p
∆
CUT
Γ
max(m,max(n,m)+1)−−−−−−−−−−−→
p
∆
CUT
Again, the height of derivation of the conclusion is max(n,m) + 1, so Γ n+m−−→
p
∆.
Furthermore, the rank of d is p because h(x : A), h(x : B) < p = h(x : A ⊃ B).
If x : C is x : A then Γ is xRy, Γ′ and d1 and d2 are
....
xRz, xRy, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, z : A
xRy, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : A
R
....
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ′ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : A, xRy, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
L
where z is not in the conclusion of R. First, consider the two following deriva-
tions. The first, has as premises the conclusion of R (with a weakening for match-
ing the contexts) and the premise of L. The derivation uses IH in order to keep p
as rank. Note that by applying cut instead IH we would have rank p+ 1 because
of the cut on h(x : A) = p.
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xRy, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : A
y : A, xRy, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : A
L-W
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ′ m−1−−→
p
∆
y : A, xRy, Γ′
n+(m−1)−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
In the second derivation, Lemma 2.1.3 is applied in order to replace z with y in the
premise of R. Note that z is eigenvariable and so the substitution does not affect
the context.
xRz, xRy, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, z : A
xRy, xRy, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, y : A
y/z
xRy, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, y : A
L-C
Then, by applying cut on their conclusions we obtain
xRy, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
,∆, y : A y : A, xRy, Γ′
n+(m−1)−−−−−→
p
∆
xRy, Γ′
max(n−1,n+(m−1))+1−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
p
∆
CUT
Now, max(n− 1, n+ (m− 1)) + 1 = max(n, n+m) = n+m because n,m 6= 0. More-
over, the rank is p because cut applies on a formula smaller than x : A. Therefore,
we conclude xRy, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆.
If x : C is x : ♦A then Γ is xRy, Γ′ and d1 and d2 are
....
xRy, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : ♦A, y : A
xRy, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : ♦A
R♦
....
z : A, xRz, xRy, Γ′ m−1−−→
p
∆
x : ♦A, xRy, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
L♦
where z is not in the conclusion of L♦. As above, consider the following partial
derivations.
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xRy, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : ♦A, y : A
x : ♦A, xRy, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
x : ♦A, xRy, Γ′ m−→
p
∆, y : A
R-W
xRy, Γ′
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆, y : A
IH
and
z : A, xRz, xRy, Γ′ m−1−−→
p
∆
y : A, xRy, xRy, Γ′ m−1−−→
p
∆
y/z
y : A, xRy, Γ′ m−1−−→
p
∆
L-C
By applying cut on the conclusions we obtain
xRy, Γ′
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆, y : A y : A, xRy, Γ′ m−1−−→
p
∆
xRy, Γ′
max((n−1)+m,m−1)+1−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
p
∆
CUT
Once again, height of the derivation is max((n − 1) + m,m − 1) + 1 = n + m and
rank p because h(y : A) < h(x : ♦A).

Observation. In the proof we often use height and rank preserving invertibility of
the logical rules. However, the invertibility can be avoided and the derivation con-
versions can be obtained by an application of weakening and contraction which are
height and rank preserving admissible by Theorems 2.1.4 and 2.1.6. The choice of
applying the Inversion Lemma 2.1.5 is due to the fact that in this way all the ap-
plications of contraction have atomic formulas x : P and xRy as principal formulas.
In fact, the only applications of contraction admissibility required are that of the
case 1a when one of the premise of cut is an initial sequent and the cut formula
x : P is principal in it, and that of the case 2b in which the cut formula is a modal
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formula x : A and it is principal in both premises of cut. In the latter, contraction
applies on two occurrences of xRy. Thus, there is no need to prove admissibility of
contraction for arbitrary formulas and the proof of Theorem 2.1.6 can be restricted
to the case in which contracted formulas are either propositional x : P or relational
atoms xRy.
Rank reduction Lemma
In the previous lemma, it is shown that if the premises of cut are derivable then
the conclusion of cut is also derivable, and the height and the rank can be kept
constant. Now, we prove that every derivation of a sequent Γ → ∆ can be trans-
formed into a derivation of the same sequent in which the rank of derivations can
be reduced. However, the height increases from m to 2m.
Lemma 2.2.3 (Rank Reduction). Every derivation d in G3KC such that
d ` Γ m−−→
p+1
∆
can be converted into a derivation d∗ such that
d∗ ` Γ 2m−→
p
∆
Proof. By induction on m.
If m = 0 then d is an initial sequent or conclusion of L⊥. In both cases, we take
d∗ := d and we have d∗ ` Γ 20=1−−→
p
∆.
If m = k + 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for m = k
and prove that it holds also for k + 1. We argue by distinction of cases according
to the last rule R of d. In all cases d∗ is found by applying IH on the premise(s) of
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R and then R again, the only exception being that of cut rule with cut formula of
rank p when we need Lemma 2.2.2.
If R is a one-premise rule, say L, then Γ is x : A, xRy, Γ′ and d ends with
....
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ′ k−−→
p+1
∆
x : A, xRy, Γ′ k+1−−→
p+1
∆
L
Find d∗ as follows
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ′ k−−→
p+1
∆
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ′ 2
k−→
p
∆
IH
x : A, xRy, Γ′ 2
k+1−−→
p
∆
L
Given that 2k + 1 6 2k+1, we can conclude also x : A, xRy, Γ′ 2
k+1−−→
p
∆.
If R is R then ∆ is ∆′, x : A and d is
....
xRy, Γ k−−→
p+1
∆, y : A
Γ k+1−−→
p+1
∆′, x : A
R
where y is not in the conclusion of R. Find d∗ as follows
xRy, Γ k−−→
p+1
∆, y : A
xRy, Γ 2
k−→
p
∆′, y : A
IH
Γ 2
k+1−−→
p
∆′, x : A
R
Therefore d∗ ` Γ′ 2k+1−−→
p
∆, x : A.
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If R is a two-premise rule as L ⊃ we have that x : A ⊃ B, Γ′ and d is
....
Γ′ k−−→
p+1
∆, x : A
....
x : B, Γ′ k−−→
p+1
∆
x : A ⊃ B, Γ′ k+1−−→
p+1
∆
L⊃
and it can be converted into d∗ as follows
Γ′ k−−→
p+1
∆, x : A
Γ′ 2
k−→
p
∆, x : A
IH
x : B, Γ′ k−−→
p+1
∆
x : B, Γ′ 2
k−→
p
∆
IH
x : A ⊃ B, Γ′ 2k+1−−→
p
∆
L⊃
As above, d∗ ` x : A ⊃ B, Γ′ 2k+1−−→
p
∆.
The case in which R is cut is straightforward when cut formula has height < p and
follows the same pattern of two-premise rules. The most important case is when R
is cut and height of cut formula is p, i.e. h(x : C) = p
Γ k−−→
p+1
∆, x : C x : C, Γ k−−→
p+1
∆
Γ k+1−−→
p+1
∆
CUT
By applying IH on the premises of cut we obtain
Γ 2
k−→
p
∆, x : C and x : C, Γ 2
k−→
p
∆
At this point we use the Main Lemma 2.2.2 in order to get
Γ 2
k+1−−→
p
∆
since 2k + 2k = 2(2k) = 2k+1.
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Cut-free derivations
The final step of cut elimination consists in showing that any istance of cut can
be dispensed with, that is, every derivation with rank p can be converted into a
derivation with rank 0. We will show that the procedure of cut elimination has as
consequence an hyperexponential growth of the derivation.
Theorem 2.2.4 (Cut elimination). In G3KC cut is eliminable, i.e. every derivation
d such that
d ` Γ n−→
p
∆
can be converted into a derivation d− such that
d− ` Γ 2p(n)−−−→
0
∆
Proof. By induction on p.
If p = 0 then d has no cuts and we can take d as d−.
If p = k+ 1 assume by inductive hypothesis (IH) that the claim holds for p = k and
prove that it holds also for p = k+ 1. Thus from
d ` Γ n−−→
k+1
∆
we find d− by applying the rank reduction Lemma 2.2.3:
d− ` Γ 2n−→
k
∆
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Now, by IH
d− ` Γ 2k(2
n)−−−→
0
∆
By Proposition 2.2.1 we have 2k(2n) = 2k+1(n) and therefore
d− ` Γ 2k+1(n)−−−−→
0
∆

Observation. We return to the role of contraction in the proof of cut elimination. We
have seen that rule L (resp. R♦) is trivially invertible, once one has shown that
weakening is admissible: since principal formulas x : A, xRy (resp. xRy, x : ♦A)
are repeated, the inversion of L (resp. R♦) holds by Theorem 2.1.4. Therefore,
contraction is admissible (Theorem 2.1.6) without any use of inversion (Lemma
2.1.5) of L (resp. R♦). This is to say, the repetition of principal formulas builds
contraction into the logical rules. In fact, when the rule without repetition is con-
sidered, i.e. L1
y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L1
the standard L becomes derivable by a step of contraction. The double infer-
ence line indicates repeated applications of the structural rules of weakening or
contraction.
y : A, x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L1
x : A, xRy, Γ→ ∆ L-C
The difference between L and L1 is that L derives basic theorems of modal
logic without any application of contraction, whereas with L1 these applications
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are unavoidable. For example, to derive x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P → x : Q with L1
contraction is essential.
y : P→ y : Q, y : P y : Q, y : P→ y : Q
y : P ⊃ Q, y : P→ y : Q L⊃
xRy, y : P ⊃ Q, x : P→ y : Q L1
xRy, xRy, x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P→ y : Q L1
xRy, x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P→ y : Q C
x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P→ x : Q R
The situation is analogous in first-order logic to the derivation of the sequent
→ ∃x(Px ⊃ ∀yPy), where a contraction on ∃x(P(x) ⊃ ∀yP(y)) is required if R∃
is without repetition of the principal formula. On the contrary, using L any ap-
plication of contraction can be dispensed with and the above derivation can be
found by applying a systematic proof-search from the sequent to be derived. How-
ever, on a closer inspection the application of contraction in the above derivation
has xRy as principal formula, whereas in L both x : A and xRy are repeated
in the premise. Therefore, we consider a new left rule for  where the relational
atom xRy, but not x : A, is repeated in the premise.
xRy, y : A, Γ→ ∆
xRy, x : A, Γ→ ∆ L2
Still, the standard L is derivable from L2 by contraction
y : A, xRy, x : A, Γ→ ∆
x : A, xRy, x : A, Γ→ ∆ L2
xRy, x : A, Γ→ ∆ L-C
In contrast to L1, L2 proves x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P → x : Q without any
contraction. In fact,
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y : P, xRy→ y : Q, y : P y : Q, xRy, y : P→ y : Q
xRy, y : P ⊃ Q, y : P→ y : Q L⊃
xRy, y : P ⊃ Q, x : P→ y : Q L2
xRy, x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P→ y : Q L2
x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P→ x : Q L⊃
Therefore, if we take L1 as primitive, we need primitive contraction as well oth-
erwise the calculus is not complete: as we have shown, there is a valid sequent
which is not derivable without contraction, i.e. x : (P ⊃ Q), x : P → x : Q.
However, we conjecture that the repetition of x : A in the the premise of L is
not needed in G3K. In other words, we could take L2 as primitive instead of L,
and still have a cut-free and complete system. However, like L1, rule L2 is not
invertible and this constitutes a serious obstacle to the proof of contraction admis-
sibility: if the principal formula x : A is not available in the premise, there is no
immediate method of converting a derivation of
....
xRy, x : A, y : A, Γ→ ∆
xRy, x : A, x : A, Γ→ ∆ L2
xRy, x : A, Γ→ ∆ L-C
into a derivation in which contraction is applied to smaller formulas.
2.3 Correspondence with an axiomatic system
The system G3K corresponds to the Hilbert system K of the basic modal logic.
All the axioms of K are derivable and its rules are admissible in G3K, so K ⊆
G3K. Along with completeness of K, admissibility of rules of K and derivability
of K axioms give an indirect completeness proof for G3K. The full correspondence
between G3K and K with the soundness of G3K rules (see Lemma 2.4.1). We recall
that the standard presentation of an axiomatic system consists of all the axioms
71
of the classical propositional logic (A1) together with the distributivity axiom (A2)
and the axiom of duality between modal operators (A3). The rules are the modus
ponens and the generalization of . For a detailed exposition see from Hughes and
Cresswell (1996).
A1 All the axioms of propositional logic PC
A2 (A ⊃ B) ⊃ A ⊃ B Distributivity
A3 ♦A ⊃⊂ ¬¬A Duality
R1 From Γ ` A ⊃ B and ∆ ` A infer Γ,∆ ` B Modus Ponens
R2 From ` A infer ` A Necessitation
Since, the system G3K allows a systematic proof-search procedure, a derivation
for each axiom of the Hilbert-style system can be systematically found.
Lemma 2.3.1. All the axioms (rules) of K are derivable (resp. admissible) in G3K.
Proof. By a systematic proof-search procedure from the sequent to be derived. The
axioms of PC are derivable straightforwardly. The distributivity axiom A2 has the
following derivation
y : A, xRy, x : (A ⊃ B), x : A→ y : B, y : A y : A, y : B, xRy, x : (A ⊃ B), x : A→ y : B
y : A, y : A ⊃ B, xRy, x : (A ⊃ B), x : A→ y : B L⊃
xRy, x : (A ⊃ B), x : A→ y : B L
x : (A ⊃ B), x : A→ x : B R
→ x : (A ⊃ B) ⊃ A ⊃ B R⊃
Note that topmost sequents are derivable by Lemma 2.1.1. The duality axiom A3
is derivable by
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xRy, y : A, x : ¬A→ y : A
y : ¬A, xRy, y : A, x : ¬A→ L¬
xRy, y : A, x : ¬A→ L
x : ♦A, x : ¬A→ L♦
x : ♦A→ x : ¬¬A R¬
→ x : ♦A ⊃ ¬¬A R⊃
y : A, xRy→ x : ♦A, y : A
xRy→ x : ♦A, y : ¬A, y : A R¬
xRy→ x : ♦A, y : ¬A R♦
→ x : ♦A, x : ¬A R
x : ¬¬A→ x : ♦A L¬
→ x : ¬¬A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
Once again, topmost sequents are derivable by Lemma 2.1.1. Modus ponens (R1)
is proved to be admissible by cut as follows
∆→ x : A
Γ,∆→ x : B, x : A R-W
Γ→ x : A ⊃ B
Γ,∆→ x : A ⊃ B L-W
x : A, Γ,∆→ x : B INV
Γ,∆→ x : B CUT
The admissibility of necessitation (R2) requires admissibility of substitution (Lemma
2.1.3).
→ x : A
→ y : A y/x
xRy→ y : A L-W
→ x : A R
Note that admissibility of necessitation requires essentially the use of substitution
of labels which is admissible by Lemma 2.1.3. 
2.4 Completeness
There are three main methods for proving the completeness theorem of a sequent
system: One is the indirect method that establishes an equivalence with an ax-
iomatic system known to be complete with respect to a certain class of frames. The
second is through Henkin sets with the canonical frame construction, and the third
by a direct method that shows how root-first proof search in the sequent system
either gives a proof or leads to a countermodel. The results of the previous section
73
correspond to the first method for proving the completeness theorem: the sequent
system we have presented for modal logic is closed under the rules of modus po-
nens and necessitation and permits to derive the axioms of a standard axiomatic
presentation. In this section, we follow the proof of Negri (2009) and we prove
that G3K is complete by the method that will permit proofs of underivability and
constructions of countermodels. First, we recall the definitions of frame and model
from previous sections, suitably adapted for the mono-modal logic.
Definition (Frame). A frame is a structure F = 〈X,R〉 where X is a non-empty set
and R is a binary relation on X.
Definition (Model). A model is a structure M = 〈F,〉 where F is a frame and 
is a binary relation between elements of X and atomic formulas P.
The relation  is extended in a unique way to arbitrary formulas by means of the
following clauses
x  ⊥ for no x
x  A ∧ B if and only if x  A and x  B
x  A ∨ B if and only if x  A or x  B
x  A ⊃ B if and only if x  A implies x  B
x  A if and only if for all x, xRy implies y  A
x  ♦A if and only if for some y, xRy and y  A
Definition (Interpretation). Let L be the set of labels. An interpretation of labels
in a frame F is a function J·K : L −→ X that assigns a possible state JxK of F to each
label x in L, and the accessibility relation R of F to the relational symbol R.
Definition (Validity in a model). A sequent Γ→ ∆ is valid in a modelM if for every
interpretation it holds that whenever for all labelled formulas x : A and relational
atoms yRz in Γ, JxK  A and JyKRJzK hold, then for some w : B in ∆, JwK  B.
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Definition (Validity). A sequent Γ→ ∆ is valid when it is valid in every model.
Before proving the completeness of G3K, we show that it is sound, that is in G3K
are derivable only valid sequents.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Soundness of G3K). If Γ→ ∆ is derivable G3K then it is valid.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ→ ∆.
If Γ → ∆ is initial then Γ and ∆ have an atom in common x : P and the claim is
obvious; similarly if Γ→ ∆ is a conclusion of L⊥ since no x can force ⊥.
If Γ → ∆ is a conclusion of a propositional or modal rule assume by inductive
hypothesis (IH) that its premise(s) is (are) valid and prove that also the conclusion
is. We distinguish the following cases according to the last rule applied. If it is L∧
then the derivation ends with
....
x : A, x : B, Γ′ → ∆
x : A ∧ B, Γ′ → ∆ L∧
Assume by IH the validity of the premise, the validity of the conclusion follows
since JxK  A and JxK  B is equivalent to JxK  A ∧ B.
If Γ→ ∆ is a conclusion of L ⊃ then the derivation ends with
....
Γ′ → ∆, x : A
....
x : B, Γ′ → ∆
x : A ⊃ B, Γ′ → ∆ L⊃
By IH the premises are valid. If the left premise is valid then either JxK  A or
JwK  C, for some w : C in ∆. In the latter case, the conclusion is valid. If the right
premise is valid then for all v : D in Γ′ JvK  D and JxK  B. Then JxK  A ⊃ B and
the conclusion is valid too.
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The situation is analogous for the other propositional rules. If Γ → ∆ is a conclu-
sion of a modal rule, say L♦, then the last step of the derivation is
....
xRy, y : A, Γ′ → ∆
x : ♦A, Γ′ → ∆ L♦
Assume by IH that the premise is valid. Let J·K be an arbitrary interpretation that
validates all the formulas in Γ′, x : ♦A. We claim that one of the formulas in ∆
is valid under this interpretation. Since JxK  ♦A, we can choose an element k of
X such that JxKRk and k  A. Let J·K′ be the interpretation identical to J·K except
possibly on y, for which we set JyK′ = k. Clearly J·K′ validates all the formulas in
the antecedent of the premise, so it validates one formula in ∆. Since y does not
occur in ∆, also J·K validates one formula in ∆.

The completeness theorem is proved following the pattern of Negri (2009), in anal-
ogy with Kripke’s original proof (see Kripke 1963). Instead of Kripke’s proof, we
do not look for a failed search of a countermodel, but directly for a proof: To see
whether a formula is derivable, we check if it is universally valid, that is, if x  A
for an arbitrary state x. This is translated to a sequent → x : A. The rules of
G3K applied backwards give equivalent conditions until the atomic components of
A are reached. It can happen that we find a proof, or that we find that a proof does
not exist either because we reach a stage where no rule is applicable, or because
we go on with the search forever. In the two latter cases the attempt proof itself
gives a countermodel.
Theorem 2.4.2. For all Γ → ∆ in G3K either Γ → ∆ is derivable or it has a
countermodel.
Proof. We define for an arbitrary Γ → ∆ of G3K a reduction tree by applying the
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rules of G3K root first in all possible ways. If the construction terminates we
obtain a proof, else the tree becomes infinite. By König’s lemma an infinite tree
has an infinite branch that is used to define a countermodel to the end-sequent.
Construction of the reduction tree
The reduction tree is defined inductively in stages as follows: Stage 0 has Γ → ∆
at the root of the tree. Stage n > 0 has two cases:
CASE I: If every topmost sequent is initial or a conclusion of L⊥ the construction
of the tree ends.
CASE II: If not every topmost sequent is initial or a conclusion of L⊥, we continue
the construction of the tree by writing above those sequents that are not initial
nor a conclusion of L⊥, other sequents that are obtained by applying root first the
rules of G3K whenever possible, in a given order.
There are 10 different stages, 6 for propositional rules, 4 for modal rules. At stage
n = 11 we repeat stage 1, at stage n = 12 we repeat stage 2, and so on for every n.
Case of L∧. For each topmost sequent of the form
x1 : B1 ∧ C1, . . . , xm : Bm ∧ Cm, Γ′ → ∆
where B1 ∧ C1, . . . , Bm ∧ Cm are all the formulas in Γ with a conjunction as the
outermost logical connective, we write
x1 : B1, x1 : C1, . . . , xm : Bm, xm : Cm, Γ′ → ∆
on top of it. This step corresponds to applying root first m times rule L∧.
Case of R∧. For each topmost sequent of the form
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Γ→ ∆′, x1 : B1 ∧ C1, . . . , xm : Bm ∧ Cm
where B1 ∧ C1, . . . , Bm ∧ Cm are all the formulas in Γ with a conjunction as the
outermost logical connective, we write on top of it the 2m sequents
Γ→ ∆′, x1 : D1, . . . , xm : Dm
where Di is either Bi or Ci and all possible choices are taken.
Case of L∨. Analogous to R∧.
Case of R∨. Analogous to L∧.
Case of L ⊃. For each topmost sequent of the form
x1 : B1 ⊃ C1, . . . , xm : Bm ⊃ Cm, Γ′ → ∆
where B1 ⊃ C1, . . . , Bm ⊃ Cm are all the formulas in Γ with a conjunction as the
outermost logical connective, we write on top of it the 2m sequents
xi1 : Ci1 , . . . , xik : Cik , Γ
′ → ∆, xjk+1 : Bjk+1 , . . . , xjm : Bjm
where i1, . . . ik ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and kk+1, . . . im ∈ {1, . . . ,m}r {i1, . . . ik}. Although less
transparent, this step corresponds to the root-first application of rule L ⊃ with
principal formulas B1 ⊃ C1, . . . , Bm ⊃ Cm.
Case of R ⊃. For each topmost sequent of the form
Γ→ ∆′, x1 : B1 ⊃ C1, . . . , xm : Bm ⊃ Cm
where B1 ⊃ C1, . . . , Bm ⊃ Cm are all the formulas in Γ with a implication as the
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outermost logical connective, we write on top of it
x1 : B1, . . . , xm : Bm, Γ→ ∆, x1 : C1, . . . , xm : Cm ⊃ Cm
that is, we apply m time the rule R ⊃.
Case of L. For each topmost sequent of the form
x1 : B1, . . . , xm : Bm, x1Ry1, . . . , xmRym, Γ′ → ∆
where B1, . . . ,Bm are all the formulas with  as the outermost logical connec-
tive, we write on top of it
y1 : B1, . . . , ym : Bm, x1 : B1, . . . , xm : Bm, x1Ry1, . . . , xmRym, Γ′ → ∆
Case of R. For each topmost sequent of the form
Γ→ ∆′, x1 : B1, . . . , xm : Bm
we write on top of it
x1Ry1, . . . , xmRym, Γ→ ∆′, y1 : B1, . . . , ym : Bm
where y1, . . . , ym are fresh variables, not yet used in the reduction tree.
Case of L♦. Analogous to R.
Case of R♦. Analogous to L.
For any n, for each sequent that is neither initial, nor conclusion of L⊥, nor treat-
able by any one of the above reductions, we write the sequent itself above it. If the
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reduction tree is finite, all its leaves are initial or conclusions of L⊥, and the tree,
read from the leaves to the root, yields a derivation.
Construction of the countermodel
By König’s lemma, if the reduction tree is infinite, it has an infinite branch. Let
Γ0 → ∆0 ≡ Γ → ∆, Γ1 → ∆1, . . . , Γi → ∆i, . . . be one such branch. Consider the set
of labelled formulas and relational atoms
Γ ≡ ⋃
i≥0
Γi and ∆ ≡ ⋃
i≥0
∆i
We define a model that forces all formulas in Γ and no formula in ∆ and is therefore
a countermodel to the sequent Γ→ ∆.
Consider the frame F the elements of which are all the labels that appear in the
relational atoms in Γ, with their mutual relationship expressed by the xRy’s in Γ.
The model is defined as follows: For all atomic formulas x : P in Γ, we stipulate
that x  P in the frame F, and for all atomic formulas y : Q in ∆, we stipulate
that y 1 Q in F. Since no sequent in the infinite branch is initial, this choice can
be coherently made, for if there were the same labelled atom in Γ and in ∆, then,
since the sequents in the reduction tree are defined in a cumulative way, for some
i there would be a labelled atom x : P both in the antecedent and in the succedent
of Γi → ∆i.
We then show inductively on the structure of formulas that B is forced at x if x : B
is in Γ and B is not forced at x if x : B is in ∆. Therefore we have a countermodel to
the end-sequent Γ→ ∆.
If B is ⊥, it cannot be in Γ because no sequent in the branch contains x : ⊥ in the
antecedent, so it is not forced at any node of the model.
If x : B∧C is in Γ, there exists i such that x : B∧C appears first in Γi, and therefore,
for some j > 0, x : B and x : C are in Γi+j. By IH, x  B and x  C and therefore
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x  B ∧ C.
If x : B ∧ C is in ∆ consider the step i in of the reduction tree. This gives a branch-
ing, and one of the two branches belongs to the infinite branch, so either x : B or
x : C is in ∆. By IH, x 1 B or x 1 C and therefore x 1 B ∧ C.
The case of x : B ∨ C is in Γ is analogous to the case of x : B ∧ C is in ∆.
The case of x : B ∨ C is in ∆ is analogous to the case of x : B ∧ C is in Γ.
If x : B ⊃ C is in Γ, either x : B is in ∆ or x : C is in Γ. By IH, in the former case
x 1 B, and in the latter x  C, so in both cases x  B ⊃ C.
If x : B ⊃ C is in ∆, for some i, x : B is in Γi and x : C is in ∆i, so by IH x  B and
x 1 C, so x 1 B ⊃ C.
If x : B is in Γ, we consider all the relational atoms xRy that occur in Γ. If there is
no such atom, then the condition that for all y accessible from x in the frame, y  B
is vacuously satisfied, and therefore x  B in the model. Else, for any occurrence
of xRy in Γ we find, by the construction tree, an occurrence of y : B in Γ. By IH
y  B, and therefore x  B in the model.
If x : B is in ∆, consider the step at which the reduction for x : B applies. We
find y : B in ∆, for some y with xRy in Γ. By IH x 1 B, and therefore x 1 B.

Corollary 2.4.3 (Completeness of G3K). If a sequent Γ → ∆ is valid then it is
derivable in G3K.
The proof of the completeness theorem given in this section is close to Kripke’s orig-
inal argument but without any appeal to a geometric intuition. In fact, Kripke’s
proof was criticized since it makes appeal to intuitive arguments on the geometry
of tableau proofs and lacks the rigor of the alternative set-theoretic approach due
to Henkin. The proof can be extended to systems with mathematical for the acces-
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sibility relation R as the logic of knowledge and belief, and also to systems with
new modal operators as in the dynamic epistemic logic.
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Chapter3
Extensions of Labelled Sequent
Systems
This chapter is devoted to the labelled sequent systems for logics that extend basic
modal logic. In particular, our aim is to augment the set of the rules of G3K
and find cut-free systems equivalent to well-known systems for modal logics such
as T, S4, B, S5, D, etc. In the Hilbert-style approach various extensions of K
are obtained by simply adding new axioms. Thus, the system T is K together
with A ⊃ A (axiom T), system S4 is T plus A ⊃ A (axiom 4), and, B is
T with A ⊃ ♦A (axiom B). Finally, system S5 is T with ♦A ⊃ ♦A (axiom
5). Many other systems and axioms are known and we shall deal with them in
the following. For the time being, our aim is to follow the Gentzen-style tradition
and present extensions of G3K by new inference rules, rather than new axioms.
Sequent calculi equivalent to K, T, S4 and S5 are presented in Ono (1998) as
extensions of the original Gentzen’s system LK (without quantifiers rules). The
system GK is LK with the new rule 
Γ→ A
Γ→ A 
83
Γ denotes the list of all the A for A in Γ. Observe that when Γ is empty, rule
 is the rule of necessitation. When Γ is not empty, with the application of  all
formulas in Γ get prefixed by. This prevents the derivation of the invalid formula
A ⊃ A. A system for the modal logic T (G3T) is then obtained from GK by adding
the rule →
A, Γ→ ∆
A, Γ→ ∆ →
The rule permits to derive the axiom A ⊃ A. The system G3S4 is G3T plus the
following rule →1 (or, equivalently, LK with → and →1)
Γ→ A
Γ→ A →1
With this addition the corresponding axioms A ⊃ A is derivable. Finally,
GS5 is obtained from G3T and the following rule →2 (or, equivalently, LK with
→ and →2)
Γ→ ∆, A
Γ→ ∆,A →2
Note that →1 is a special case of→2 with ∆ empty. In fact, axiom 5, formulated
as ¬¬A ⊃ ¬¬A, is derivable as follows
¬A→ ¬A
→ ¬A,¬¬A R¬
→ ¬A,¬¬A →2
¬¬A→ ¬¬A L¬
→ ¬¬A ⊃ ¬¬A R⊃
Cut elimination holds for all the systems thus obtained (see also Ohnishi and Mat-
sumoto 1957), with the exception of G3S5. A simple counterexample is given by
the derivation of A ⊃ ♦A (axiom B) which is theorem of S5 but not derivable
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without cut in G3S5,
¬A→ ¬A
→ ¬¬A,¬A R¬
→ ¬¬A,¬A →2
A→ A
¬A, A→ L¬
¬A, A→ →1
A→ ¬¬A CUT
→ A ⊃ ¬¬A R⊃
More recently and also in view of the applications to automated deduction, G3-
systems have been preferred to the original Gentzen’s system LK which has all
the structural rules primitive. Thus, it is reasonable to start from the classical
multi-succedent sequent calculus G3c of Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000) (see
also Negri and von Plato 2001) in which all the structural rules are admissible and
all the logical rules are invertible. A cut-free system for the basic modal logic is
considered in Hakli and Negri (2011) and is obtained from G3c by the rule LR.
Γ→ A
Φ,Γ→ A,Ψ LR
The calculus with LR is proved to be equivalent to the axiomatic system K and
it is used to show that the standard argument in favor of the failure of deduction
theorem in modal logic is untenable. A sequent system for the modal logic S4 is
presented in Troelstra and Schwichtenberg (2000, ch. 9) by adding to G3c the
following rules for  and ♦, both taken as primitive:
Γ, A,A→ ∆
Γ,A→ ∆ L
Γ→ A,♦∆
Γ′,Γ→ A,♦∆,∆′ R
Γ, A→ ♦A
Γ′,Γ,♦A→ ♦∆,∆′ L♦
Γ→ A,♦∆,∆
Γ→ ♦A,∆ R♦
The calculus is used to prove that a variant of the Gödel embedding of intuition-
istic logic into modal logic S4 is faithful. However, having a weakening- and
contraction-free calculus does not solve the long-standing problem of cut elimi-
nation for S5. Nowadays, it is a common opinion that a satisfactory account of the
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modal logic S5 cannot be given within the traditional Gentzen systems. As noted
at the very beginning of Avron (1996, p. 3)
The framework of ordinary sequents is not capable of handling all inter-
esting logics. There are logics with nice, simple semantics and obvious
interest for which no decent, cut-free formulation seems to exist.
Therefore, alternative proof systems have been recently proposed in which the
syntax of the rules is enriched. The modifications come in two flavors. On the
one hand, it is possible to generalize sequent calculus so that the semantics is
made implicit part of a more structured syntax. Among the various proposal,
there is the hypersequent approach (see Avron 1996 for an overview). Roughly
speaking, hypersequents are multisets of sequents interpreted disjunctively. If
Γ1 → ∆1 . . . Γn → ∆n are sequents, an hypersequent is a syntactic object of the form
Γ1 → ∆1 | . . . | Γn → ∆n, where the standard interpretation of the | is disjunctive.
In Poggiolesi (2008) the following rules for the  operator, where G stands for an
arbitrary hypersequent, are introduced
G | A,A, Γ→ ∆
G | A, Γ→ ∆ A1
G | A, Γ→ ∆ | A, Γ′ → ∆′
G | A, Γ→ ∆ | Γ′ → ∆′ A2
G | Γ→ ∆ | → A
G | Γ→ ∆,A K
Informally, the rules can be read in terms of relational semantics: the ruleK says
that if A is false at the actual state then there is some possible state at which
A is false. The existence of such a state is achieved syntactically by inserting one
disjunct on the top of the hypersequent of the conclusion. Conversely, if A is
true at the actual state then A is true at every possible state (rule A2), includ-
ing the actual one (rule A1). The rules for other propositional connectives are
obvious and they do not change the hypersequents but only the formulas within
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the sequents. Moreover, the axiom A ⊃ ¬¬A which was problematic in the
traditional approach, has a simple cut-free derivation.
A→ A | ¬A→
A,¬A→ | ¬A→ ¬A
A→ | ¬A→ A1
A→ | → ¬¬A ¬K
A→ ¬¬A K
→ A ⊃ ¬¬A ⊃K
Systems alternative to hypersequents are carefully surveyed in Wansing (2002)
and they include Došen’s heigher-level sequent systems (see Došen 1985), or 2-
sequents systems (see Martini and Masini 1996), multiple-sequent systems of In-
drzejczak (1998), and others. More recently, systems of tree-sequents (see Cerrato
1996), tree-hypersequents of Poggiolesi (2009, 2010) and systems of deep inference
(see Stewart and Stouppa 2006, Brünnler 2009) have been proposed.
On the other hand, in the labelled approach we employed so far, the notion of
sequent is left untouched and the modal content is achieved by an explicit in-
ternalization of the relational semantics into the syntax of the rules. We already
discussed how the internalization works in the case of basic modal logic, and in the
rest of the chapter we show how to get labelled systems for various modal logics.
The underlying idea it that they are obtained by adding rules that correspond to
the properties of the accessibility relation. Therefore, the new rules do not act on
labelled formulas, but only on relational atoms and they do not directly correspond
to modal axioms, but to first order conditions on the accessibility relation. For in-
stance, instead of adding a sequent rule that corresponds directly to the axiom
A ⊃ A, we add a rule for reflexivity of R, ∀x(xRx). However, the correspondence
between modal axioms and frame properties does not solve at all the problem of
finding cut-free extensions of G3K. In fact, it does not matter whether axioms are
formulated in the language of modal logic or in that of first order logic. In either
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case, an immediate extension would cause the failure of cut elimination (see Gi-
rard 1987, p. 125). Therefore, before going into the details of modal systems, we
shall shortly outline the general problem concerning axioms and cut elimination.
3.1 Axioms in sequent calculus
In general, an axiom A is added in sequent calculus by permitting derivations to
start with the sequent → A. For instance, a sequent system for first order logic
with equality can be obtained by adding to G3c the reflexivity of equality and the
replacement schema in the form of sequents→ x = x and t = s, P(t)→ P(s), where
P is atomic. However, as a simple counterexample to cut elimination, consider that
the cut applied in the derivation of the symmetry of =, that is, → t = s ⊃ s = t
is not eliminable. Suppose that P(x) is the atom x = t (so, the instance of the
replacement schema is t = s, t = t → s = t), then there is no cut-free derivation of
symmetry,
→ t = t t = s, t = t→ s = t
t = s→ s = t CUT
→ t = s ⊃ s = t R⊃
Instead of axiomatic sequents, one may consider rules of inference. In particular,
one can replace → x = x with the following rule Re f=, and the rule schema Repl,
instead of the axiom schema t = s, P(t)→ P(s).
x = x, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ref=
P(s), Γ→ ∆
t = s, P(t), Γ→ ∆ Repl
′
Since the P can be any atomic formula, the latter rule schema specializes into the
following rule when the atom P(x) is x = t.
s = t, Γ→ ∆
t = s, t = t, Γ→ ∆ Repl∗
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Note that the axioms are derivable from the rules, and viceversa. Thus, assume
→ x = x and the premise of Re f=. Then the conclusion of Re f= is derivable by cut
as follows
→ x = x x = x, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ CUT
In the other direction, find a derivation of→ x = x by applying Re f= on the initial
sequent x = x → x = x:
x = x → x = x→ x = x Ref=
Also the replacement schema and the rules of replacement are derivable from each
other, as the following derivation show:
t = s, P(t)→ P(s) P(s), Γ→ ∆
t = s, P(t), Γ→ ∆ CUT
P(s)→ P(s)
t = s, P(t)→ P(s) Repl
′
However, axioms and rules are different with respect to the possibility of finding
a cut-free derivations. This is clear in our example of symmetry of equality, since
the sequent→ t = s ⊃ s = t is derivable without any application of cut:
s = t→ s = t
t = t, t = s→ s = t Repl∗
t = s→ s = t Ref=
→ t = s ⊃ s = t R⊃
Examples of failure of cut elimination arise also in modal logic. Observe that it is
possible to deal with the accessibility relation R of modal logic in the same way as
equality in first-order logic. Similarly to equality, the relation R can be assumed
to satisfy certain properties. Suppose that R is an equivalence relation, that is, it
is reflexive and euclidean. When these properties are considered as axioms of the
form→ xRx and xRy, xRz→ yRz the following derivation of the symmetry of R
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→ xRx xRy, xRx → yRx
xRy→ yRx CUT
has a cut that cannot be eliminated. Therefore, we can start from G3K and find
the sequent rule corresponding to the reflexivity and euclideaness of R
xRx, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ref
yRz, Γ→ ∆
xRy, xRz, Γ→ ∆ Eucl′
Once again, with Re f and Eucl′ the symmetry of R is derivable without cut:
yRx → yRx
xRy, xRx → yRx Eucl′
xRy→ yRx Ref
In contrast to Re f , rule Eucl′ reveals an important feature of the new rules, they
are “logic free”. The role of logical connectives in the axiom of euclideaness, that
is, ∧ and ⊃, is absorbed into the combinatorics of the rule: the role of conjunction
is played by the comma in the antecedent, that of implication by the inference
step. When rules such as Eucl′ are deprived of logical content, only relational
atoms appear as principal in them. This is the reason why these rules are called
mathematical or, more generally, non-logical inference rules. Another important
feature of mathematical rules is that they act only on one side of sequents. In this
formulation principal formulas of relational rules appear only in the antecedent,
but an equivalent system can be obtained with rules in which relational atoms
occur only in the succedent.
3.2 The method of axioms-as-rules
The above examples show only the idea of how to get sequent rules from axioms,
but this idea can be made precise and generalized so to get a systematic procedure.
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In Negri and von Plato (1998) a general method of adding axioms to sequent cal-
culus in the form of extra-logical inference rule while preserving cut elimination
is introduced (see also Negri and von Plato 2001, Ch. 6, for a detailed survey and
Negri and von Plato 2011 for further developments). This method covers specific
mathematical theories (apartness, order and lattice theories) and geometric theo-
ries (affine and projective geometry) and, besides, it successfully applies to modal
and non-classical logics in Negri (2005).
We start from the classical multi-succedent sequent calculus G3c and we use the
existence of conjunctive normal form in classical logic: every quantifier-free for-
mula is equivalent to some formula in conjunctive normal form, that is, to a con-
junction of disjunctions of atomic formulas or negation of atomic formulas. Within
each conjunct the positive atomic formulas can be separated from the negation of
atomic formulas
¬P1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Pm ∨Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qn
and this can be converted into the classically equivalent implication
P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pm ⊃ Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qn REG
Special cases are with m = 0, where REG reduces to Q1 ∨ · · · ∨Qn, and with n = 0
where REG is ¬(P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pm). The universal closure of this implication is called
a regular formula. Regular formulas can be converted into a sequent rule in two
ways. One is based on the idea that if each Qj together with other assumptions
Γ is sufficient to derive ∆, then the Pi’s together with Γ are sufficient to derive ∆.
Formally, it corresponds to the following rule schema, where the multiset P1, . . . , Pm
(resp. Q1, . . . ,Qn) is abbreviated in P (resp. Q).
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Q1, Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn, Γ→ ∆
P, Γ→ ∆ L-Reg
′
A dual schema is found if we start from the idea that if each Pi (together with ∆)
can be derived from Γ then also each Q (together with ∆) can be derived from Γ.
Γ→ ∆, P1 . . . Γ→ ∆, Pn
Γ→ ∆,Q R-Reg
′
In practice, regular rule schemata specialize in many rules, depending on the con-
text of application. We shall give some example of theories that extend system G3c
with the rules following the schema L-Reg′. We already considered the case of first
order logic with equality, where the relation = is reflexive. This corresponds to the
axiom of reflexivity ∀x(x = x) which is a special istance of REG, with m = 0 and
n = 1. In the theory of strict linear order atoms are of the form x < y and, unlike
=, the relation < is irreflexive. However, irreflexivity ∀x¬(x < x) is still a special
case of a regular formula, with m = 0 and n = 1. Thus, the rule of irreflexivity of
strict order is
x < x, Γ→ ∆ Irref<
The relation 6 in the theory of linear order satisfies the property expressed by the
axiom of linearity (or totality), ∀x∀y(x 6 y ∨ y 6 x). Once again, linearity is a
regular formula with m = 0 and n = 2. The corresponding rule is
x 6 y, Γ→ ∆ y 6 x, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Lin6
However, the schemata L-Reg′ and R-Reg′ do not satisfy the structural properties
usually required to G3-systems and must be augmented in order to have contrac-
tion admissible. Once again, the method of Kleene (1952) is followed and the prin-
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cipal formulas in the the conclusion of L-Reg′ are repeated in the premises. The
same holds for R-Reg′, mutatis mutandis, and the rule schemata take the form
Q1, P, Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn, P, Γ→ ∆
P, Γ→ ∆ L-Reg
Γ→ ∆,Q, P1 . . . Γ→ ∆,Q, Pm
Γ→ ∆,Q R-Reg
For the left schema, repetitions in the premises make left contraction commute
with rules following the schema, whereas admissibility of right contraction is not
problematic. This is reversed for the right rule schema. Moreover, it can happen
that instantiation of labels in atoms produces a duplication, so two identical atoms
are in the conclusion of a rule schema: P1, . . . , Pm−2, P, P, Γ → ∆. As every formula
in the conclusion is repeated in the premises, each premise has the duplication
of P to ensure the admissibility of contraction. We must require that the rule
with duplication P, P contracted into a single P is added to the system, that is, we
impose that the system satisfies the following closure condition.
Proposition 3.2.1 (Closure Condition). Given a system with rule following the
regular schema, if it has a rule where a substitution in the atoms produces a rule-
instance of the form
Q1, P1, . . . , Pm−2, P, P, Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn, P1, . . . , Pm−2, P, P, Γ→ ∆
P1, . . . , Pm−2, P, P, Γ→ ∆
then it also contains the rule
Q1, P1, . . . , Pm−2, P, Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn, P1, . . . , Pm−2, P, Γ→ ∆
P1, . . . , Pm−2, P, Γ→ ∆
Symmetrically, for the right rule schema, we have that a system containing a rule-
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instance of the form
Γ→ ∆,Q1, . . . ,Qn−2,Q,Q, P1 Γ→ ∆,Q1, . . . ,Qn−2,Q,Q, Pm
Γ→ ∆,Q1, . . . ,Qn−2,Q,Q
it also contains the rule
Γ→ ∆,Q1, . . . ,Qn−2,Q, P1 Γ→ ∆,Q1, . . . ,Qn−2,Q, Pm
Γ→ ∆,Q1, . . . ,Qn−2,Q
The condition is not problematic, since the number of rules to be added to a given
system is finite and often the closure condition is even superfluous, because the
contracted rule is already a rule of the system or admissible in it. It is clear
that universal axioms are derivable from the schema L-Reg (R-Reg), and that the
schema L-Reg (resp. R-Reg) is derivable from the corresponding axiom, using cut.
A detailed proof of admissibility of the structural rules and cut in the presence of
rules following the schema R-Reg or L-Reg can be found in Negri and von Plato
2001, pp. 131–34.
By the same method, it is possible to convert into rules also existential axioms, or,
more generally, axioms of the form of geometric implications. These are univer-
sal closures of implications A ⊃ B in which A and B do not contain implications
or universal quantifiers. Geometric implications can be turned in a useful normal
form that consists of conjunctions of formulas of the form
∀x(P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pm ⊃ ∃y1M1 ∨ · · · ∨ ∃ynMn) GEOM
In GEOM, each Pi is an atomic formula, each Mj a conjunction of a list of atomic
formulas Qj, and none of the variables in the vectors yj are free in Pi. In turn, each
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of these formulas can be turned into an inference rule of the following form:
Q1(z1/y1), P, Γ→ ∆ . . . Qn(zn/yn), P, Γ→ ∆
P, Γ→ ∆ L-Gen
The variables yi are called the replaced variables of the schema, and the variables
zi the proper variables, or eigenvariables. In what follows, we shall consider for
ease of notation the case in which the vectors of variables yi consist of a single
variable. The geometric rule schema is subject to the condition that the eigenvari-
ables must not be free in the conclusion of the rule, P, Γ,∆. In this way the rule
expresses in a logic-free way the role of the existential quantifier in a geometric
axiom. Cut elimination still holds in presence of rules following the general rule
schema and a detailed proof can be found in Negri (2003). An example of geometric
theory is Robinson arithmetic in which the induction schema of PA in replaced by
a weaker axiom: every number is either zero or it is a successor of some number,
that is, ∀x(x = 0∨ ∃y(x = s(y))). Robison’s axiom is a special case of GEOM, with
m = 0 and gets converted into
x = 0, Γ→ ∆ x = s(y), Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ RA
The rule must meet the variable condition that y must not appear in the conclu-
sion. Geometric formulas arise naturally also in modal logic. For instance, the
property of directedness of R, that is, ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ⊃ ∃w(yRw ∧ zRw)), is a
special case of GEOM with m = 2 and n = 1. The corresponding rule Dir must meet
the condition that w is the eigenvariable and it cannot appear in the conclusion
yRw, zRw, xRy, xRz, Γ→ ∆
xRy, xRz, Γ→ ∆ Dir
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3.3 From frame properties to sequent rules
In the light of the method of axioms-as-rules, modal logic is viewed as a mathe-
matical theory of the accessibility relation R and its axioms as the standard frame
conditions. In this perspective, reflexivity of R can be converted to a left (right)
rule following the schema L-Reg (resp. R-Reg).
xRx, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ L-Ref Γ→ ∆, xRx R-Ref
Next, the modal axioms of the various axiomatic systems become theorems of the
corresponding sequent calculus. Thus, in the presence of L-Re f (R-Re f ) the axiom
T is derivable. Observe that when the mathematical rules follow R-Reg, the modal
rules with relation atoms xRy in the succedent are needed, thus we shall use also
L0 and R♦0 of G0K, accordingly:
x : A, xRx, x : A→ x : A
xRx, x : A→ x : A L
x : A→ x : A L-Ref
→ x : A ⊃ A R⊃
→ xRx R-Ref x : A→ x : A
x : A→ x : A L0
→ x : A ⊃ A R⊃
In the same way, transitivity R corresponds to the following left (right) rule,
xRz, xRy, yRz, Γ→ ∆
xRy, yRz, Γ→ ∆ L-Trans
Γ→ ∆, xRz, xRy Γ→ ∆, xRz, yRz
Γ→ ∆, xRz R-Trans
And the axiom 4 has the following derivation by using L-Trans
z : A, xRz, xRy, yRz, x : A→ z : A
xRz, xRy, yRz, x : A→ z : A L
xRy, yRz, x : A→ z : A L-Trans
xRy, x : A→ y : A R
x : A→ x : A R
→ x : A ⊃ A R⊃
Otherwise, by R-Trans
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xRy, yRz→ xRz, xRy xRy, yRz→ xRz, yRz
xRy, yRz→ xRz R-Trans z : A→ z : A
xRy, yRz, x : A→ z : A L0
xRy, x : A→ y : A R
x : A→ x : A R
→ x : A ⊃ A R⊃
Finally, symmetry of R gets converted into
yRx, xRy, Γ→ ∆
xRy, Γ→ ∆ L-Sym
Γ→ ∆, xRy, yRx
Γ→ ∆, xRy R-Sym
and axiom B has the following derivations
yRx, xRy, x : A→ y : ♦A, x : A
yRx, xRy, x : A→ y : ♦A R♦
xRy, x : A→ y : ♦A L-Sym
x : A→ x : ♦A R
→ x : A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
xRy→ yRx, xRy
xRy→ yRx R-Sym x : A→ x : A
xRy, x : A→ y : ♦A R♦0
x : A→ x : ♦A R
→ x : A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
Note that L-Re f , L-Trans and L-Sym (R-Re f , R-Tran and R-Sym), when added to
G3K, give a system equivalent to S5. In fact, S5 is sound and complete with re-
spect to the class of reflexive, transitive, and symmetric frames. Equivalently, S5
is characterized by the class of reflexive and euclidean frames. Therefore, we can
drop L-Trans and L-Sym (resp. R-Trans and R-Sym), and add the rules correspond-
ing to the property of euclideaness, ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ⊃ yRz)
yRz, xRy, xRz, Γ→ ∆
xRy, xRz, Γ→ ∆ L-Eucl
Γ→ ∆, yRz, xRy Γ→ ∆, yRz, xRz
Γ→ ∆, yRz R-Eucl
Axiom 5, can be derived by L-Eucl
yRz, xRy, xRz, z : A→ y : ♦A, z : A
yRz, xRy, xRz, z : A→ y : ♦A R♦
xRy, xRz, z : A→ y : ♦A L-Eucl
xRy, x : ♦A→ y : ♦A L♦
x : ♦A→ x : ♦A R
→ x : ♦A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
97
or, equivalently, by R-Eucl
xRy, xRz,→ yRz, xRy xRy, xRz,→ yRz, xRz
xRy, xRz,→ yRz R-Eucl z : A→ z : A
xRy, xRz, z : A→ y : ♦A R♦0
xRy, x : ♦A→ y : ♦A L♦
x : ♦A→ x : ♦A R
→ x : ♦A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
Besides the property of directedness taken into account in the previous section,
another important geometric formula in modal logic is expressed by the seriality
of R, that is, ∀x∃y(xRy), a special case of GEOM with m = 0 and n = 1. The role
of existential quantifier is reflected by the variable condition that the label y is not
in Γ,∆.
xRy, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ L-Ser Γ→ ∆, xRy R-Ser
The axiom A ⊃ ♦A corresponding to seriality is known in the literature as D,
from deontic logic. With the new rules it has the following derivation.
y : A, xRy, x : A→ x : ♦A, y : A
xRy, x : A→ x : ♦A, y : A L
xRy, x : A→ x : ♦A R♦
x : A→ x : ♦A L-Ser
→ x : A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
→ xRy R-Ser
→ xRy R-Ser y : A→ y : A
x : A→ y : A L0
x : A→ x : ♦A R♦0
→ x : A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
In the table below some well-known modal logic with its characteristic axioms and
frame properties is presented
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Name Axiom Frame property
T A ⊃ A ∀x(xRx)
4 A ⊃ A ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ yRz ⊃ xRz)
5 ♦A ⊃ ♦A ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ⊃ yRz)
B A ⊃ ♦A ∀x∀y(xRy ⊃ yRx)
3 (A ⊃ B) ∨(B ⊃ A) ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ⊃ zRy)
D A ⊃ ♦A ∀x∃y(xRy)
2 ♦A ⊃ ♦A ∀x∀y∀z(xRy ∧ xRz ⊃ ∃w(yRw ∧ zRw))
The corresponding Gentzen systems are obtained by adding combinations of the
above rules to G3K.
G3T = G3K+ Re f
G3K4 = G3K+ Trans
G3B = G3T+ Sym
G3S4 = G3T+ Trans
G3S5 = G3K+ Re f + Trans+ Sym = G3K+ Re f + Eucl
G3D = G3K+ Ser
3.4 Multi-modal epistemic logic
Starting from the cut-free calculus G3K we find a system for epistemic logic G3Kn.
As we already said in the introduction, the language of alethic modal logic has a
single modal operator , whereas epistemic logic has one knowledge K operator
for each agent a in a given set of agents A. Formulas such as KaA have to be read:
“agent a knows that A”. Consequently, in the corresponding epistemic frame we
have as many accessibility relations R as agents in A. Therefore, xRay says that
the agent a can reach the state y from x, or y is Ra-accessible from x. In order
to formally describe the properties of knowledge, each Ra is also assumed to be
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an equivalence relation, that is, it is reflexive, transitive and symmetrical. The
knowledge formulas are evaluated as follows
x  KaB if and only if for all y, xRay implies y  B
Consequently, G3Kn has the following rules for the Ka operator
Logical rules of G3Kn
y : A, x : KaA, xRay, Γ→ ∆
x : KaA, xRay, Γ→ ∆ LK
xRay, Γ→ ∆, y : A
Γ→ ∆, x : KaA RK
with the usual restriction on RK that y must not appear in the conclusion. The
first order conditions on Ra, that is, reflexivity, transitivity and symmetry of Ra,
are regular formula and so can be converted into mathematical rules following the
regular rule schema. The difference with respect to mono-modal system G3K is
that here we have as many accessibility relations as agents inA, with the following
rules:
Mathematical rules of G3Kn
xRax, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Refa
yRax, xRay, Γ→ ∆
xRay, Γ→ ∆ Syma
xRaz, xRay, yRaz, Γ→ ∆
xRay, yRaz, Γ→ ∆ Transa
Starting from G3Kn we can also obtain a sequent system for belief. Belief is
weaker than knowledge as it does not satisfy axiom T. Intuitively, it is natural
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to think that something is believed but not true, and thus, in contrast with knowl-
edge, believing that something is true does not imply that it is indeed true. How-
ever, our beliefs are at least coherent and the only requirement that belief is sup-
pose to satisfy is that contradictions are not believed. Thus, to obtain a system for
belief we first replace the knowledge operators Ka with belief operators Ba, one for
each agent a in A, and we read a formula BaA as “the agent a believes that A”.
Then, the rules for Ba are obvious:
Logical rules of G3Be
y : A, x : BaA, xRay, Γ→ ∆
x : BaA, xRay, Γ→ ∆ LB
xRay, Γ→ ∆, y : A
Γ→ ∆, x : BaA RB
The axiomatic system for belief G3D is obtained from the multi-modal basic epis-
temic logic by adding the axiom ¬Ba(A∧¬A). The system D is sound and complete
with respect to the class of frames in which each accessibility relation Ra is serial.
Therefore, a labelled sequent system G3Be is found by adding to G3K the geomet-
ric rule of seriality. Rule Sera must meet the condition that the label y does not
appear in the conclusion.
Logical rule of G3Be
xRay, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Sera
In the next section we show the admissibility of all the structural rules and cut
elimination for the systems G3Kn and G3Be.
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Admissibility of the structural rules
In this section we show that in the systems G3Kn and G3Be all the structural
rules are admissible and cut is eliminable. Often, the proofs are straightforward
extensions of that of G3K and we shall refer to previous results.
Lemma 3.4.1. In G3Kn and G3Be it holds that
` x : A, Γ 2·h(A)−−−→
0
∆, x : A
for every labelled formula x : A.
Proof. See Lemma 2.1.1. 
Lemma 3.4.2. The substitution of labels is height- and rank-preserving admissible
in G3Kn and G3Be, i.e.
If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` Γ[y/x] n−→
p
∆[y/x]
for every label x and y.
Proof. By induction on n. The proof is the same as Lemma 2.1.3 up to the case
in which Γ → ∆ is concluded by a mathematical rule. All the mathematical rules
of G3Kn follow the regular rule schema and the proof proceeds as for the propo-
sitional case: apply IH on the premise of the mathematical rule R that concluded
Γ → ∆ and then another application of R gives the conclusion. In G3Be we need
to be careful with the variable condition because Sera follows the geometric rule
schema. The problematic case arises when the y is the eigenvariable of Sera.
....
xRay, Γ
k−→ ∆
Γ k+1−−→ ∆
Sera
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We first replace y with a new z in order to have ` xRaz, Γ k−→ ∆ and next apply IH
in order to conclude ` xRaz[y/x], Γ[y/x] k−→ ∆[y/x]. Finally, given that z appears
only in yRaz, Sera can be correctly applied. 
Theorem 3.4.3. Weakening is height- and rank-preserving admissible in G3Kn
and G3Be, i.e.
i) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` x : A, Γ n−→
p
∆
ii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A
iii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` xRay, Γ n−→p ∆
Proof. By induction on n. Also in this case, the proof follows that of Theorem 2.1.4.
The cases in which Γ → ∆ is concluded by mathematical rules of G3Kn are dealt
with analogously to the propositional ones. When Γ → ∆ is concluded by Sera
in G3Be, we apply Lemma 3.4.2 in order to avoid label clash, IH, and then Sera
again. 
Lemma 3.4.4. All the rules of G3Kn and G3Be are height- and rank-preserving
invertible.
Proof. The proof is straightforward because the mathematical rules have the rep-
etition of the principal formulas in the premise, so the premise can be obtained
from the conclusion by Theorem 3.4.3. 
Theorem 3.4.5. Contraction is height- and rank-preserving admissible in G3Kn
and G3Be, i.e.
i) If ` x : A, x : A, Γ n−→
p
∆ then ` x : A, Γ n−→
p
∆
ii) If ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A, x : A then ` Γ n−→
p
∆, x : A
iii) If ` xRay, xRay, Γ n−→p ∆ then ` xRay, Γ
n−→
p
∆
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Proof. By simultaneous induction on n. For the cases i and ii the proof is an imme-
diate extension of Theorem 2.1.6. Consider now the case iii. If xRay, xRay, Γ → ∆
is initial or conclusion of L⊥ then none of the occurrences of xRay is principal and
therefore also xRay, Γ → ∆ is initial or conclusion of L⊥. Else, if xRay, xRay, Γ → ∆
is concluded by a rule R of G3Kn and none of the occurrences of xRy is principal
then IH is applied to the premise(s) and a derivation of the conclusion is found by
R again. The same holds if R is a rule of G3Be. If one of the occurrences of xRay
is principal then the derivation is concluded by a mathematical rule. This is the
case that requires the repetition of the principal formulas in the premise. In fact,
suppose that xRay, xRay, Γ→ ∆ is concluded by Syma and one of the occurrences of
xRay is principal
....
yRax, xRay, xRay, Γ
k−→ ∆
xRay, xRay, Γ
k+1−−→ ∆
Syma
Given that both the occurrences of xRay are in the premise, IH can be applied and
the conclusion is obtained by Syma. However, there is another case to deal with:
it may happen that both the occurrences of xRay are principal formulas of Transa.
This is possible when both y and z are are one and the same variable.
xRax, xRax, xRax, Γ→ ∆
xRax, xRax, Γ→ ∆ Transa
In this case, IH can be applied twice and the conclusion follows. Else, xRax, Γ→ ∆
can be derived by IH and Re fa. Else, note that Transa is subject to the closure
condition and therefore if G3Kn contains Transa it must contain also its contracted
istance
xRax, xRax, Γ→ ∆
xRax, Γ→ ∆ Transa
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The latter case is an example of a general result concerning the role of the closure
condition in labelled systems: instances of the closure condition that are just like
contractions on relational atoms need not be added because they are admissible.
More precisely, when R is a frame rule and R? is the corresponding contracted
instance that arises from the closure condition, it is possible to prove that if R? is
an instance of contraction, it is hp-admissible in the system extended with those
rules arising from the closure condition that are not instances of contraction. The
result has been proved for a labelled system for the logic of group acceptance in
Hakli and Negri (2011a).
Cut elimination
The proof of the cut-elimination theorem for G3K can be extended to systems with
mathematical rules following the regular and geometric rule schema. The proof
with all the details can be found in Negri (2005). Here as a case study, we prove
that the systems G3Kn and G3Be satisfy cut elimination. In addition we show
that the upper bound on the growth of cut free derivations is maintained in these
systems.
Lemma 3.4.6 (Main Lemma). Let d1 and d2 be two derivations in G3KnC and
G3BeC such that
d1 ` Γ n−→p ∆, x : C and d2 ` x : C, Γ
m−→
p
∆
and let h(x : C) = p. Then there is a derivation d in G3KnC and G3BeC such that
d ` Γ n+m−−→
p
∆
105
Proof. By induction on n + m. The proof is to a large extent similar to the proof
of Main Lemma 2.2.2 for G3K. In addition, we have to consider the cases in
which either d1 or d2 is the conclusion of a mathematical rule following the reg-
ular (G3KnC) or the geometric rule schema (G3BeC). Observe that when at least
one of d1, d2 is initial or conclusion of L⊥, the proof is the same as in Main Lemma
2.2.2 because initial sequents and conclusion of L⊥ do not have relational atoms
xRay as principal. If d1 is neither an initial sequent nor a conclusion of L⊥, we first
give the proof for G3KnC. Suppose that d1 is concluded by either Re fa, or Transa,
or else Syma. Therefore x : C is not principal and d1 is
....
uRu, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
Γ n−→
p
∆, x : C
Refa
....
uRw, uRv, vRw, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
uRv, vRw, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : C
Transa
....
vRu, uRv, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
uRv, Γ′ n−→
p
∆, x : C
Syma
The conclusion d is found from d2 by admissibility of weakening (Theorem 3.4.3)
and IH as follows. For Re fa,
uRu, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
x : C, Γ m−→
p
∆
x : C, uRu, Γ m−→
p
∆
L-W
uRu, Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
Γ n+m−−→
p
∆
Refa
Similarly, for Transa and Syma,
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uRw, uRv, vRw, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
x : C, uRv, vRw, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
x : C, uRw, uRv, vRw, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
L-W
uRw, uRv, vRw, Γ′Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
uRv, vRw, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆
Transa
vRu, uRv, Γ′ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
x : C, uRv, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
x : C, vRu, uRv, Γ′ m−→
p
∆
L-W
vRu, uRv, Γ′Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
uRv, Γ′ n+m−−→
p
∆
Syma
For G3BeC the proof is analogous. If d1 is concluded by Sera,
....
uRv, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
Γ n−→
p
∆, x : C
Sera
where v does not appear in the conclusion of Sera, a derivation d of the conclusion
is obtained from d2, Theorem 2.1.4 and IH as follows. Note that in this case there
is no need to change the eigenvariable v of Sera because v does not appear in d2 too:
uRv, Γ n−1−−→
p
∆, x : C
x : C, Γ m−→
p
∆
x : C, uRv, Γ m−→
p
∆
L-W
uRv, Γ
(n−1)+m−−−−−→
p
∆
IH
Γ n+m−−→
p
∆
Sera
The case in which d2 is concluded by a mathematical rule of G3Kn or G3Be and
the cut formula is not principal is analogous. The case in which both occurrences of
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the cut formula are principal in a mathematical rule of G3KnC or G3BeC simply
does not arise because no relational atom can occur in the succedent.

Lemma 3.4.7 (Rank Reduction). Every derivation d in G3KnC and G3BeC such
that
d ` Γ m−−→
p+1
∆
can be converted into a derivation d∗ such that
d∗ ` Γ 2m−→
p
∆
Proof. By induction on m. The proof extends the proof of Reduction Lemma 2.2.3
with new cases corresponding to mathematical rules. If m = 0 then d is an initial
sequent or conclusion of L⊥ and the claim holds as above. If m = k+ 1 we argue by
distinction of cases according to the last rule R of d. If R is a mathematical rule of
G3KnC or G3BeC then IH is applied to its premise and then another application
of R gives the conclusion. For instance, if
....
xRax, Γ
k−−→
p+1
∆
Γ k+1−−→
p+1
∆
Refa
by IH on the premise of Re fa, we find that xRax, Γ
2k−→
p
∆ and, by Re fa, Γ
2k+1−−→
p
∆ since
2k+ 1 6 2k+1. Other mathematical rules of G3KnC or G3BeC are analogously dealt
with.

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Theorem 3.4.8 (Cut elimination). In G3KnC and in G3BeC cut is eliminable, i.e.
every derivation d such that
d ` Γ n−→
p
∆
can be converted into a derivation d− such that
d− ` Γ 2p(n)−−−→
0
∆
Proof. By induction on p. The proof is the same of Theorem 2.2.4 of G3KC. 
Completeness
In this section we shall prove the completeness of the systems G3Kn and G3Be
through the equivalence with their corresponding Hilbert-style systems. In partic-
ular, we prove that all the axioms are derivable and all the rules are admissible.
As a sound and complete axiomatization consider the system Kn of Fagin et al.
(1995).
A1 All the axioms of modal logic K
A2 KaA ⊃ A Factual Knowledge
A3 KaA ⊃ KaKaA Positive Introspection
A4 ¬KaA ⊃ Ka¬KaA Negative Introspection
R1 From Γ ` A ⊃ B and ∆ ` A infer Γ,∆ ` B Modus Ponens
R2 From ` A infer ` KaA Necessitation
An adequate system for belief Be can be easily obtained from the basic modal
system K together with the axiom of consistency for the belief operator Ba.
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A1 All the axioms of modal logic K
A2 ¬Ba(A ∧ ¬A) Consistency
R1 From Γ ` A ⊃ B and ∆ ` A infer Γ,∆ ` B Modus Ponens
R2 From ` A infer ` BaA Necessitation
Lemma 3.4.9. All the axioms (rules) of Kn are derivable (resp. admissible) in
G3Kn.
Proof. By root-first proof search from the sequent to be derived. For the derivations
of K axioms see Lemma 2.3.1. For factivity of knowledge (A2), the derivation is
x : A, xRax, x : KaA→ x : A
xRax, x : KaA→ x : A LK
x : KaA→ x : A Refa
→ x : KaA ⊃ A R⊃
where the topmost sequents are derivable by Lemma 3.4.1. Positive introspection
(A3) has the following derivations.
z : A, xRaz, xRay, yRaz, x : KaA→ z : A
xRaz, xRay, yRaz, x : KaA→ z : A LK
xRay, yRaz, x : KaA→ z : A Transa
xRy, x : KaA→ y : KaA RK
x : KaA→ x : KaKaA RK
→ x : KaA ⊃ KaKaA R⊃
Finally, for negative introspection (A4) we have
y : A, z : KaA, zRay, zRax, xRay, xRaz→ y : A
z : KaA, zRay, zRax, xRay, xRaz→ y : A LK
z : KaA, zRax, xRay, xRaz→ y : A Transa
z : KaA, xRay, xRaz→ y : A Syma
xRay, xRaz→ y : A, z : ¬KaA R¬
xRay→ y : A, x : Ka¬KaA RK
→ x : KaA, x : Ka¬KaA RK
x : ¬KaA→ x : Ka¬KaA L¬
→ x : ¬KaA ⊃ Ka¬KaA R⊃
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In either case the topmost sequents are derivable by Lemma 3.4.1. The admissi-
bility of the Kn rules in G3Kn is proved as in Lemma 2.3.1. 
Lemma 3.4.10. All the axioms (rules) of Be are derivable (resp. admissible) in
G3Be.
Proof. The proof reduces to find a derivation of axiom A2 as follows
y : A, xRay, x : Ba(A ∧ ¬A)→ y : A
y : A, y : ¬A, xRay, x : Ba(A ∧ ¬A)→ L¬
y : A ∧ ¬A, xRay, x : Ba(A ∧ ¬A)→ L∧
xRay, x : Ba(A ∧ ¬A)→ LB
x : Ba(A ∧ ¬A)→ Sera
→ x : ¬Ba(A ∧ ¬A) R¬
where the topmost sequents are derivable by Lemma 3.4.1. Again, for admissibil-
ity of Be rules, see Lemma 2.3.1.

3.5 Intuitionistic Logic
It is well known that the semantics of S4 can be used to provide a direct interpreta-
tion of the intuitionistic connectives, the intuitionistic implication being a -type
modality (see Kripke 1965). The intuitionistic accessibility relation is denoted by
6 and satisfies the properties of reflexivity and transitivity. Therefore, it is pos-
sible to internalize the semantics of intuitionistic implication into the the syntax
of sequent calculus analogously to the internalization of the modal operator  in
G3S4. In fact, the inductive definition of validity of implicative formulas is:
x  A ⊃ B if and only if for all y, x 6 y and y  A implies y  B
111
Along with the clauses for the other connectives, the definition can be converted
into a pair of sequent rules with the condition that the label y must not appear in
the conclusion of the right rule for implication. In addition, the forcing relation has
to be proved monotone with respect to the relation 6. That is, for any arbitrary
formula A the following has to hold:
x 6 y and x  A implies y  A
It is enough to impose monotonicity of forcing, in the form of an initial sequent,
with respect to only atomic formulas. This is not a restriction because full mono-
tonicity is then shown derivable. In this way, one of the design principles of G3-
style calculi, namely the restriction of initial sequents to atomic formulas needed
to guarantee the full range of structural properties, is respected. The following
labelled sequent calculus G3I for intuitionistic logic is thus obtained. As usual,
negation is defined in terms of ⊥ and ⊃, the formulas P are atomic, and y /∈ Γ,∆ in
rule R ⊃.
Rule of G3I
x 6 y, x : P, Γ→ ∆, y : P
x : A, x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ∧ B, Γ→ ∆ L∧
Γ→ ∆, x : A Γ→ ∆, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∧ B R∧
x : A, Γ→ ∆ x : B, Γ→ ∆
x : A ∨ B, Γ→ ∆ L∨
Γ→ ∆, x : A, x : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ∨ B R∨
x 6 y, x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆, y : A x 6 y, x : A ⊃ B, y : B, Γ→ ∆
x 6 y, x : A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆ L⊃
x : ⊥, Γ→ ∆ L⊥
x 6 y, y : A, Γ→ ∆, y : B
Γ→ ∆, x : A ⊃ B R⊃
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If 6 is assumed to be reflexive and transitive, system G3I must contain also the
following rules for 6.
Mathematical rules of G3I
x 6 x, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ref6
x 6 z, x 6 y, y 6 z, Γ→ ∆
x 6 y, y 6 z, Γ→ ∆ Trans6
Full monotonicity of forcing is obtained by the following:
Lemma 3.5.1. In G3I it holds that
i) ` x 6 y, x : A, Γ→ ∆, y : A
ii) ` x : A, Γ→ ∆, x : A
for every labelled formula x : A.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the height h of A. The proof of ii is done at
each step of the induction by Re f6 and the inductive hypothesis of i. The proof of
(i) is trivial for A atomic and for ⊥, whereas it uses the inductive hypothesis of (ii)
and Trans6 if A is B ⊃ C:
. . . , z : B, Γ→ ∆, z : C, z : B . . . , z : C, Γ→ ∆, z : C
x 6 z, x 6 y, y 6 z, x : B ⊃ C, z : B, Γ→ ∆, z : C L⊃
x 6 y, y 6 z, x : B ⊃ C, z : B, Γ→ ∆, z : C Trans6
x 6 y, x : B ⊃ C, Γ→ ∆, y : B ⊃ C R⊃
The cases in which A is a conjunction or a disjunction are handled by the inductive
hypothesis of i.

System G3I enjoys all the structural properties usually required of sequent sys-
tems and the same holds for each extension G3I* with rules that follow the regular
or the geometric rule schema.
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Theorem 3.5.2. In G3I* it holds that:
i) All the logical rules are hp-invertible;
ii) The rules of weakening and contraction are hp-admissible;
iii) Cut is admissible.
Proof. See the proofs of Theorems 12.27–12.29 of Negri and von Plato (2011). 
For our purposes, the most remarkable extension of G3I is obtained by imposing
symmetry of the accessibility relation
y 6 x, x 6 y, Γ→ ∆
x 6 y, Γ→ ∆ Sym6
This extension gives a system equivalent to classical logic and we shall refer to it
as G3C. Given that G3C is an extension of G3I with a rule that follows the regular
rule schema, it admits cut elimination by Theorem 3.5.2. Systems G3I and G3C
will play an important role in the last chapter.
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Chapter4
Dynamic Epistemic Logics
This chapter takes into account one of the most prominent development of epis-
temic modal logic, the dynamics of knowledge. So far, we have been considering
epistemic logic as a formal investigation concerning what agents statically know or
believe, in the sense that our analysis did not take into account the possibility that
knowledge might change. In fact, epistemic logic traditionally builds on a model
of knowledge which is not formally able to cope with the fact that agents that are
ignorant about a certain P can eventually learn it. However, it is natural to think
that they indeed may come to know that P is the case, once for instance they are
informed to this end by other agents. From this perspective, knowledge is strictly
connected with the practice of communication, and agents’ comprehension of the
world depends not only on what they know, but also on what they eventually may
come to know in the process of information flow.
4.1 Public Announcement Logic
Dynamic epistemic logic (DEL) provides a general account of the problem of knowl-
edge change. However, DEL is a large family and not a single logic, and in this
chapter we shall focus on the simplest type of DEL, the logic of public an-
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nouncements (PAL). Along with the standard epistemic modal operators Ka for
each agent a, and propositional connectives, the language of PAL has formulas for
announcements [A]B, intuitively read as: “after every announcement of A, B”. It is
clear that there is a strong analogy between announcements in PAL and programs
in dynamic logic of programs (PDL, see Harel 2000). In the latter, the modality is
a -like operator such that [α]B stands for: after every terminating execution of
the program α, B. Public announcements are specific form of programs in which
α is in turn a formula. The dual operation is 〈 〉 and 〈A〉B is defined as ¬[A]¬B
and read as: after some announcements of A, B. Although this perspective on the
PAL language is nowadays dominant, it is not the only one. PAL originated with
the seminal work of Plaza (1989) in which announcements are formalized by the
binary non truth-functional connective + in such a way that a formula as A+ B
means: “A is true and after announcing that A, also B is true”. Despite A + B
and 〈A〉B can be considered equivalent, they reveal two different perspectives: the
latter notation takes the operator [ ] as a unary operator applying to formulas that
are postconditions of the program execution, where [ ] is relative to some program
α. The former is simply a binary connective as conjunction or disjunction, with the
basic difference that it is truth-functional.
Formal semantics
The basic idea behind the formal semantics of PAL is that agents can gain new
information by the public announcement of some (true) fact. The consequence of
an announcement is the update of the agents’ knowledge: agents rule out some
situations that are not any longer considered as possible because incompatible
with the announcement. We have said that the standard presentation of PAL in
van Ditmarsch et al. (2007) arises from the seminal work of Plaza (1989): despite
the binary notation A + B employed there, Plaza’s announcements are formulas
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such as 〈A〉B which is true whenever A is true and after A is announced B is
true. Therefore, the dual formula [A]B is satisfied whenever if A is true then af-
ter A is announced B is true. Thus, in Plaza’s interpretation (P-interpretation) of
announcements a formula can be announced only if it is true and hence announce-
ments are considered as a completely truthful resource of information. The truth-
fulness of announcements is formally expressed by the formula (A ⊃ [A]B) ⊃ [A]B
which is is a theorem of PAL when Plaza’s interpretation of announcements is
considered. Thus, “announcement” means “truthful and public announcement”.
However, this is not the whole picture and alternative interpretations are possible
if we drop the requirement that what is announced must be true and allow that
every formula can be announced, no matter what its truth-value is. In contrast
with P-announcements, it may happen that the agents do not assume the truth
of what is announced and could correctly exclude as impossible also the situation
in which the announcement is made. This approach, proposed by Gerbrandy and
Groenveled (1997), modifies the original perspective on truthful announcements
due to Plaza (1989). For a clear and compact presentation of the Gerbrandy and
Groenveled announcements (GG-announcements) see Bucheli et al. (2010). In
what follows we present the formal semantics for both P- and GG-interpretations
of PAL, even though we shall go into the details only of the GG-interpretation. In
either case, the semantics of PAL is based on the semantics of epistemic logic and
consists into a modification of the standard epistemic frames and models by means
of an operation of state and arrow restriction.
Definition (P-Restricted Model). Let A be a formula and M = {X,Ra,} an epis-
temic model. The P-restriction of M to A is the model MA = 〈XA,RAa ,A〉 where
XA = {x ∈ X | x  A};
RAa = {〈x, y〉 ∈ XA × XA | xRay} for every agent a ∈ A;
A= {〈x, P〉 | x ∈ XA and x  P} for every atom P.
117
Definition (GG-Restricted Model). Let A be a formula and M = {X,Ra,} an
epistemic model. The GG-restriction of M to A is the model MA = 〈XA,RAa ,A〉
where
XA ≡ X;
RAa = {〈x, y〉 ∈ X× X | xRay and y  A} for every agent a ∈ A;
A=  .
Observation. From the above definitions we have that in the P-restricted model
MA, for every x, y ∈ X,
xRAa y if and only if xRay and M, x  A and M, y  A;
MA, x  P if and only if M, x  A and M, x  P.
On the other hand, when MA is a GG-restricted model, we have that for every
x, y ∈ X,
xRAa y if and only if xRay and M, y  A;
MA, x  P if and only if M, x  P.
Notational convention. In order to simplify the notation we shall write x A P
instead of MA, x  P.
In both P- and GG-announcements the forcing relation  is given on atomic formu-
las and it is extended in a unique way to arbitrary formulas. The clauses for the
propositional connectives and knowledge are the standard ones, whereas there are
two different ways to evaluate announcements. In the P-interpretation the clause
assumes explicitly that what is announced is true.
x  [A]B if and only if x  A implies x A B
Conversely, in GG-interpretation the assumption that A is true is left out.
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x  [A]B if and only if x A B
In order to understand the difference between P- and GG- announcements we use
an example of a formula which is valid in the P-interpretation, but falsified in the
GG-interpretation.
Example. Consider the formula (A ⊃ [A]KaP) ⊃ [A]KaP and the following model:
A ⊃ [A]KaP holds but not [A]KaP, so the model is a countermodel to (A ⊃ [A]KaP) ⊃
[A]KaP.
x
y A
Ra
In fact, x 1 A and then A ⊃ [A]KaP is trivially true at x. On the other hand, we
have x 1 [A]KaP if and only if x 1A KaP. This, in turn, holds if and only if there
is some state s which is RAa -accessible from x and s 1A P. The latter conjunction
is equivalent to xRas and s  A but s 1 P. It is clear that if y is such s and
y 1 P then we have that x 1A KaP. On the other hand, with P-announcements
(A ⊃ [A]KaP) ⊃ [A]KaP is true in the model because it is valid and this can be
verified by applying the above semantic definitions for P-announcements without
any appeal to the diagram. In fact, suppose that for an arbitrary x it holds that
x  A ⊃ [A]KaP. This is equivalent to x  A implies that if x  A then x A KaP.
This holds if and only if x  A and x  A implies x A KaP by propositional
reasoning. Therefore we have x  A implies x A KaP which is x  [A]KaP.
In the P- and GG-interpretation announcements can be composed: any effect of
two consecutive assertions could also have been produced by making only one as-
sertion. Two consecutive announcements that A and B are equivalent to the single
announcements that A and after the announcement that A, B. In other words,
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two announcements [A][B] can be reduced to the single announcement [A ∧ [A]B].
Another property is the associativity of public announcements, that is, the equiv-
alence between [A][B ∧ [B]C]D and [A ∧ [A]B][C]D.
Proposition 4.1.1 (Associativity). The following are equivalent:
i) x  [A ∧ [A]B][C]D
ii) x  [A][B ∧ [B]C]C
Proposition 4.1.2 (Compositionality). The following are equivalent:
i) x  [A ∧ [A]B]C
ii) x  [A][B]C
Both the properties are provable by induction on the formula announced and they
are similar, so we prove only compositionality of GG-announcements.
Proof. By induction on C. If C is an atom P then by definition x  [A ∧ [A]B]P
if and only x A∧[A]B] P if and only if x  P. In GG-restricted model, the latter
is equivalent to x A P and this, in turn, holds if and only if x A,B P, and,
by definition, x  [A][B]P. If C is D ∧ E we have that x  [A ∧ [A]B](D ∧ E) if
and only if x A∧[A]B (D ∧ E). By definition of conjunction this is equivalent to
x A∧[A]B D and x A∧[A]B E. By inductive hypothesis (IH) we have that x A,B D
and x A,B E which is equivalent to x A,B (D∧ E). Now, by definition, we conclude
x  [A][B](D∧ E). The proof is analogous when C is another propositional formula.
When C is of the form KaD, we have: x  [A ∧ [A]B](KaD) if and only if x A∧[A]B
KaD. The latter holds if and only if for an arbitrary y, xRay and y  A ∧ [A]B
implies y A∧[A]B D. By IH, we obtain: for all y, xRay and y  A ∧ [A]B implies
y A,B D. Now, the antecedent of the conditional holds if and only if xRay and
y  A and y A B. By definition of RAa in GG-models this is equivalent to xRAa y
and y A B. Now, we have that for all y, xRAa y and y A B implies y A,B D
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and this is, by definition of Ka, x A,B (KaD). Finally, when C is of the form [C]D
then we have x  [A ∧ [A]B]([D]E) if and only if x A∧[A]B,D E. By associativity
of public announcements, x A∧[A]B,D E and x A,B∧[B]D E are equivalent. By
IH on the latter we obtain x A,B,D E and from this by definition we conclude
x  [A][B]([D]E).

To prove the compositionality of public announcement an inductive argument is
required. This is to say that the validity of the formula [A ∧ [A]B]C ⊃⊂ [A][B]C
cannot be proved schematically as other valid formulas like, for instance, the ax-
ioms of knowledge operator. However, in the labelled system we shall introduce in
the next section compositionality and associativity of public announcements can
be proved schematically and without any induction on formulas.
4.2 A labelled sequent calculus for PAL
In this section we present a labelled sequent system for PAL in which announce-
ments are GG-interpreted and we shall refer to this system as G3PAL. When the
semantics of announcements is internalized into sequent calculus, we have to con-
sider the general case of models restricted to a (possibly empty) list of formulas,
instead of a single formula. Given a list ϕ of formulas, we indicate by Mϕ the
model restricted to ϕ
Mϕ =
 M if ϕ = e((MA1)A2 . . . )An) if ϕ = A1, . . . , An
Note that Mϕ,A should be written MϕA , but we prefer a linear notation where the
comma has the same role of the concatenation operator • of Balbiani et al. (2010).
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As usual, the logical rules of G3PAL are obtained by exploiting the definition of
the forcing relation in the restricted model. A labelled formula of G3PAL is an
expression of the form x :ϕ A, where ϕ is an arbitrary list of formulas and indicates
that A is true at the state x in the model restricted to (formulas in) ϕ. Propositional
rules are immediate because their application leaves untouched the formulas in ϕ.
In the case of atomic and knowledge formulas we must distinguish the case in
which the list is empty from that in which it is of the form ϕ, A. In particular, if ϕ
is empty, atoms x : P can appear as principal only in initial sequents, whereas if
the list is of the form ϕ, A we add two rules, L0 and R0, that reflect the definition
of the forcing relation in GG-models
x ϕ,A P if and only if x ϕ P
The rules corresponding to this definition are
x :ϕ P, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A P, Γ→ ∆ L0
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ P
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A P R0
Likewise, the rules for the knowledge operator are the standard ones when ϕ is
empty. Instead, when ϕ is a non empty list the last element of which is the formula
A, then the clause becomes
x ϕ,A KaB if and only if for all y, xRϕ,Aa y implies y ϕ,A B
This can be immediately converted in two logical rules following the usual method
y :ϕ,A B, x :ϕ,A y,KaB, xR
ϕ,A
a y, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A KaB, xR
ϕ,A
a y, Γ→ ∆
xRϕ,Aa y, Γ→ ∆, y :ϕ,A B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB
In the presence of such rules we need as primitive also two non-logical rules for
formulas such as xRϕ,Aa y, in analogy to the rules for restricted propositional atoms
L0 and R0. These are found from the definition of GG-models:
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xRϕ,Aa y if and only if xR
ϕ
a y and y ϕ A
Therefore, we find the rules
xRϕy, y : A, Γ→ ∆
xRϕ,Ay, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, xRϕy Γ→ ∆, y :ϕ A
Γ→ ∆, xRϕ,Ay
However, these rules make problematic the proof of the admissibility of the struc-
tural rules, in particular the admissibility of cut because relational atoms appears
active both in the antecedent and succedent of a mathematical rule. A possible way
out is to rephrase the semantics of the knowledge operator so that the definition
of restricted relational atoms is embedded in it.
x ϕ,A KaB if and only if for all y, xRϕa y and y ϕ A implies y ϕ,A B
The move is analogous to that for the treatment of Gödel-Löb provability logic in
Negri (2005), where a modification in the definition of the -operator allows to in-
ternalize a condition of the accessibility relation, the property of being Noetherian,
that is not even first order expressible. Thus, from the the sufficient condition for
KaB to be forced at x in a model restricted to a list ϕ, A we have
xRϕa y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆, y :ϕ,A B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB RK
′
As usual, RK′ has the variable condition that y must not appear in the conclusion.
Conversely, from the opposite direction of the definition the following rule is found
y :ϕ,A B, x :ϕ,A KaB, xR
ϕ
a y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A KaB, xR
ϕ
a y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
LK′
Finally, we have also two rules corresponding to the property of compositionality
of public announcements
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x :ϕ,A,B C, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A∧[A]B C, Γ→ ∆
Lcmp
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A,B C
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A∧[A]B C
Rcmp
The system G3PAL can be easily modified in order to deal with the P-interpretation
of announcements. The rules that must be changed are L0, R0, LK′, RK′, L[ ] and
R[ ]. In the P-interpretation, what is announced must be true. So, when atomic
formulas are evaluated in the P-restricted model to a non empty list of formulas,
the inductive clause in the semantic definition is
x ϕ,A P if and only if x ϕ A and x ϕ P
and the corresponding rules are
x :ϕ A, x :ϕ P, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A P, Γ→ ∆ L0
′ Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ P
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A P R0
′
Analogously, the semantics of announcements brings the two following rules
x :ϕ,A B, x :ϕ [A]B, x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ [A]B, x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆ L[ ]
′ x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ [A]B R[ ]
′
Finally, in the definition of x ϕ,A KaB we need to take into account also the defini-
tion of restricted relational atom xRϕ,Aa y in a P-restricted model: xR
ϕ
a y and x ϕ A
and y ϕ A. The rules for the Ka operator become
y :ϕ,A B, x :ϕ,A KaB, xR
ϕ
a y, x :ϕ A, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A KaB, xR
ϕ
a y, x :ϕ A, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
LK′′
xRϕa y, x :ϕ A, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆, y :ϕ,A B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB RK
′′
Thus, the logical rules of G3PAL with GG-announcements are the following:
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Logical rules of G3PAL
x : P, Γ→ ∆, x : P x :ϕ ⊥, Γ→ ∆ L⊥
x :ϕ P, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A P, Γ→ ∆ L0
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ P
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A P R0
x :ϕ A, x :ϕ B, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ A ∧ B, Γ→ ∆ L∧
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ B Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A ∧ B R∧
x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆ x :ϕ B, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ A ∨ B, Γ→ ∆ L∨
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A, x :ϕ B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A ∨ B R∨
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A x :ϕ B, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ A ⊃ B, Γ→ ∆ L⊃
x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A ⊃ B R⊃
y : A, x : KaA, xRay, Γ→ ∆
x : KaA, xRay, Γ→ ∆ LK
xRay, Γ→ ∆, y : A
Γ→ ∆, x : KaA RK
y :ϕ,A B, x :ϕ,A KaB, xR
ϕ
a y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A KaB, xR
ϕ
a y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
LK′
xRϕa y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆, y :ϕ,A B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB RK
′
x :ϕ,A B, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ [A]B, Γ→ ∆ L[ ]
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A B
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ [A]B R[ ]
x :ϕ,A,B C, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ,A∧[A]B C, Γ→ ∆
Lcmp
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A,B C
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A∧[A]B C
Rcmp
P- and GG- restricted models were introduced as based on standard epistemic mod-
els. Therefore, we still assume that each accessibility relation Ra is an equivalence
relation and that the rules for Ra are those of G3S5, and we have
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Mathematical rules of G3PAL
xRϕa x, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ref
xRϕa z, xR
ϕ
a y, yR
ϕ
a z, Γ→ ∆
xRϕa y, yR
ϕ
a z, Γ→ ∆
Trans
xRϕa y, yR
ϕ
a x, Γ→ ∆
xRϕa y, Γ→ ∆
Sym
4.3 Admissibility of the structural rules and cut
In this section we prove that the structural rules of weakening and contraction are
hp-admissible and all the logical rules of G3PAL hp-invertible. Furthermore, the
rule of cut is proved to be admissible. All this results hold also in the system for
the P-interpretation of announcements and the proofs can be easily adapted. The
structural rules of PAL are as follows:
Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆ L-W
Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A R-W
Γ→ ∆
xRϕa y, Γ→ ∆
L-W
x :ϕ A, x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆
x :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆ L-C
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A, x :ϕ A
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A R-C
xRϕa y, xR
ϕ
a y, Γ→ ∆
xRϕa y, Γ→ ∆
L-C
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ A x :ϕ A, Γ′ → ∆′
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ CUT
Note that the cut rule is formulated as a context-independent rule, unlike the
context-sharing formulation employed in G3K. In order to prove these results we
need to extend the straightforward definition of length of a formula as follows:
Definition. The length ` of a formula A is defined by induction.
`(⊥) = 0;
126
`(P) = 1;
`(A ◦ B) = `(A) + `(B) + 1, when ◦ is ∧,∨,⊃;
`(KaA) = `(A) + 1;
`([A]B) = `(A) + `(B) + 1.
For labelled formulas, `(x : A) = `(A) and `(xRay) = 1. Furthermore, if ϕ is the
list A1, . . . , An, we define `(x :ϕ,A B) = `(A1) + · · ·+ `(An) + `(A) + `(B).
Lemma 4.3.1. In G3PAL it holds that:
i) The substitution of labels is hp-admissible;
ii) Arbitrary initial sequents are derivable;
iii) All the rules are hp-invertible.
Proof. (i) Substitution of labels is proved to be hp-admissible by induction on the
height h of the derivation of a sequent Γ → ∆. If h = 0 then the premise is initial
or an istance of L⊥ and also the conclusion is initial or conclusion of L⊥. If h =
n + 1, suppose that the claim holds for derivations of height n and consider the
last rule applied in the derivation. If the last rule is a propositional rule or a
modal rule without variable conditions, apply the inductive hypothesis (IH) to the
premises and then the rule. If the last rule is a rule with a variable condition
such as RK or RK′, we must be careful with the cases in which either x or y is
the eigenvariable of the rule, because a straightforward substitution may result
in a violation of the restriction. In those cases we must apply IH to the premise
and replace the eigenvariable with a fresh variable that does not appear in the
derivation. Consider the case in which Γ → ∆ has been concluded by RK′ with
x :ϕ,A KaB as principal formula and y as eigenvariable. Thus the derivation is
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....
xRϕa y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆′, y :ϕ,A B
Γ→ ∆′, x :ϕ,A KaB RK
′
Given that y is the eigenvariable of RK′ we must replace it with a fresh z. Note
that if z is fresh the substitution does not affect the context Γ,∆′. Then by IH and
RK′ we obtain the desired conclusion.
xRϕa y, y :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆′, y :ϕ,A B
xRϕa z, z :ϕ A, Γ→ ∆′, z :ϕ,A B
IH
xRϕa z, z :ϕ A, Γ[y/x]→ ∆′[y/x], z :ϕ,A B
IH
Γ[y/x]→ ∆′[y/x], x :ϕ,A KaB RK
′
When Γ→ ∆ is concluded by an announcement rule such as
....
u :ϕ,A B, Γ→ ∆
u :ϕ [A]B, Γ→ ∆ L[ ]
we apply IH to the premise of L[ ] and then L[ ] again
....
u :ϕ,A B, Γ[y/x]→ ∆[y/x]
u :ϕ [A]B, Γ[y/x]→ ∆[y/x] L[ ]
(ii) Derivability of arbitrary initial sequents, that is, ` x :ϕ B, Γ → ∆, x :ϕ B for an
arbitrary list ϕ and an arbitrary formula B, is proved by induction on `(x :ϕ B). If
B is atomic and ϕ has length zero, we have an initial sequent. If B is ⊥ then we
have an istance of L⊥. If B is an atomic formula P and ϕ is of the form ϕ, A, the
rules L0 and R0 are used to reduce the length of the list of announcements and IH
is applied:
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x :ϕ P, Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ P
x :ϕ P, Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A P R0
x :ϕ,A P, Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A P L0
The topmost sequent is derivable by IH because `(x :ϕ P) < `(x :ϕ,A P). If B is a
compound formula, apply root-first the appropriate rules and observe that similar
sequents, of reduced length, appear in the premises. Then the claim holds by IH.
(iii) Invertibility with the preservation of the height is proved for all the logical
rules by induction on the height h of the derivation. The proof of the cases corre-
sponding to the rule for ∧, ∨ and ⊃ is similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1.5. Rules
LK and LK′ are trivially hp-invertible, since their premises are obtained by weak-
ening from the conclusion (see Theorem 4.3.3 in the next). The proof for RK and
RK′ needs some care for the variable condition. Consider the case of RK′: we need
to prove that if Γ → ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB is derivable, also xRϕa y, y :ϕ A, Γ → ∆, y :ϕ,A B
is derivable. If Γ → ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB is an initial sequent or an istance of L⊥ then
x :ϕ KaB is not principal and also xRϕy, y :ϕ A, Γ → ∆, y :ϕ,A B is initial or an is-
tance of L⊥. If Γ → ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB is concluded by a derivation of height h > 0, we
have to consider the rule that introduced it. If x :ϕ,A KaB is principal formula of
RK′ and y is its eigenvariable then the premise of RK′ has a derivation of a lower
height and the claim holds by IH. If instead, the eigenvariable of RK′ is a z differ-
ent from y then apply hp-substitution of z with y and, again, the claim holds by IH.
If x :ϕ,A KaB is not principal and it has been introduced by a rule without variable
condition, apply IH and then the rule. If Γ → ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB is a conclusion of RK′
we apply first hp-substitution admissibility in order to avoid clash of variables and
then IH and RK′ again. The last step is
....
uRψy, y :ψ C, Γ→ ∆, y :ψ,C D, x :ϕ,A KaB
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,A KaB, u :ψ,C KaD RK
′
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By replacing y with a new z have uRψz, z :ψ C, Γ → ∆, z :ψ,C D, x :ϕ,A KaB. By IH
we get xRϕa y, y :ϕ A, uRψz, z :ψ C, Γ → ∆, z :ψ,C D, y :ϕ,A B and an application of RK′
gives xRϕa , y :ϕ A, Γ → ∆, y :ϕ,A B. The hp-inversion of L[ ], R[ ], L0, R0, Lcmp and
Rcmp is proved exactly as for the propositional cases: apply IH on the premise of
the last rule applied and then the rule. 
In G3PAL an analogous result of Lemma 2.1.2 of G3K holds. The result will be
useful in the proof the admissibility of cut rule.
Lemma 4.3.2. In G3PAL it holds that
If ` Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ ⊥ then ` Γ n−→ ∆
Proof. Similar to the proof of the Lemma 2.1.2. 
Now we can turn to the the admissibility of the structural rules of weakening and
contraction. Also in this case, we shall refer to previous results we the proofs can
be easily adapted.
Theorem 4.3.3. Weakening is height-preserving admissible in G3PAL, i.e.
i) If d ` Γ n−→ ∆ then d ` x :ϕ A, Γ n−→ ∆
ii) If d ` Γ n−→ ∆ then d ` Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ A
iii) If d ` Γ n−→ ∆ then d ` xRϕa y, Γ n−→ ∆
Proof. By induction on n. The proof follows the pattern of Theorem 2.1.4 to which
we add the following cases. Suppose the premise of d is the conclusion of R0, so ∆
is ∆′, u :ψ,B P and
....
Γ n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ P
Γ n−→ ∆′, u :ψ,B P
R0
By inductive hypothesis (IH) on a lower derivation we obtain
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i) x :ϕ A, Γ n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ P
ii) Γ n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ P, x :ϕ A
iii) xRϕa y, Γ
n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ P
and by R0 once again we get the conclusion. If d has been concluded by R[ ] then it
ends with
....
Γ n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ,B C
Γ n−→ ∆′, u :ψ [B]C
R[ ]
By IH we have
i) x :ϕ A, Γ n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ,B C
ii) Γ n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ,B C, x :ϕ A
iii) xRϕa y, Γ
n−1−−→ ∆′, u :ψ,B C
from which by R[ ] we conclude
i) x :ϕ A, Γ n−→ ∆′, u :ψ [B]C
ii) Γ n−→ ∆′, u :ψ [B]C, x :ϕ A
iii) xRϕa y, Γ
n−→ ∆′, u :ψ [B]C
The case in which d is concluded by L[ ] is dealt with in analogous way.

Theorem 4.3.4. Contraction is height-preserving admissible in G3PAL, i.e.
i) If d ` x :ϕ A, x :ϕ A, Γ n−→ ∆ then d ` x :ϕ A, Γ n−→ ∆
ii) If d ` Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ A, x :ϕ A then d ` Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ A
iii) If d ` xRϕa y, xRϕa y, Γ n−→ ∆ then d ` xRϕa y, Γ n−→ ∆
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Proof. By simultaneous induction on n. The proof follows the pattern of Theorem
2.1.6. A new case arises when one of the contracted formulas x :ϕ A is principal in
an announcement rule. We have
....
x :ϕ,B C, x :ϕ [B]C, Γ n−1−−→ ∆
x :ϕ [B]C, x :ϕ [B]C, Γ n−→ ∆
L[ ]
From the hp-invertibility of the logical rules of G3PAL (Lemma 4.3.1) the premise
becomes
x :ϕ,B C, x :ϕ,B C, Γ n−1−−→ ∆
and IH is applicable
x :ϕ,B C, Γ n−1−−→ ∆
and we get the conclusion by L[ ]
x :ϕ [B]C, Γ n−→ ∆

Theorem 4.3.5 (Cut Admissibility). Cut in admissible in G3PAL, i.e. for every d1
and d2 derivations in G3PAL such that
d1 ` Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ C and d2 ` x :ϕ C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
there is a derivation d in G3PAL such that
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d ` Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆
Proof. The proof has the same structure as the proof of admissibility of cut for the
modal systems G3K of Negri (2005). The proof is by induction on the length of the
cut formula with sub-induction on the sum of the heights of the derivations of the
premises of cut. In the inductive step, we shall refer to the inductive hypothesis
on the length of the cut cut formula as the main inductive hypothesis (MIH), and
to the inductive hypothesis on the sum of the heights as the secondary inductive
hypothesis (SIH). The proof follows the pattern:
1. Either d1 or d2 is initial or conclusion of L⊥:
(a) d1 is initial or conclusion of L⊥;
(b) d2 is initial or conclusion of L⊥.
2. Neither d1 nor d2 is initial or conclusion of L⊥ and:
(a) x : C is not principal in d1;
(b) x : C is not principal in d2;
(c) x : C is principal both in d1 and d2.
Case 1a
If d1 is initial then Γ and ∆ have an atom u : P in common and so also Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆
is initial. Else, x : C is atomic and Γ is x : P, Γ′′. In this case take d2 and apply
hp-admissibility of weakening (Theorem 4.3.3)
x : P, Γ′ → ∆′
x : P, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ W
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If d1 is conclusion of L⊥ then u :ϕ ⊥ is in Γ and also Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ is conclusion of
L⊥.
Case 1b
If d2 is initial then either Γ′ and ∆′ have an atom u : P in common and so also
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ is initial, or else, x : C is an atom x : P and it is in ∆′. As above, take
d1 and apply hp-admissibility of weakening (Theorem 4.3.3).
Γ→ ∆, x : P
Γ′, Γ→ ∆,∆′′, x : P W
where ∆′ is ∆′′, x : P. If d2 is conclusion of L⊥ then either u :ϕ ⊥ is in Γ′ or x :ϕ C is
x :ϕ ⊥. In the first case also the conclusion of cut is derived by L⊥. In the second
case apply Lemma 4.3.2 and weakening on d1.
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ ⊥
Γ→ ∆
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ W
Case 2a
If none of the premises of cut is initial or conclusion of L⊥, consider the case in
which d1 is conclusion of a rule R1 in which the cut formula x :ϕ C is not principal.
If R1 is a propositional rule, say L∧, then Γ is u :ψ A ∧ B, Γ′′ and d1 is
....
u :ψ A, u :ψ B, Γ′′ n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
u :ψ A ∧ B, Γ′′ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
L∧
From d2 and the premise of L∧ we find d by applying IH and L∧
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u :ψ A, u :ψ B, Γ′′ n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C x :ϕ C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
u :ψ A, u :ψ B, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ IH
u :ψ A ∧ B, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ L∧
The proof is similar when R1 is one of the other propositional rules or a modal rule
without variable condition, that is LK and LK′. Suppose that d1 is the conclusion
of an announcement rule like L[ ] or R[ ] with principal formula u :ϕ [A]B
....
u :ψ,A B, Γ′′ n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
u :ψ [A]B, Γ′′ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
L[ ]
A derivation d of the conclusion of cut can be found in this way
u :ψ,A B, Γ′′ n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C x :ϕ C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
u :ψ,A B, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ SIH
u :ψ [A]B, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ L[ ]
The case in which d1 is by L0 or R0 are similar. When the last step of d1 is by a
modal rule with variable condition, say RK′, we have
....
uRψa v, v :ψ A, Γ
n−→ ∆′′, vψ,AB, x :ϕ C
Γ n−→ ∆′′, uψ,AKaB, x :ϕ C
RK′
where v is the eigenvariable of the rule and does not appear in the conclusion. We
find d by applying IH on the premise of RK′ and d2. We need hp-admissibility of
substitution in order to avoid variable clash because v may occur in Γ′,∆′. So, let z
be a fresh label
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uRψa v, v :ψ A, Γ
(n−1)−−−→ ∆′′, vψ,AB, x :ϕ C
uRψa z, z :ψ A, Γ
(n−1)−−−→ ∆′′, zψ,AB, x :ϕ C
z/v
x :ϕ C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
uRψa z, z :ψ A, Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆′′, zψ,AB
SIH
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆′′, uψ,AKaB RK
′
Finally, we have the cases in which the left premise of cut is concluded by a math-
ematical rule, say Re fa. In this case, d1 is of the form
uRau, Γ
n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
Refa
The conclusion of cut is found from d2 and the premise of Re fa
uRau, Γ
n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C x :ϕ C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
uRau, Γ, Γ′ →,∆′,∆ SIH
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ Refa
Analogously, when d1 is concluded by Syma or Transa
....
vRau, uRav, Γ′′
n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
uRav, Γ′′
n−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
Syma
....
uRaw, uRav, vRaw, Γ′′
n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
uRav, vRaw, Γ′′
n−→ ∆, x :ϕ C
Transa
In the first case, d is found as follows
vRau, uRav, Γ′′
n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C x :ϕ C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
vRau, uRav, Γ′′, Γ′ →,∆′,∆ SIH
uRav, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆
Syma
Else, if d1 is concluded by Transa, d is
wRau, uRav, vRaw, Γ′′
n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ C x :ϕ C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
uRaw, uRav, vRaw, Γ′′, Γ′ →,∆′,∆ SIH
vRau, uRav, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆
Transa
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Case 2b
Similar to case 2a.
Case 2c
Suppose now that the cut formula x :ϕ C is principal in both d1 and d2. We take
into account only the cases arising from announcement and atomic rules, the other
being analogous. We argue by distinction of cases according to the structure of
x :ϕ C. If C is atomic and ϕ non empty, that is, if x : C is of the form x :ϕ,A P, then
d1 and d2 are
....
Γ n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ P
Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ,A P
R0
....
x :ϕ P, Γ′ m−1−−→ ∆′
x :ϕ,A P, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
L0
At this stage IH is applicable because `(x :ϕ P) < `(x :ϕ,A P) and d is found as
follows.
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ P x :ϕ P, Γ′ → ∆′
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ IH
If the cut formula is of the form x :ϕ [B]C then from d1 and d2 of the form
....
Γ n−1−−→ ∆, x :ϕ,B C
Γ n−→ ∆, x :ϕ [B]C
R[ ]
....
x :ϕ,B C, Γ′ m−1−−→ ∆′
x :ϕ [B]C, Γ′ m−→ ∆′
L[ ]
a derivation d is found as follows
Γ→ ∆, x :ϕ,B C x :ϕ,B C, Γ′ → ∆′
Γ, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ IH
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The admissibility of cut and other structural rules has as main consequence the
possibility to use the system G3PAL for searching systematically derivations in
PAL. This possibility is precluded with the Hilbert-style system of the next section.
4.4 Completeness
In the table below, we recall from Bucheli et al. (2010) the standard Hilbert-style
system for PAL (PAL). We shall prove that all PAL axioms are derivable and all
PAL rules are admissible in G3PAL. More specifically, PAL axioms can be proved
to be derivable in G3PAL by applying a systematic proof-search procedure. PAL
rules, modus ponens and the necessitation, are admissible in G3PAL by using
the admissible rules of G3PAL. Derivability and admissibility in G3PAL of PAL
axioms and rules give that every theorem of PAL is derivable, that is, PAL ⊆
G3PAL. The completeness theorem for PAL proved in Gerbrandy and Groenveled
(1997) and in Bucheli et al. (2010) permits to conclude that every valid sequent
of PAL is derivable in G3PAL. The proof is indirect proof since it is based on the
completeness of the axiomatic system PAL. The other direction of the inclusion
G3PAL ⊆ PAL can be proved following the pattern of Theorem 2.4.1 and gives the
equivalence between PAL and G3PAL. However, completeness can be established
also directly by extending the proof of the Theorem 2.4.3. The results of this section
also exemplify how G3PAL is used for making proofs in PAL. In fact, PAL axioms
are difficult to use in practice because they reduction axioms: Every formula that
contains announcements can be rewritten into a formula without announcements.
On the contrary, the admissibility of the structural rules in G3PAL allow a proof-
search procedure for G3PAL derivations, that is, permit to construct a derivation
starting from the conclusion: the end-sequent is analyzed in order to determine a
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last possible rule of inference and thus its premise(s). The procedure is iterated
until a node at which no rule can be applied is reached: If every leaf is an initial
sequent or a conclusion of L⊥, we obtain a derivation. Otherwise, the procedure
fails if at least one of the leaves is not an initial sequent or a conclusion L⊥, or if
the proof search does not terminate. The table below shows the axioms and rules
of the axiomatic system given in Bucheli et al. (2010).
A1 All the axioms of modal logic S5
A2 [A]P ⊃⊂ P Atomic Independence
A3 [A](B ⊃ C) ⊃⊂ ([A]B ⊃ [A]C) Normality
A4 [A]¬B ⊃⊂ ¬[A]B Functionality
A5 [A]KaB ⊃⊂ Ka(A ⊃ [A]B) Update
A6 [A][B]C ⊃⊂ [A ∧ [A]B]C Announcements Composition
R1 From Γ ` A ⊃ B and ∆ ` A infer Γ,∆ ` B Modus Ponens
R2 From ` A infer ` KaA Necessitation
Through the admissibility of the structural rules and cut it is possible in G3PAL to
find systematically a derivation for each axiom of the list above. The admissibility
of the necessitation and modus ponens are proved as in Lemma 3.4.9.
Lemma 4.4.1. All the axioms (rules) of PAL are derivable (resp. admissible) in
G3PAL.
Proof. By applying a systematic proof-search procedure from the sequent to be
derived. First, axiom A2 is derivable as follows:
x : P→ x : P
x :A P→ x : P L0
x : [A]P→ x : P L[ ]
→ x : [A]P ⊃ P R⊃
x : P→ x : P
x : P→ x :A P R0
x : P→ x : [A]P R[ ]
→ x : P ⊃ [A]P R⊃
The derivation of axiom A3 (left-to-right direction) is
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x :A B→ x :A C, x :A B x :A C, x :A B→ x :A C
x :A B ⊃ C, x :A B→ x :A C L⊃
x :A (B ⊃ C), x :A B→ x : [A]C R[ ]
x : [A](B ⊃ C), x : [A]B→ x : [A]C L[ ]
→ x : [A](B ⊃ C) ⊃ ([A]B ⊃ [A]C) R⊃
where the top sequents are derivable by Lemma 4.3.1. Axiom A3 (right-to-left
direction) is derivable as follows
x :A B→ x :A C, x :A B
x :A B→ x :A C, x : [A]B R[ ]
x :A C, x :A B→ x :A C
x : [A]C, x :A B→ x :A C L[ ]
x : [A]B ⊃ [A]C, x :A B→ x :A C L⊃
x : [A]B ⊃ [A]C → x :A B ⊃ C R⊃
x : [A]B ⊃ [A]C → x : [A](B ⊃ C) R[ ]
→ x : ([A]B ⊃ [A]C) ⊃ [A](B ⊃ C) R⊃
where the top sequents are derivable by Lemma 4.3.1. Axiom A4 can be derived
by the following derivation
x :A B→ x :A B
x :A ¬B, x :A B→ L¬
x : [A]¬B, x : [A]B→ L[ ]
x : [A]¬B→ x : ¬[A]B R¬
→ x : [A]¬B ⊃ ¬[A]B R⊃
x :A B→ x :A B
→ x :A ¬B, x :A B R¬
→ x : [A]¬B, x : ¬[A]B R[ ]
x : ¬[A]B→ x : [A]¬B L¬
→ x : ¬[A]B ⊃ [A]¬B R⊃
where the top sequents are derivable by Lemma 4.3.1. Axiom A5 (left-to-right
direction) has the following derivation:
y :A B, xRay, x :A KaB, y : A→ y :A B
y :A B, xRay, x :A KaB, y : A→ y : [A]B
R[ ]
xRay, x :A KaB, y : A→ y : [A]B LK
′
xRay, x :A KaB→ y : A ⊃ [A]B
R⊃
x :A KaB→ x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B)
RK
x : [A]KaB→ x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B) L[ ]
→ x : [A]KaB ⊃ Ka(A ⊃ [A]B) R⊃
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where the top sequent is derivable by Lemma 4.3.1. Axiom A5 (right-to-left direc-
tion) is derivable with the following derivation
x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B), xRay, y : A→ y :A B, y : A
y :A B, x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B), xRay, y : A→ y :A B
y : [A]B, x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B), xRay, y : A→ y :A B
L[ ]
y : A ⊃ [A]B, x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B), xRay, y : A→ y :A B
L⊃
x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B), xRay, y : A→ y :A B
LK
x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B)→ x :A KaB
RK′
x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B)→ x : [A]KaB
R[ ]
→ x : Ka(A ⊃ [A]B) ⊃ [A]KaB R⊃
where the top sequents are derivable by Lemma 4.3.1. The derivation of axiom A6
is found as follows
x :A,B C → x :A,B C
x :A,B C → x :A∧[A]B C
Rcmp
x :A,B C → x : [A ∧ [A]B]C R[ ]
x : [A][B]C → x : [A ∧ [A]B]C L[ ]
→ x : [A][B]C ⊃ [A ∧ [A]B]C R⊃
x :A,B C → x :A,B C
x :A∧[A]B C → x :A,B C
Lcmp
x :A∧[A]B C → x : [A][B]C
R[ ]
x : [A ∧ [A]B]C → x : [A][B]C L[ ]
→ x : [A ∧ [A]B]C ⊃ [A][B]C R⊃
where the top sequents are derivable by Lemma 4.3.1. The derivation of composi-
tionality axiom A6 requires the rules Lcmp and Rcmp. These rules make derivable
also the other property of PAL, that is, the associativity of public announcements
(see 4.1.1) by the following
x :A,B,C D → x :A,B,C D
x :A,B∧[B]C D → x :A,B,C D
Lcmp
x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D → x :A,B,C D L[ ]
x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D → x :A,B [C]D R[ ]
x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D → x :A∧[A]B [C]D
Rcmp
x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D → x : [A ∧ [A]B][C]D R[ ]
→ x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D ⊃ [A ∧ [A]B][C]D R⊃
and
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x :A,B,C D → x :A,B,C D
x :A,B,C D → x :A,B∧[B]C D
Rcmp
x :A,B,C D → x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D R[ ]
x :A,B [C]D → x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D L[ ]
x :A∧[A]B [C]D → x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D
Lcmp
x : [A ∧ [A]B][C]D → x : [A][B ∧ [B]C]D L[ ]
→ x : [A ∧ [A]B][C]D ⊃ [A][B ∧ [B]C]D R⊃
The proofs of admissibility of modus ponens and necessitation is the same as in
G3K.

It is possible to give also a direct completeness proof for G3PAL following the
pattern of Theorem 2.4.3 of the previous section. The theorem has been proved
for the P-interpretation of announcements in Maffezioli and Negri (2010) and we
shall give here the corresponding proof for the GG-interpretation.
Theorem 4.4.2. For all Γ → ∆ in G3PAL either Γ → ∆ is derivable or it has a
countermodel.
Proof. We define for an arbitrary Γ → ∆ of G3PAL a reduction tree by applying
the rules of G3PAL root first in all possible ways. If the construction terminates
we obtain a proof, else the tree becomes infinite. By König’s lemma an infinite tree
has an infinite branch that is used to define a countermodel to the end-sequent.
Construction of the reduction tree
The reduction tree is defined inductively in stages as follows: Stage 0 has Γ → ∆
at the root of the tree. Stage n > 0 has two cases:
CASE I: If every topmost sequent is initial or a conclusion of L⊥ the construction
of the tree ends.
142
CASE II: If not every topmost sequent is initial or a conclusion of L⊥, we continue
the construction of the tree by writing above those sequents that are not initial
nor a conclusion of L⊥, other sequents that are obtained by applying root first the
rules of G3PAL whenever possible, in a give order. There are 14 different stages,
8 for the propositional and atomic rules, 2 for the epistemic rules for each K, 2 for
the announcement rules, and 2 for the composition of announcements. At stage
n = 15 we repeat stage 1, at stage n = 16 we repeat stage 2, and so on for every n.
We will not take into account the details of the proof when the topmost sequents
have either a conjunction, or a disjunction, or an implication, or else an epistemic
formula as principal formula, the proof being similar to the proof given in Negri
(2009). The essentially new cases are as follows.
We start, for n = 1, with L0. For each topmost sequent of the form
x1 :ϕ,A P1, . . . , xm :ϕ,A PmΓ′ → ∆
where P1, . . . Pm are all the formulas in Γ with an atom as the principal formula, we
write
x1 :ϕ P1, . . . , xm :ϕ Pm, Γ′ → ∆
on top of it. This corresponds to applying m times rule L0.
For n = 2, with R0. For each topmost sequent of the form
Γ→ ∆′x1 :ϕ,A P1, . . . , xm :ϕ,A Pm
where P1, . . . Pm are all the formulas in ∆ with an atom as the principal formula,
we write
Γ′ → ∆′x1 :ϕ P1, . . . , xm :ϕ Pm
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on top of it. This corresponds to applying m times rule R0. For the stages from
n = 3 to n = 10, corresponding to propositional and epistemic cases, the proof is
analogous to Negri (2009).
For n = 11, take all the topmost sequents with x1 :ϕ [B1]C1, . . . , xm :ϕ [Bm]Cm in the
antecedent, and write on top of these sequents
x1 :ϕ,B1 C1, . . . , xm :ϕ,Bm Cm, Γ′ → ∆
For n = 12, take all the topmost sequents with x1 :ϕ [B1]C1, . . . , xm :ϕ [Bm]Cm in the
succedent, and write on top of these sequents
Γ→ ∆′, x1 :ϕ,B1 C1, . . . , xm :ϕ,Bm Cm
For n = 13, we consider all the topmost sequents with the multiset of formulas
x1 :ϕ,A∧[A]B C1, . . . , xm :ϕ,A∧[A]B Cm in the antecedent, and write on top of these
sequents
x1 :ϕ,A,B C1, . . . , xm :ϕ,A,B Cm, Γ′ → ∆
that is, apply m times Lcmp.
Likewise, for n = 14, take all the topmost sequents with the multiset of formu-
las x1 :ϕ,A∧[A]B C1, . . . , xm :ϕ,A∧[A]B Cm in the succedent, and write on top of these
sequents
Γ→ ∆′, x1 :ϕ,A,B C1, . . . , xm :ϕ,A,B Cm
that is, apply m times Rcmp.
For any n, for each sequent that is neither initial, nor conclusion of L⊥, nor treat-
able by any one of the above reductions, we write the sequent itself above it. If the
reduction tree is finite, all its leaves are initial or conclusions of L⊥, and the tree,
read from the leaves to the root, yields a derivation.
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Construction of the countermodel
By König’s lemma, if the reduction tree is infinite, it has an infinite branch. Let
Γ0 → ∆0 ≡ Γ → ∆, Γ1 → ∆1, . . . , Γi → ∆i, . . . be one such branch. Consider the set
of labelled formulas and relational atoms
Γ ≡ ⋃
i≥0
Γi and ∆ ≡ ⋃
i≥0
∆i
We define a restricted Kripke model that forces all formulas in Γ and no formula in
∆ and is therefore a countermodel to the sequent Γ → ∆. The construction of the
countermodel is similar to that given in Theorem 2.4.3 and in Negri (2009). The
new cases are:
If x :ϕ [B]C is in Γ, we find x :ϕ,B C in Γ. By IH x ϕ,B C, and therefore x ϕ [B]C in
the model.
If x :ϕ [B]C is in ∆, consider the step at which the reduction for x :ϕ [B]C applies.
We find w :ϕ,B C in ∆. By IH x 1ϕ,B C, and by definition of the semantics x 1ϕ [B]C.
If x :ϕ,A∧[A]B C is in Γ, for some i, x :ϕ,A,B C is in Γi. By IH x ϕ,A,B C and by Lemma
4.1.2 we conclude x ϕ,A∧[A]B C.
If x :ϕ,A∧[A]B C is in ∆, for some i, x :ϕ,A,B C is in ∆i. By IH x 1ϕ,A,B C and by Lemma
4.1.2 we conclude x 1ϕ,A∧[A]B C. 
Corollary 4.4.3. If a sequent Γ → ∆ is valid in every restricted Kripke model then
it is derivable in G3PAL.
4.5 Conclusions
Although we focused mostly on GG-announcements, in the literature on DEL the
P-interpretation of announcement is dominant. In van Ditmarsch et al. (2007, p.
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89) is proposed the following axiomatization for Plaza’s announcements, where it
is clear that it is assumed the truth of what is announced.
A1 All the axioms of modal logic S5
A2 [A]P ⊃⊂ (A ⊃ P) Atomic Permanence
A3 [A](B ∧ C) ⊃⊂ ([A]B ∧ [A]C) Announcement and Conjunction
A4 [A]¬B ⊃⊂ (A ⊃ ¬[A]B) Announcement and Negation
A5 [A]KaB ⊃⊂ (A ⊃ Ka[A]B) Announcement and Knowledge
A6 [A][B]C ⊃⊂ [A ∧ [A]B]C Announcements Composition
R1 From Γ ` A ⊃ B and ∆ ` A infer Γ,∆ ` B Modus Ponens
R2 From ` A infer ` KaA Necessitation
Obviously, axioms A1, A3 and A5 cannot be derived using the rules applied so
far. However, if we consider the rules for P-announcements it is possible to find
a derivation of all the axioms listed above. For instance, consider axiom A1 using
and derive it by using the rules L0′, R0′, L[ ]′ and R[ ]′ of the previous section. We
have:
x : A, x : P, x : [A]P, x : A→ x : P
x :A P, x : [A]P, x : A→ x : P L0
′
x : [A]P, x : A→ x : P L[ ]
′
x : [A]P→ x : A ⊃ P
→ x : [A]P ⊃ (A ⊃ P) R⊃
R⊃
And, in the opposite direction
x : A ⊃ P, x : A→ x : A
x : A→ x : P, x : A x : P, x : A→ x : P
x : A ⊃ P, x : A→ x : P L⊃
x : A ⊃ P, x : A→ x :A P R0
′
x : A ⊃ P→ x : [A]P R[ ]
′
→ x : (A ⊃ P) ⊃ [A]P R⊃
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In this chapter, we introduced a sequent system for the logic of public announce-
ments and proved that all the structural properties are satisfied. Moreover, we
proved both indirectly, through equivalence with the axiomatic system, and di-
rectly, through the method of reduction trees, its completeness with respect to the
semantics of restricted Kripke models. As we pointed out, G3PAL is not only a
different formalism, alternative to the standard axiom systems: It is designed for
making explicit the structure of proofs in PAL. The novelty of G3PAL is that the
rules incorporate the notion of model change and the dynamics of information up-
date through the internalization of semantics of restricted forcing into the syntax
of the calculus. The next step should be that of adding rules to deal with the
common knowledge operator (cf. van Ditmarsch et al. 2007) in order to formalize
sentences such as: “After it is announced that A, it is a common knowledge among
the agents that A”. However, the proof theory of the logic of common knowledge
(with or without public announcements) is problematic and requires a rule with
an infinite number of premise. Thus, the possibility of mechanizing proofs is def-
initely lost. A closely related approach is presented in Balbiani et al. (2010) in
which a tableau system for PAL is given. From the point of view of sequent sys-
tems, a tableau proof can be regarded as a single-sided sequent calculus proof, with
formulas only in the antecedent, that aims at a check for satisfiability, whereas a
sequent proof in a labelled system is a check for validity. By the duality in a clas-
sical framework between the unsatisfiability of a formula and the validity of its
negation, the two approaches are duals to each other. The tableau system of Bal-
biani et al. (2010) operates on labelled formulas and accessibility relations: It has
labels that range over natural numbers, which would seem to impose a restric-
tion to linear orders, whereas our system does not assume any underlying implicit
structure on the set of labels, but imposes it with suitable properties of the ex-
plicit accessibility relation. A closed tableau corresponds to a proof in our system,
whereas an open tableau gives a countermodel.
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Chapter5
The Church-Fitch Paradox
In this chapter, the attention focuses on the Church-Fitch paradox of knowa-
bility (see Fitch 1963 and Salerno 2009 for an historical introduction). The Church-
Fitch’s paradox is a well-known semantic paradox that claims to threaten the anti-
realist position about truth by deriving that every truth is actually known (omni-
science thesis) from the assumption that every truth is possibly known (knowa-
bility principle). The principle gets formalized as A ⊃ ♦KA (“if A is true then
it possible to know that A”), and along with minimal assumptions on K and the
use of classical logic, makes it possible to derive the counter-intuitive conclusion
A ⊃ KA (“if A is true that it is known”). We propose a Gentzen-style reconstruc-
tion of the Church-Fitch paradox following a labelled approach to sequent calculi.
First, it is shown how to identify the semantic condition for A ⊃ ♦KA to be valid
by exploiting cut elimination in labelled systems. This condition is then converted
into non-logical inference rule by applying the method of-axioms-as-rules. Finally,
when the rule is made part of logical system, it is possible to provide an adequate
proof-theory governing the interaction among the modalities involved in Fitch’s
proof and to give a logical framework for dealing with Fitch’s paradox (knowability
logic). Moreover, it is argued in favor of the use of intuitionsitic logic as a solu-
tion of the paradox and it is shown that A ⊃ KA is only classically derivable, but
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neither intuitionistically derivable nor intuitionistically admissible.
5.1 Overview
According to the Dummettian tradition in the philosophy of language, realism /
anti-realism debate can be characterized in terms of the notion of truth involved.
Realism takes the notion of truth either as primitive or as defined over the notion
of “fact”, whereas anti-realism embraces an epistemic conception of truth. One
possible version of this epistemic conception is the following:
(1E) A is true if and only if it is possible to exhibit a direct justification for A.
A justification is something connected to linguistic practice, therefore it is sup-
posed not to transcend our epistemic capacities. This leads to:
(2E) If it is possible to exhibit a direct justification for A, then it is possible to
know that A.
Putting (1E) and (2E) together we get what is called the knowability principle:
(3E) If A is true, then it is possible to know that A.
What is known as the Fitch or Church-Fitch paradox is an argument that threat-
ens the anti-realist position: In the argument, it is concluded from the knowability
principle that all truths are actually known, a paradoxical consequence, known
as the principle of omniscience, that undermines the epistemic conception of
truth. The paradox was presented in Fitch (1963) but, as recently discovered by
Joe Salerno and Julien Murzi, it was actually suggested by Church in a series of
referee’s reports dating back to 1945 and now reproduced in Salerno (2009). The
force of the argument lies in the fact that it is a formal argument, completely devel-
oped in a plainly faultless logical setting. More precisely, the knowability principle
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is formalized with a schema that uses two modal operators, K and ♦. The first is
a zero-agent epistemic operator K to be read as “it is known that . . . ”. The second
is the possibility operator ♦ to be read as “it is possible that . . . ”. In this formal
language, the knowability principle takes the form of the schema
A ⊃ ♦KA KP
In the same manner, omniscience is formalized by the schema
A ⊃ KA OP
The Church-Fitch paradox consists in a formal derivation that starts from KP,
passes through its instance with the Moore sentence1 A ∧ ¬KA, and then leads to
OP by using only logical steps. We shall consider here only the definition of K as a
primitive modal operator, and not the one, alternatively proposed by Fitch at the
end of his paper (1963, p. 141) in which K is defined on the basis of a causation
relation that allows to define knowledge in terms of justified true belief.
Many different ways to block the paradox have been proposed. They can be grouped
into three categories of intervention:
1. Restriction on the possible instances of KP (Dummett 2001, Tennant 1997,
2009, Restall 2009);
2. Reformulation of the formalization of the knowability principle (Edington
1985, Rabinowicz and Segerberg 1994, Martin-Löf 1998, van Benthem 2009,
Burgess 2009, Proietti and Sandu 2010, Artemov and Protopopescu 2011,
Proietti 2011);
3. Revision of the logical framework in which the derivation is made (Williamson
1982, Beall 2000, 2009, Wansing 2002a, Dummett 2009, Giaretta 2009, Priest
2009).
1We extend here to knowledge the usual notion of Moore sentence, originally conceived for belief.
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Even if some of the proposed solutions focus on the type of derivability relation that
connects OP to KP, none of them has taken derivations themselves as objects of
study or analyzes the structure of the derivation of OP from KP. Our precise aim,
instead, is to focus on this analysis. Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the
standard derivation of the Church-Fitch paradox is given in an axiomatic calcu-
lus (Beall 2000, Brogaard and Salerno 2009, Wansing 2002a). This calculus hides
structural operations such as cut, weakening and contraction. For the purposes of
an analysis that leaves no inferential passage implicit, it is therefore preferable to
move to systems of sequent calculus that make these operations explicit, and, by
a suitable design as achieved in the G3-systems, completely eliminable. We begin
with a sequent calculus derivation of the Church-Fitch paradox, built by translat-
ing a natural deduction derivation. The calculus that it is used is contraction free
and cut free, thus a good basis for the structural analysis of the paradox. How-
ever, the presence of an axiomatic assumption in the derivation results in a non-
eliminable cut. As we shall see, the method of axioms-as-rules is not applicable
here because the knowability principle cannot be reduced to its atomic instances.
This fact is established syntactically by means of a failed proof search in the given
sequent system. We turn therefore to the method of labelled calculi and present a
bimodal extension of the system G3I of Ch. 3. We show that the system has all
the structural rules admissible. The system is equivalent to a standard axiomatic
system used in the analysis of the paradox, but the labelled approach allows a
stronger completeness result: We prove completeness in a direct way by showing
that for every sequent in the language of the logic in question, either there is a
proof in the calculus, or a countermodel in a precisely defined frame class is found.
The completeness result is used for showing that the classical standard form of
the Church-Fitch paradox is not derivable intuitionistically: We consider the clas-
sically derivable sequent with KP instantiated with the Moore sentence A ∧ ¬KA
as an antecedent and OP instantiated with A as succedent. Then, by the failed
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proof search, we extract a countermodel for OP. The argument suffices for block-
ing, within an intuitionistic bimodal system, the specific proof of the paradox, but
it is not yet conclusive. To conclude that an intuitionistic system that incorporates
KP as a derivation principle does not derive OP, it is not sufficient to shown that
OP does not follow from a particular instance of KP. Therefore, we make clear,
through an example from classical logic, that the notion to be considered when
comparing principles of proof should be admissibility, rather than derivability. To
clarify the relation between the two principles, it is necessary to make explicit the
conditions that characterize their validity. The semantical assumption behind the
axiom schema KP is determined, and the frame condition KP-Fr is then made part
of the logical system in the form of a block of additional rules of inference, linked by
a variable condition. By this addition, a complete contraction- and cut-free proof
system for intuitionistic bimodal logic extended with the knowability principle is
obtained. We show, using proof search and construction of countermodels, that OP
is not derivable in the system, therefore not valid. We also discuss how an over-
sight on the variable condition could lead to an opposite conclusion. We then show
how, by just adding symmetry of the preorder, OP becomes derivable. The latter
is a cut-free derivation of the Church-Fitch paradox that uses KP as a derivation
principle and that guarantees that the source of the paradox is to be found only in
the assumption on which it depends. It is also shown that the same result can be
obtained for belief-like notions of knowledge that do not assume factivity among
their defining principles.
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5.2 Towards a structural analysis of the Church-
Fitch argument
The Church-Fitch paradox was originally presented in Fitch (1963) without using
an explicit logical system, and it was later formalized using semantic arguments
and various deductive systems for modal logic: linear derivations, natural deduc-
tion, sequent calculus. All these formalizations have contributed to single out a
minimal logical ground that gives rise to the paradox. It consists in a basic bi-
modal logic that extends classical propositional logic with an alethic modality ♦
and an epistemic modality K. No requirement is made on the alethic modality,
whereas the epistemic modality is supposed to satisfy distributivity over con-
junction, K(A ∧ B) ⊃ KA ∧ KB, and factivity, KA ⊃ A. The former property is
indeed derivable for any necessity-like modality in normal modal logic, so the only
requirement added to a normal bimodal logic is factivity of K. A formalization of
the Church-Fitch argument is the first step towards its analysis. We start with a
derivation in natural deduction:
2
[A ∧ ¬KA]
KP
A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) ⊃E
1
[K(A ∧ ¬KA)]
KA K∧1
1
[K(A ∧ ¬KA)]
K¬KA K∧2
¬KA KE
⊥ ⊃E
⊥ ♦E1
¬(A ∧ ¬KA) ⊃I2
The conclusion is the weaker intuitionistic version of OP, and intuitionistically
equivalent to A ⊃ ¬¬KA. We will call both of them WOP (for weak omniscience
principle). The conclusion A ⊃ KA is obtained by classical propositional steps
and leads, in conjunction with factivity, to the identification of truth and knowl-
edge, A ⊃⊂ KA. A closer inspection of the derivation above shows that we used
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the following rules
K(A ∧ B)
KA K∧1
K(A ∧ B)
KB K∧2
These are derivable in any system of normal epistemic modal logic. Rule KE corre-
sponds to factivity of knowledge and rule ♦E is the dual of the familiar necessita-
tion rule: observe that the latter can be formulated in natural deduction as
♦A
1
[A]....⊥
⊥ ♦E1
The minor premise of the rule is ⊥ and may depend on A, discharged by the rule,
similarly to the rule of existence elimination, with falsity, rather than any formula
not containing the eigenvariable, as the minor premise. With a sequent notation
and an empty succedent in place of ⊥, the rule becomes
A→
♦A→
This rule is the dual of the rule of of necessitation:
→ A
→ A
A further step in the analysis of derivations comes from sequent calculus that
has several advantages over natural deduction. First, structural steps are explicit
and not hidden in vacuous and multiple discharge and in non-normal instances of
rules (see Negri and von Plato 2001, Ch. 1). Secondly, sequent calculus, contrary
to natural deduction, is well suited for classical logic and its modal extensions.
The sequent calculus that we shall use is obtained as an extension of the classical
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propositional contraction-free sequent calculus G3c with the following rules for
the alethic and epistemic modalities, where KΓ denotes the multiset of all the KA
for A in Γ:
Modal rules of G3♦K
Γ→ A
KΓ,Θ→ ∆,KA LR-K
A,KA, Γ→ ∆
KA, Γ→ ∆ LK
A→ ∆
♦A, Γ→ Θ,♦∆ LR-♦
The resulting system, called G3♦K, is an extension of the calculus G3K presented
in section 4 of Hakli and Negri (2011), and the proof of its structural properties
follows the lines of the proof for G3K:
Theorem 5.2.1. In G3♦K it holds that:
i) All sequents of the form A, Γ→ ∆, A are derivable;
ii) All the propositional rules are height-preserving invertible;
iii) Weakening and contraction are hp-admissible.
iv) Cut is admissible.
Proof. We show here only one extra case that arises in the proof of cut elimination
because of the addition of rule LK, with the cut formula principal in both premises
of cut, the right one being LK:
Γ→ A
Θ,KΓ→ ∆,KA LR-K
KA, A, Γ′ → ∆′
KA, Γ′ → ∆′ LK
Θ,KΓ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ CUT
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The cut is transformed as follows in two consecutive cuts, the upper of decreased
derivation height, the lower of decreased cut formula height. Repeated applica-
tions of LK are denoted by a double inference line.
Γ→ A
Θ,KΓ→ ∆,KA KA, A, Γ′ → ∆′
A,Θ,KΓ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ CUT
Θ, Γ,KΓ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ CUT
Θ,KΓ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ LK
The conversions for a cut formula of the form ♦A principal in both premises of cut
in LR-♦ is symmetric to the conversion of a cut formula of the form KA principal
in both premises of cut in LR-K treated in the above mentioned article. 
The sequent-style reconstruction of the Church-Fitch paradox calls for the follow-
ing
Lemma 5.2.2. The following rules
→ A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
A,¬KA→ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) Inv
KA,K¬KA→
K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ Distr
are derivable in G3♦K with cut.
Proof. By the two derivations
→ (A ∧ ¬KA) ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
A→ A ¬KA→ ¬KA
A,¬KA→ A ∧ ¬KA R∧ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
A,¬KA, (A ∧ ¬KA) ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) L⊃
A,¬KA→ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) CUT
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A,¬KA→ ¬KA
A ∧ ¬KA→ ¬KA L∧
K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ K¬KA LR-K
A,¬KA→ A
A ∧ ¬KA→ A L∧
K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ KA LR-K KA,K¬KA→
K(A ∧ ¬KA),K¬KA→ CUT
K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ CUT
The topmost sequents, except of the premises of the rules in question, are derivable
by Theorem 5.2.1.

A proof of the Church-Fitch paradox can now be obtained as a derivation in sys-
tem G3♦K of the sequent → A ⊃ KA from a special instance of the knowability
principle KP, the sequent→ (A ∧ ¬KA) ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA), as follows
KP
→ A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
A,¬KA→ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) Inv
KA→ KA
KA,¬KA→ L¬
KA,K¬KA,¬KA→ L-W
KA,K¬KA→ LK
K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ Distr
♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ LR-♦
A,¬KA→ CUT
A→ ¬¬KA R¬
KA→ KA
→ KA,¬KA R¬
¬¬KA→ KA L¬
A→ KA CUT
→ A ⊃ KA R⊃
Observe that the presence of the the sequent → A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) from
which the derivation starts makes the application of cut non-eliminable because,
in general, cut elimination fails when cuts depend on proper axioms. By applying
the method of axioms-as-rules introduced in the previous section, KP should be
converted into a rule of the form
♦KA, Γ→ ∆
A, Γ→ ∆ Kn
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This rule can be easily proved to be equivalent to the sequent→ A ⊃ ♦KA. Then,
it should be reduced to a rule that has only formulas devoid of logical structure as
principal, i.e., a reduction of the general knowability principle to the knowability
principle for only atomic formulas. If such were the case, the rule in the above
derivation could be turned into a left rule of sequent calculus with atomic principal
formulas, of the form
♦KP, Γ→ ∆
P, Γ→ ∆ Kn-At
However, it can be proved that the knowability principle cannot be reduced to its
atomic instances. By the following result, the knowability principle on a conjunc-
tion does not follow from the knowability on its conjuncts.
Lemma 5.2.3. The sequent P ⊃ ♦KP,Q ⊃ ♦KQ → P ∧ Q ⊃ ♦K(P ∧ Q) is not
derivable in G3♦K.
Proof. The result is obtained through a failed proof-search procedure: Start a
derivation tree with the sequent P ⊃ ♦KP,Q ⊃ ♦KQ → P ∧ Q ⊃ ♦K(P ∧ Q) as
a root and apply backwards all the propositional rules:
Q ⊃ ♦KQ, P,Q→ ♦K(P ∧Q), P
♦KP, P,Q→ ♦K(P ∧Q),Q
....
♦KP,♦KQ, P,Q→ ♦K(P ∧Q)
♦KP,Q ⊃ ♦KQ, P,Q→ ♦K(P ∧Q) L⊃
P ⊃ ♦KP,Q ⊃ ♦KQ, P,Q→ ♦K(P ∧Q) L⊃
P ⊃ ♦KP,Q ⊃ ♦KQ, P ∧Q→ ♦K(P ∧Q) L∧
P ⊃ ♦KP,Q ⊃ ♦KQ→ P ∧Q ⊃ ♦K(P ∧Q) R⊃
Since the rules used are invertible, there is no need of backtracking. The left
premises of the two steps of L ⊃ are initial sequents, and therefore derivability of
the sequent is equivalent to derivability of the rightmost sequent, ♦KP,♦KQ, P,Q→
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♦K(P ∧ Q). Proof search for the latter can be effected in two ways, depending on
the choice of principal formula in LR-♦, each followed by an application of LR-K.
In one case it leads to the sequent Q → P, in the other to P → Q. Since both are
underivable, the proof search fails.

By Lemma 5.2.3 we conclude that the rule of knowability on arbitrary formulas
does not follow from its restriction to atomic formulas. The method of conversion
of axiom into rules, successfully employed elsewhere for extending structural proof
analysis from standard sequent calculi to systems with added axioms (see Negri
and von Plato 2001, 2011) thus cannot be applied in this case. We shall therefore
use the more refined labelled deductive machinery.
5.3 Intuitionistic bimodal logic
We start from the cut-free labelled calculi G3I for intuitionistic logic of Ch. 3 and
we consider its language augmented with two modalities K and ♦. The correspond-
ing accessibility relations in Kripke semantics are RK and R♦, and the behavior of
these two modal operators is captured by the following valuation clauses:
x  KA if and only if for all y, xRKy implies y  A
x  ♦A if and only if for some y, xR♦y and y  A
Each definition can be unfolded in the necessary and sufficient conditions and
converted into the following sequent rules, with the condition y 6= x, y /∈ Γ,∆
for RK and L♦.
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Logical rules of G3IK♦
y : A, xRKy, x : KA, Γ→ ∆
xRKy, x : KA, Γ→ ∆ LK
xRKy, Γ→ ∆, y : A
Γ→ ∆, x : KA RK
xR♦y, y : A, Γ→ ∆
x : ♦A, Γ→ ∆ L♦
xR♦y, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A, y : A
xR♦y, Γ→ ∆, x : ♦A R♦
Unlike for the extension with Sym6, in the presence of the new rules it is not
guaranteed that Theorem 3.5.2 is still valid. Moreover, we need to prove that the
full monotonicity property (Lemma 3.5.1) extends also to modal formulas. Indeed,
it is easy to see that if the standard rules for K and ♦ are used, Lemma 3.5.1 does
not hold. A possible way out has been found in Božic´ and Došen (1984) by requiring
that models satisfy the extra conditions
∀x∀y∀z(x 6 y ∧ yRKz ⊃ xRKz) MonK
∀x∀y∀z(x 6 y ∧ xR♦z ⊃ yR♦z) Mon♦
Observe that these conditions state that the following diagrams can be completed
(the completing arrows are the dotted ones):
x
y z
6
RK
RK
x
y z
6
R♦
R♦
Conditions MonK and Mon♦ are universal axioms and by applying the method of
conversion of axioms into sequent rules they become:
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Mathematical rules of G3IK♦
xRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, Γ→ ∆
x 6 y, yRKz, Γ→ ∆ MonK
yR♦z, x 6 y, xR♦z, Γ→ ∆
x 6 y, xR♦z, Γ→ ∆
Mon♦
We shall call G3IK♦ the extension of G3I with rules LK, RK, L♦, R♦, MonK and
Mon♦. With the new mathematical rules monotonicity of forcing can now be ex-
tended to cover arbitrary formula, including also modal formulas.
Lemma 5.3.1. In G3IK♦ it holds that
i) ` x 6 y, x : A, Γ→ ∆, y : A
ii) ` x : A, Γ→ ∆, x : A
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the height h of A, as in the proof of Lemma
3.5.1. The proof of ii is done at each step of the induction by Re f6 and the inductive
hypothesis of i. The most relevant cases of the proof of i are the following, where
the new mathematical rules are applied.
z 6 z, z : B, xRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, x : KB, Γ→ ∆, z : B
z : B, xRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, x : KB, Γ→ ∆, z : B Ref6
xRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, x : KB, Γ→ ∆, z : B LK
x 6 y, yRKz, x : KB, Γ→ ∆, z : B MonK
x 6 y, x : KB, Γ→ ∆, y : KB RK
z 6 z, yR♦z, x 6 y, xR♦z, z : B, Γ→ ∆, y : ♦B, z : B
yR♦z, x 6 y, xR♦z, z : B, Γ→ ∆, y : ♦B, z : B
Ref6
yR♦z, x 6 y, xR♦z, z : B, Γ→ ∆, y : ♦B R♦
x 6 y, xR♦z, z : B, Γ→ ∆, y : ♦B
Mon♦
x 6 y, x : ♦B, Γ→ ∆, y : ♦B L♦
where the topmost sequents are derivable by the inductive hypothesis. 
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Finally, the system G3IK♦ satisfies the structural properties of G3-systems, that
is, the admissibility of the structural rules and cut.
Theorem 5.3.2. In G3IK♦ it holds that
i) The substitution of labels is hp-admissible;
ii) All the logical rules are hp-invertible;
iii) The rules of weakening and contraction are hp-admissible;
iv) Cut is admissible.
Proof. (i) By induction on the height h of the derivation of the premise. If h = 0
and the substitution is not vacuous then Γ → ∆ is x 6 y, x : P, Γ′ → ∆′, y : P or
x : ⊥, Γ′ → ∆. In each case, we obtain an initial sequent or a conclusion of L⊥. If
h = n + 1, suppose by induction hypothesis (IH) that we have the conclusion for
derivations of height n and consider the last rule applied. If it is a rule without
a variable condition, apply IH to the premise(s) and then the rule. If the last
rule applied is either R ⊃, or RK, or L♦ we have to consider whether y is the
eigenvariable or not. Consider the case of L♦, the others being analogous. If y is
the eigenvariable then the premise is xR♦y, y : A, Γ′ → ∆ and we have to refresh by
IH y with a new z in order to avoid a variable clash, and we obtain a derivation of
xR♦z, z : A, Γ′ → ∆. Again by IH, we replace x with y and thus obtain the sequent
yR♦z, z : A, Γ′ → ∆. Next, we are allowed to apply L♦ to conclude y : ♦A, Γ′ → ∆.
Note that if the eigenvariable is x, the substitution is vacuous.
(ii) We prove the result for those rules that are not in common with G3I, the oth-
ers have been already proved admissible by Theorem 3.5.2. LK and R♦ are clearly
invertible by hp-admissibility of weakening. We consider only the case of L♦ be-
cause RK is analogous, and we proceed by induction on the height h of premise
x : ♦A, Γ → ∆. If h = 0 and the premise is initial or a conclusion of L⊥, then
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so is xR♦y, y : A, Γ → ∆. If h = n + 1 then x : ♦A, Γ → ∆ has been concluded
by a certain rule R. If x : ♦A is principal, then R is L♦ and its premise, that is
xR♦y, y : A, Γ → ∆, has a derivation with height n. If on the contrary x : ♦A
is not principal, consider what rule R is. If it is a rule without variable condi-
tion, apply the IH to its premise(s) and then R again. If R is, for instance, RK
with x : KB as principal formula, its premise is xRKy, x : ♦A, Γ → ∆′, y : B. Ap-
ply first hp-admissibility of substitution and replace y with a new z, so to obtain
xRKz, x : ♦A, Γ→ ∆′, z : B. Then by IH conclude xRKz, xR♦y, y : A, Γ→ ∆′, z : B and
by one application of RK obtain xR♦z, y : A, Γ→ ∆′, x : KB.
(iii) Consider the case of weakening with a relational atom xRy. The proof is by
induction on the height h of the derivation of the premise. The inductive step is
straightforward if the premise(s) is concluded by a rule without a variable con-
dition. If the last rule is a rule with a variable condition, say RK with x : KB
as principal formula, hp-admissibility of substitution is applied to its premise
xRKy, Γ → ∆′, y : B in order to replace the eigenvariable y with a new z. Then
by the IH and RK, we obtain the conclusion xRy, Γ→ ∆′, x : KB.
(iii) By simultaneous induction on the height h of the derivation. If h = 0, the
premise is an initial sequent or has been concluded by L⊥. In each case the con-
clusion is initial or L⊥. If h = n + 1, suppose the claim holds for derivations of
height n and distinguish what rule R is used to derive the premise. If the contrac-
tion formula is not principal in R, both occurrences are in the premise(s) of R and
by IH we can contract the two occurrences and obtain a smaller derivation height
of the conclusion. If contraction formula is principal of R, we distinguish two cases.
The premise is concluded by a rule with the repetition of the principal formula, as
L ⊃, LK, R♦, and the mathematical rules. In this case the IH is applicable directly
on the premise of R. For instance, if R is R♦, the the last step of the derivation is,
where Γ is xR♦y, Γ′):
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....
xR♦y, Γ′ → ∆, x : ♦A, x : ♦A, y : A
xR♦y, Γ′ → ∆, x : ♦A, x : ♦A
R♦
By IH on the premise we obtain xR♦y, Γ′ → ∆, x : ♦A, y : A and next by R♦ again
xR♦y, Γ′ → ∆, x : ♦A. If R is without repetition of principal formulas we need hp-
inversion on the premise(s), as in the standard proof for G3c. The crucial steps
here are the cases in which R is either R ⊃, or RK, or L♦, that is, rules with
variable condition. Take for instance the case in which R is L♦, the others being
analogous. The premise has the following derivation:
....
xR♦y, y : A, x : ♦A, Γ→ ∆
x : ♦A, x : ♦A, Γ→ ∆ L♦
By the invertibility of L♦, we obtain xR♦y, y : A, xR♦y, y : A, Γ → ∆. Then by IH,
y : A, xR♦y, Γ→ ∆ and, by L♦ again, we conclude x : ♦A, Γ→ ∆.
(iv) By induction on the height of the cut formula with subinduction on the sum
of the heights of the derivations of the premises of cut. We consider in detail only
the case of cut formula principal in modal rules in both premises of cut and in
mathematical rules. As for the latter, consider the case of left premise concluded
by MonK.
xRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, Γ′′ → ∆, x : A
x 6 y, yRKz, Γ′′ → ∆, x : A
MonK
x : A, Γ′ → ∆′
x 6 y, yRKz, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ CUT
It converts to
xRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, Γ′′ → ∆, x : A x : A, Γ′ → ∆′
xRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ CUT
x 6 y, yRKz, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆
MonK
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Likewise for other mathematical rules. If the cut formula is principal in a K-rule,
it is of the form x : KB and the cut derivation is
xRKz, Γ→ ∆, z : B
Γ→ ∆, x : KB RK
y : B, x : KB, xRKy, Γ′′ → ∆′
x : KB, xRKy, Γ′′ → ∆′ LK
xRKy, Γ′′, Γ→ ∆,∆′ CUT
It can be converted into
xRKz, Γ→ ∆, z : B
xRKy, Γ→ ∆, y : B z/y
xRKz, Γ→ ∆, z : B
Γ→ ∆, x : KB RK y : B, x : KB, xRKy, Γ′′ → ∆′
y : B, xRKy, Γ′′, Γ→ ∆,∆′ CUT
xRKy, xRKy, Γ′′, Γ, Γ→ ∆,∆,∆′ CUT
xRKy, Γ′′, Γ→ ∆,∆′ C
Note that the first cut reduced cut-height and the second is on a smaller formula.
If the cut formula is principal in a ♦-rule, it is of the form x : ♦B and the cut
derivation is
xR♦y, Γ′′ → ∆, x : ♦B, y : B
xR♦y, Γ′′ → ∆, x : ♦B
R♦
xR♦z, z : B, Γ′ → ∆′
x : ♦B, Γ′ → ∆′
xR♦y, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ CUT
and it can be converted into
xR♦y, Γ′′ → ∆, x : ♦B, y : B x : ♦B, Γ′ → ∆′
xR♦y, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆, y : B CUT
xR♦z, z : B, Γ′ → ∆′
xR♦y, y : B, Γ′ → ∆′
y/z
xR♦y, xR♦y, Γ′′, Γ′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆′,∆ CUT
xR♦y, Γ′′, Γ′ → ∆′,∆ C

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Observe that all the above structural results that have been established for G3IK♦
hold also for any of its extensions with frame rules that follow the regular or ge-
ometric rule schema. The details can be easily spelled out following the general
pattern of the parallel results of basic modal logic in Negri (2005).
We shall sketch the direct completeness proof, along the lines of Negri (2009), be-
cause this is the method that will permit proofs of underivability and constructions
of countermodels in what follows. The proof is similar to the proof of the complete-
ness theorem for G3K and we shall refer to it for the details. First, we adapt the
semantic definition of validity for a sequent Γ → ∆ to the setting of the bimodal
intuitionistic logic.
Definition. Let F = 〈X,6,RK,R♦〉 be a frame that satisfies the properties Ref6,
Trans6, MonK, Mon♦. A model M is a frame together with a binary relation 
between possible states and atomic formulas, x  P. The forcing is also monotone,
that is, if x  P and x 6 y then y  P. Let L be the set of labels, an interpretation
of the labels in a frame F is a function J·K : L −→ X that assigns a possible state JxK
of F to each label x in L, and an accessibility relation of F to the relational symbol
6,RK,R♦.
Forcing is extended in a unique way to arbitrary formulas by means of inductive
clauses.
x  ⊥ for no x
x  A ∧ B if and only if x  A and x  B
x  A ∨ B if and only if x  A or x  B
x  A ⊃ B if and only if for all y, x 6 y and y  A implies y  B
x  KA if and only if for all y, xRKy implies y  A
x  ♦A if and only if for some y, xR♦y and y  A
167
Definition. A sequent Γ→ ∆ is valid in a modelM if for all labelled formulas x : A
and relational atoms y 6 z, y′RKz′, y′′R♦z′′ in Γ, whenever JxK  A and JyK 6 JzK,Jy′KRKJz′K, Jy′′KR♦Jz′′K in X, then for some w : B in ∆, JwK  B. A sequent is valid if
it is valid for every model.
The rules of G3IK♦ are sound, that is, the conclusion is valid whenever their
premise(s) are valid.
Theorem 5.3.3 (Soundness). If the sequent Γ→ ∆ is derivable in G3IK♦, it is valid
in every frame with the properties Ref6, Trans6, MonK, Mon♦.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ→ ∆ in G3IK♦. If it is an initial sequent,
there is a labelled atom x : P both in Γ and in ∆ so the claim is obvious, and
similarly if the sequent is a conclusion of L⊥, since for no valuation can ⊥ be
forced at any node. Moreover, if Γ→ ∆ is of the form x : P, x 6 y, Γ′ → ∆′, y : P then
the claim holds by the monotonicity of forcing relation. If Γ → ∆ is the conclusion
of either a propositional or modal rule the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem
2.4.1. If the sequent is a conclusion of a rule for the accessibility relations, let the
rule be for instance Mon♦:
yR♦z, x 6 y, xR♦z, Γ→ ∆
x 6 y, xR♦z, Γ→ ∆
Mon♦
Let JxK 6 JyK and JxKR♦JzK. Since 6 and R♦ satisfy Mon♦ by assumption, we haveJyKR♦JzK, so validity of the premise gives validity of the conclusion.

Next, we show that derivability of a formula in the calculus is equivalent to valid-
ity, that is, validity at an arbitrary world for an arbitrary valuation. The latter is
expressed by x  A where x is arbitrary, and it is translated into a sequent→ x : A
168
in our calculus. The rules of the calculus applied backwards give equivalent con-
ditions until the atomic components of A are reached. It can happen that we find
a proof, or that we find that a proof does not exist either because we reach a stage
where no rule is applicable, or because we go on with the search forever. In the
two latter cases the attempted proof itself gives directly a countermodel. The two
following results establish the completeness of G3IK♦
Theorem 5.3.4. Let Γ → ∆ be a sequent in the language of G3IK♦. Then either
the sequent is derivable in G3IK♦ or it has a countermodel with properties Ref6,
Trans6, MonK, Mon♦.
Proof. We define for an arbitrary sequent Γ→ ∆ in the language of G3IK♦ a reduc-
tion tree by applying the rules of G3IK♦ root first in all possible ways. If the con-
struction terminates we obtain a proof, else the tree becomes infinite. By König’s
lemma an infinite tree has an infinite branch that is used to define a counter-
model to the endsequent. The reduction tree is constructed in the same way of
Theorem 2.4.3. If the reduction tree is finite, all its leaves are initial or conclu-
sions of L⊥ and the tree, read from the leaves to the root, yields a derivation.
Else, if the reduction tree is infinite, it has an infinite branch. Let Γ0 → ∆0
Γ → ∆ ≡ Γ1 → ∆1 . . . , Γi → ∆i, . . . be one such branch. Consider the sets of la-
belled formulas and relational atoms
Γ ≡ ⋃
i>0
Γi ∆ ≡
⋃
i>0
∆i
We define a model that forces all the formulas in Γ and no formula in ∆ and is
therefore a countermodel to the sequent Γ→ ∆. Consider the frame F the nodes of
which are all the labels that appear in the relational atoms in Γ, with their mutual
relationships expressed by the relational atoms in Γ. In general, the construction
of the reduction tree imposes the frame properties of the countermodel, which in
this case are Ref6, Trans6, MonK, Mon♦. The model is defined as follows: For all
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atomic formulas x : P in Γ, we stipulate that x  P, and for all atomic formulas
y : Q in ∆ we stipulate that y 1 Q. Since no sequent in the infinite branch is
initial, this choice can be coherently made. It can then be shown inductively on
the height of formulas that A is forced in the model at node x if x : A is in Γ and
A is not forced at node x if x : A is in ∆. Therefore we have a countermodel to the
endsequent Γ→ ∆. The details are similar to those in Negri (2009) and of Theorem
2.4.3 of the previous chapters.

Corollary 5.3.5 (Completeness). If a sequent Γ → ∆ is valid in every model with
the frame properties Ref6, Trans6, MonK, Mon♦, it is derivable in G3IK♦.
Digression: A conceptual analysis of accessibility relations
Before proceeding to the structural analysis of the Church-Fitch paradox by our la-
belled calculus, we shall outline a conceptual analysis of the accessibility relations
introduced in the previous section. This will serve both as an explanation of the no-
tions used, as well as a justification of the formal choices made in defining system
G3IK♦. First, the relation 6 is the standard accessibility relation for the seman-
tics of intuitionistic logic. Its intuitive meaning is clarified in Kripke (1965, pp.
98–99). Because worlds in a model can be identified with the propositions true in
them, the relation gets the following intuitive meaning: A world y is 6-accessible
from a world x if y is a possible development of the information contained in x.
Under this interpretation, worlds are recognized as temporal states in a process
of acquisition of information. The properties of reflexivity and transitivity of the
preorder thus appear obvious, whereas monotonicity of forcing reflects the require-
ment that the acquisition of information is a cumulative process. When agents who
can gain knowledge are added to the scenario, epistemic operators together with
their accessibility relations are needed. Here we have considered just one (imper-
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sonal and generic) epistemic attitude, K, with the accessibility relation RK. The
question naturally arises of what the relation should be between RK and 6. A
minimal requirement is that in the language extended with formulas as KA mono-
tonicity of forcing is preserved: The perfect recall should apply to all formulas, not
just to the purely propositional ones, and this is achieved by imposing the property
MonK. On the other hand, factivity of knowledge, i.e., axiom KA ⊃ A, which is ex-
plicitly assumed in Fitch’s derivation, corresponds to reflexivity of RK. This axiom
states that only true formulas can be known and separates knowledge from what
is the mere belief. Monotonicity and reflexivity of RK imply that what is temporally
accessible is also epistemically accessible, i.e., the condition ∀x∀y(x 6 y ⊃ xRKy)
holds. Notice that this implication does not exclude the possibility of the existence
of epistemically accessible states that are not future states. Our analysis will show
that if this existence is explicitly imposed, i.e., ∃x∃y(xRKy ∧ x 6 y) holds, then the
identification of truth and knowledge is avoided (cf. Proietti 2011). Moreover, KP
fails if Sym6 and Re f♦ are added. Similar formal requirements apply to the ac-
cessibility relation R♦, a relation that expresses logical possibility. A state y is
R♦-accessible from x when y is logically compatible with x, in the sense that y is
a state that can in principle be reachable from x, even if we cannot specify the
nature of this access (temporal, causal, epistemic, etc.). Note that this relation is
temporally upward closed: If a state z is possibly reachable from x, then z is possi-
bly reachable from all the future states of x. We do not want to commit ourselves
in any way to assuming more than the necessary properties of R♦, in particular
we do not identify it with any other of the accessibility relations considered. A dif-
ferent choice is pursued in Proietti (2011) and Artemov and Protopopescu (2011),
where the intuitionistic double negation gets interpreted as a possibility operator,
leading to a reformulation of the knowability principle that employs only the epis-
temic modality. The above interpretations also allow to capture the temporal flavor
ascribed to the knowledge operator in Fitch’s original article. Its core result, Theo-
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rem 5, is based on the existence of “some true proposition which nobody knows (or
has known or will know) to be true” (Fitch 1963, p. 139). The temporal interpre-
tation of 6 suggests that the statement KA has to be evaluated in all situations
temporally accessible from x, where x can be considered as the actual world, but
also as a past world, or better, x can be considered as any world in which A is true.
More generally, the structural reconstruction of Fitch’s derivation will reveal that
every occurrence of KA is always in the scope of a negation or of an implication.
Therefore, reasoning root first, the application of a K-rule is always preceded by
an application of a rule that imposes a temporal-dependent evaluation of KA.
5.4 Proof-theoretical analysis of the Church-Fitch
paradox
We have now all the logical instruments needed for a structural proof analysis
of the paradox. We start with the reconstruction of the standard derivation that
uses the labelled sequent calculus introduced in the previous section. Our analysis
made clear what the ingredients of the Church-Fitch paradox are: distributivity
of K over conjunction, K(A ∧ B) ⊃ KA ∧ KB, and the factivity of knowledge, KA ⊃
A. Distributivity holds for operators that satisfy necessitation and the normality
axiom in any system for normal modal logic. Factivity of knowledge corresponds to
reflexivity of the accessibility relation, i.e., xRKx, for all possible worlds x. Through
the method of conversion of axioms into sequent rules we obtain the following:
xRKx, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ RefK
Axiom KA ⊃ A is shown derivable by this rule. Both properties are provable in
G3IK♦ and in G3IK♦ with Re fK, respectively. The following two lemmas single out
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the special instances that are needed in the proof of the Church-Fitch paradox:
Lemma 5.4.1. In G3IK♦ it holds that:
i) ` x : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ x : KA
ii) ` x : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ x : K¬KA
Proof. By a systematic proof-search procedure from the sequent to be derived. 
Lemma 5.4.2. In G3IK♦ with Re fK it holds that:
` x : K¬KA→ x : ¬KA
Proof. Consider the derivation
x : ¬KA, xRKx, x : K¬KA→ x : ¬KA
xRKx, x : K¬KA→ x : ¬KA LK
x : K¬KA→ x : ¬KA RefK
where the topmost sequent is derivable by Lemma 5.3.1. 
No further explicit conditions beyond R♦, L♦, and Mon♦ need to be imposed on ♦ to
reconstruct the standard proof of the Church-Fitch paradox. By a proof analogous
to that of Lemma 5.2.2, we have:
Lemma 5.4.3. The following rule
→ x : A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
x 6 y, y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) Inv
is derivable in G3IK♦ with Cut.
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 5.2.2. 
The use of classical logic is a further requirement for obtaining the standard proof
of OP. In particular the following lemma has to be proved.
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Lemma 5.4.4. In G3CK♦ it holds that:
` x : ¬(A ∧ ¬KA)→ x : A ⊃ KA
Proof. By root-first proof search from the sequent to be derived. Note that the
proof is classical because it makes appeal to a non-eliminable application of rule
Sym6. 
We have now all the information that is needed in order to reconstruct the stan-
dard derivation of the Church-Fitch paradox.
Theorem 5.4.5 (Fitch’s Paradox). In G3CK♦ with Re fK, Cut and KP it holds that:
` → x : A ⊃ KA.
Proof. Consider the following derivation
KP
→ x : A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)
x 6 y, y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) Inv
z : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ z : KA
yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ z : KA, y : ⊥
R-W
z : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ z : K¬KA z : K¬KA→ z : ¬KA
z : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ z : ¬KA CUT
z 6 y, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), y : KA→ y : ⊥ INV y : ⊥ → L⊥
z 6 y, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), y : KA→ CUT
z 6 z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), z : KA→ z/y
z 6 z, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ y : ⊥
CUT
yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ y : ⊥
Ref6
y : ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ y : ⊥ L♦
x 6 y, y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥ CUT
→ x : ¬(A ∧ ¬KA) R⊃ x : ¬(A ∧ ¬KA)→ x : A ⊃ KA
→ x : A ⊃ KA CUT
Notice that the topmost sequents, except for KP, are derivable by Lemmas 5.4.1,
5.4.2 and 5.4.4. Furthermore, the applications of the rule of weakening are elim-
inable by pushing them up to the initial sequents of the derivations used for the
proof of Lemma 5.4.1.

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Observe that Theorem 5.4.5 states a derivability result: There is a derivation of
OP from KP by means of the rules of G3CK♦, Re fK and cut. In this result, KP
plays the role of a derivation principle, similar to a zero-premise inference rule.
Nonetheless, a crucial difference remains. On the one hand, the inference rules
are valid in the sense that they respect the deductive harmony imposed by the
inversion principle, as it stated in Negri and von Plato (2001, p. 6). On the other
hand, the validity of KP is fixed by stipulation, because, at the syntactic level,
there is nothing that differentiates KP from another sentence of the bimodal lan-
guage under the analysis. A crucial step of our work will be to understand which
class of relational structures KP singles out, so to determine as well in which class
of models KP can be considered as formally true.
5.5 Structural analysis of the Church-Fitch para-
dox
There are two special aspects of the proof of Theorem 5.4.5. The instance of KP
appears in the derivation as a sequent with an empty antecedent of the form→ A.2
Moreover, the proof uses cuts. The presence of cuts makes it difficult to point out
where the paradox arises from, in the first place because the structure of such
derivations is not transparent. Secondly, by a thesis of Tennant, a paradox is a non-
normal derivation the normalization of which enters into a loop (Tennant 1982).
In sequent calculus, the notion of normalization is replaced by cut elimination
that becomes the essential means for analyzing the precise nature of the paradox,
and for distinguishing the case of a derivation without eliminability of cut from
that of a fallacy, in which the latter assumption and the paradoxical conclusion
are equivalent principles. Applying the cut elimination procedure for G3CK♦ with
2Cf. Definition 6.3.1 (a) in Negri and von Plato (2001), p. 134.
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Re fK to our derivation of OP, we obtain the following derivation in which, to save
space, we have abbreviated with KP(A) the formula (A ∧ ¬KA) ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA):
KP
→ x : KP(A)
....
S1
....
S2
x 6 y, yRKz, x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A L⊃
x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A→ y : KA RK
x : KP(A)→ x : A ⊃ KA R⊃
→ x : A ⊃ KA CUT
The right premise S2 of L ⊃ is derivable as follows
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,wRKw,wRKt,w : A, t : A, t : ¬KA,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A, t : A
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,wRKw,wRKt,w : A, t : A ∧ ¬KA,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A, t : A
L∧
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,wRKw,wRKt,w : A,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A, t : A
LK
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,wRKw,w : A,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A,w : KA
RK
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,wRKw,w : A,w : ¬KA,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A
L⊃
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,wRKw,w : A ∧ ¬KA,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A
L∧
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,wRKw,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A
LK
x 6 y, yRKz, yR♦w,w : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A
RefK
x 6 y, yRKz, y : ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA), x : KP(A), y : A→ z : A
L♦
where the topmost sequent is derivable by Lemma 5.3.1. The right premise of L ⊃
(in S2) is derivable because it is an instance of L⊥, left unwritten here. The left
premise S1 is derivable:
x 6 y, yRKz, y : A→ z : A, y : A
rRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, y 6 r, r 6 y, y : A, r : KA, z : A→ z : A, r : ⊥
rRKz, x 6 y, yRKz, y 6 r, r 6 y, y : A, r : KA→ z : A, r : ⊥ LK
x 6 y, yRKz, y 6 r, r 6 y, y : A, r : KA→ z : A, r : ⊥ MonK
x 6 y, yRKz, y 6 r, y : A, r : KA→ z : A, r : ⊥
Sym6
x 6 y, yRKz, y : A→ z : A, y : ¬KA R⊃
x 6 y, yRKz, y : A→ z : A, y : A ∧ ¬KA R∧
There remains one application of cut in the derivation. Unlike the other instances
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of cut, the last one is not eliminable because it depends on an instance of KP that
behaves like a proper axiom. We shall discuss this aspect later. From the previous
proof, just by ignoring the last step, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5.5.1. In G3CK♦ with Re fK it holds that:
` x : A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ x : A ⊃ KA
without any application of cut.
The result can be stated briefly as follows:
OP is derivable from the special instance KP(A) of KP.
Moreover, we notice that classical logic is used only in the step of symmetry in the
right branch of the derivation S1. Therefore that branch, pruned just before the
application of Sym6, suggests a countermodel to the sequent of Proposition 5.5.1
in the intuitionistic system G3IK♦ with Re fK:
Theorem 5.5.2. In G3IK♦ with Re fK it holds that:
0 x : A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ x : A ⊃ KA
Proof. Consider the model G = 〈W,6,RK,R♦,〉 where W = {x, y, z, r}, x 6 y,
y 6 r, x 6 r, yRKz, xRKz, all the reflexivities for 6 and RK hold, and A is forced in
y and in r but not in z. A diagrammatic representation, with the omission of the
reflexive arrows, takes the form
x
y
y  A
z
z 1 A
r
r  A
66 RK
RK6
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In this model, we have that x  A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA) because x, r 6 A ∧ ¬KA.
To see why, just observe that r  KA and use the definitions to conclude that r,
and therefore also y, do not force ¬KA. On the other hand, x 6 A ⊃ KA, because
y  A, but y 6 KA. 
It is well known that one can obtain a derivation of the weak OP in the intuition-
istic system. More precisely, a cut-free derivation of WOP from the assumption
KP(A) is obtained in our system as follows:
Theorem 5.5.3. In G3IK♦ with Re fK it holds that:
` x : A ∧ ¬KA ⊃ ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA)→ x : ¬(A ∧ ¬KA)
Proof. The sequent is derived as follows:
....
R1
....
R2
x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥ L⊃
x : KP(A)→ x : ¬(A ∧ ¬KA) R⊃
In the derivation R1 is
y 6 y, x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥, y : A ∧ ¬KA
x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥, y : A ∧ ¬KA Ref6
whereas R2 is
zRKw, z 6 z, z : A, z : ¬KA, zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA),w : A,w : ¬KA, x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥,w : A
zRKw, z 6 z, z : A, z : ¬KA, zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA),w : A ∧ ¬KA, x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥,w : A
L∧
zRKw, z 6 z, z : A, z : ¬KA, zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥,w : A
LK
z 6 z, z : A, z : ¬KA, zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥, z : KA
RK
z 6 z, z : A, z : ¬KA, zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥
L⊃
z : A, z : ¬KA, zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥
Ref6
z : (A ∧ ¬KA), zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥
L∧
zRKz, yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥
LK
yR♦z, z : K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥
RefK
y : ♦K(A ∧ ¬KA), x 6 y, x : KP(A), y : A ∧ ¬KA→ y : ⊥ L♦
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and the topmost sequent is derivable by Lemma 5.3.1. 
The countermodel of Theorem 5.5.2 shows, together with the completeness theo-
rem, that the classical version of the Church-Fitch paradox is not derivable in an
intuitionistic setting, thus seemingly confirming the thesis that intuitionistic logic
saves anti-realism from the threat of the paradox (Williamson 1982). To say that
KP implies OP does not require that there is a derivation from a special instance
of KP to the conclusion OP, as in Proposition 5.5.1. In fact, the admission of the
knowability principle corresponds to the assumption that KP is generally valid,
instead of the assumption of just a particular instance. Therefore, the following
admissibility statement should be put under analysis:
If KP is valid, then also OP is valid. (5.1)
Merely to show that OP does not follow intuitionistically from a particular in-
stance of KP is not sufficient for establishing that OP is not derivable in an intu-
itionistic system that incorporates KP as a derivation principle. In other words,
the countermodel given in the proof of Theorem 5.5.2 is not sufficient for showing
that (5.1) does not hold in an intuitionistic setting. An analogy from propositional
logic may clarify this point: The law of double negation ¬¬A ⊃ A follows from the
principle of excluded middle, A ∨ ¬A, in the sense that there is an intuitionistic
derivation of (A ∨ ¬A) ⊃ (¬¬A ⊃ A). The converse (¬¬A ⊃ A) ⊃ (A ∨ ¬A)
instead is not intuitionistically derivable even if the two principles give equiva-
lent extensions of intuitionistic logic. However, A ∨ ¬A follows from a particular
instance of the law of double negation, namely ¬¬(A ∨ ¬A) ⊃ (A ∨ ¬A). In con-
clusion, the cut-free analysis we have made suffices to establish intuitionistic un-
derivability of OP from a particular instance of KP. The latter does not exclude,
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however, the derivability of OP from other instance of KP, a question to which a
definite answer is give in the next section.
5.6 Proof analysis of KP
We proceed to find the necessary and sufficient frame property for the validity of
KP. First, we use our calculus to single out frame rules that suffice for a derivation
of KP. Then we extract from these rules a frame property and show that it is
sufficient and necessary to validate KP. We start root first from the sequent to
be derived. Observe that the only applicable rule as a first step is R ⊃. Next,
for the proof search to continue, to be able to apply R♦ it is necessary to have an
R♦-accessibility. The only rules that make available such relational atom in the
absence of other R♦-atom are Re f♦ or Ser♦. Rule Ser♦ is derivable from Re f♦, and
to make the set of assumptions on the accessibility relations minimal, we choose
the latter. Notice that Ser♦ has the variable restriction that y must not occur in the
conclusion. After that, the only applicable rule is RK. An initial sequent is then
obtained if a rule is used that adds the atom y 6 w, indicated by ♦K-Tr:
x 6 y, y 6 w, yR♦z, zRKw, y : A→ y : ♦KA,w : A
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRKw, y : A→ y : ♦KA,w : A ♦K-Tr
x 6 y, yR♦z, y : A→ y : ♦KA, z : KA RK
x 6 y, yR♦z, y : A→ y : ♦KA R♦
x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦KA Ser♦
→ x : A ⊃ ♦KA R⊃
This derivation would seem to suggest that the frame properties needed are those
that correspond to the two extra-logical rules used, namely,
xR♦y, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ser♦
x 6 z, xR♦y, yRKz, Γ→ ∆
xR♦y, yRKz, Γ→ ∆ ♦K-Tr
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Rule Ser♦ has the variable condition that y /∈ Γ,∆, which corresponds to an exis-
tential condition, whereas rule ♦K-Tr corresponds to a universal one:
∀x∃y(xR♦y) Ser♦
∀y∀z∀w(yR♦z ∧ zRKw ⊃ y 6 w) ♦K-Tr
The universal frame property ♦K-Tr is, however, too strong. The instance of rule
♦K-Tr used in the derivation of KP is not applied, root first, to an arbitrary se-
quent, but to one in which the middle term is the eigenvariable introduced by
Ser♦. The requirement that ♦K-Tr has to be applied above Ser♦, and that the mid-
dle term of ♦K-Tr is the eigenvariable of Ser♦, is the side condition of the rule.
Thus the following frame property can be read off from the derivation of KP:
∀x∃y(xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z)) KP-Fr
It is easy to show that KP-Fr is derivable in a G3-sequent system for intuitionistic
first-order logic extended by the two rules Ser♦ and ♦K-Tr:
xR♦y→ xR♦y
x 6 z, xR♦y, yRKz→ x 6 z
xR♦y, yRKz→ x 6 z ♦K-Tr
xR♦y→ yRKz ⊃ x 6 z R⊃
xR♦y→ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z) R∀
xR♦y→ xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z) R∧
xR♦y→ ∃y(xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z)) R∃
→ ∃y(xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z))
Ser♦
→ ∀x∃y(xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z)) R∀
Observe that the side condition on the application of ♦K-Tr is respected. Con-
versely, any derivation that uses the rules Ser♦ and ♦K-Tr in compliance with the
side condition, can be transformed into a derivation that uses cuts with KP-Fr.
If rule ♦K-Tr is used, it is followed by Ser♦ because of the side condition, and the
derivation contains a subderivation of the form
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x 6 z, xR♦y, yRKzΓ′ → ∆′
xR♦y, yRKzΓ′ → ∆′
♦K-Tr
....D....
xR♦y, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ser♦
We transform it as follows:
→ ∀x∃y(xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z))
yRKz, yRKz ⊃ x 6 z→ x 6 z x 6 z, xR♦y, yRKz, Γ′ → ∆′
xR♦y, yRKz, yRKz, yRKz ⊃ x 6 z, Γ′,→ ∆′ CUT
xR♦y, yRKz, yRKz ⊃ x 6 z, Γ′,→ ∆′ L-C
xR♦y, yRKz, ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z), Γ′,→ ∆′ L∀....
D′....
xR♦y, ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z), Γ→ ∆
xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z), Γ→ ∆ L∧
∃y(xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z), Γ→ ∆ L∃
∀x∃y(xR♦y ∧ ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z), Γ→ ∆ L∀
Γ→ ∆ CUT
Here D′ is obtained by adding ∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z) to all the antecedents of the
sequents in D. If rule Ser♦ is used alone, namely without occurrences of ♦K-Tr
above it, the conversion is obtained through L∃ applied on the premise of Ser♦ and
a cut with→ ∀x∃yxR♦y; the latter follows from→ ∀x∃y(xR♦y∧∀z(yRKz ⊃ x 6 z)).
We can conclude:
Proposition 5.6.1. The system with rules ♦K-Tr and Ser♦ that respect the side
condition is a cut-free equivalent of the system that employs KP-Fr as an axiomatic
sequent in addition to the structural rules.
The rules corresponding to KP-Fr do not follow the geometric rule schema. How-
ever, all the structural rules are still admissible in presence of such rules. In
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particular, cut elimination holds and the proof follows the pattern of 5.3.2.
Theorem 5.6.2. The rule of cut
Γ→ ∆, x : A x : A, Γ′ → ∆′
Γ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ CUT
is admissible in G3IK♦ with Re fK and extended with Ser♦ and ♦K-Tr.
Proof. Suppose that one of the premises of cut has been derived by ♦K-Tr followed
by Ser♦ and that the middle term of the former disappeared by an application of
the latter. We have
Γ→ ∆, x : A
y 6 z, xR♦y, yRKz, Γ′′ → ∆′′
xR♦y, yRKz, Γ′′ → ∆′′
♦K-Tr
........
x : A, xR♦y, Γ′ → ∆′
x : A, Γ′ → ∆′ Ser♦
Γ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ CUT
Observe that by hp-admissibility of substitution (Lemma 5.3.2) we can assume
without loss of generality that the variable y does not occur in the left premise of
cut. The derivation is transformed into the following in which the application of
cut is of a lower height and therefore eliminable by the inductive hypothesis
Γ→ ∆, x : A
x 6 z, xR♦y, yRKz, Γ′′ → ∆′′
xR♦y, yRKz, Γ′′ → ∆′′
♦K-Tr
........
x : A, xR♦y, Γ′ → ∆′
xR♦y, Γ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ CUT
Γ, Γ′ → ∆,∆′ Ser♦

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It is worth noting that the acceptance of KP as valid implicitly forces us to accept
some properties of the operator ♦, in particular, the derivability of A ⊃ ♦A.
Proposition 5.6.3. In G3IK♦ with Re fK, Ser♦ and ♦K-Tr it holds that:
` → x : A ⊃ ♦A.
Proof. We have the following derivation:
y 6 z, zRKz, yR♦z, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A, z : A
zRKz, yR♦z, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A, z : A ♦K-Tr
yR♦z, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A, z : A
RefK
yR♦z, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A R♦
x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A Ser♦
→ x : A ⊃ ♦A R⊃
Observe that the side condition on ♦K-Tr is respected.

In monomodal systems, the axiom schema A ⊃ ♦A is characterized by reflexive
frames, i.e., frames in which ∀x(xR♦x) holds. This is not any longer the case in
multimodal systems. The above proposition shows, in fact, that the reflexivity of
R♦ is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for the validity of A ⊃ ♦A. We have
a derivation of a purely alethic property that uses properties of the global system,
in particular, of the epistemic accessibility relation. This is a non-conservativity of
the whole system with respect to the system without K. In order to restore conser-
vativity, we add to our set of rules the rule of reflexivity of the alethic accessibility
relation:
xR♦x, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ Ref♦
With Ref♦ at our disposal, it becomes clear why the unrestricted ♦K-Tr is too
strong. In fact, together with reflexivity of R♦ it would collapse our intuitionis-
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tic system into a classical one because it would permit to derive symmetry of 6, as
in
y 6 x, yR♦x, xRKx, x 6 y, xR♦x → y 6 x
yR♦x, xRKx, x 6 y, xR♦x → y 6 x ♦K-Tr
yR♦x, x 6 y, xR♦x → y 6 x RefK
x 6 y, xR♦x → y 6 x
Mon♦
x 6 y→ y 6 x Ref♦
The derivation of the knowability principle in G3IK♦ using Re fK, Ser♦ and ♦K-Tr
guarantees that the two rules are strong enough to capture the force of KP but
does not yet permit to conclude that KP-Fr is the characterizing frame property of
KP. This latter is achieved by the following proposition:
Proposition 5.6.4. The property KP-Fr is necessary and sufficient to validate KP
in intuitionistic bimodal frames.
Proof. For sufficiency, it is enough to use the standard definition of forcing in
Kripke models. Let x be a world in a frame. To show x  A ⊃ ♦KA, let y be such
that x 6 y, and suppose y  A. By KP-Fr and monotonicity of forcing, y  ♦KA.
For necessity, we reason by contraposition. Consider an arbitrary frame and sup-
pose that KP-Fr does not hold in it. Thus,
∃x∀y(xR♦y ⊃ ∃z(yRKz ∧ x 
 z))
Let P an atom and u an arbitrary state. We can define  so that u  P if and only
if x 6 u. Therefore, in the resulting model, KP instantiated with P is not forced at
x.

What we have achieved by our analysis is a correspondence between the knowabil-
ity principle in the form of the bimodal axiom KP and the frame property KP-Fr.
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We have also shown that KP-Fr is equivalent to the two rules ♦K-Tr and Ser♦ used
in compliance with a side condition. By this equivalence, the system obtained
by the addition of suitable combinations of these two rules provides a complete
contraction- and cut-free system for intuitionistic bimodal logic extended with KP.
We shall call it knowability logic, and indicate it with G3KP. Thus, G3KP is
defined as G3IK♦ + Re fK + Ser♦ +♦K-Tr with the proper side condition. By KP-Fr
we can establish the following result:
Proposition 5.6.5. There exists an intuitionistic frame that validates KP, but not
OP.
Proof. Take the frame with three worlds, x, y, and z such that xR♦y, x 6 y, and
xRKz. The only RK and R♦-accessibilities from y and z are the reflexive ones:
x
x  P
y
y  P
z
z 1 P
R♦ 6RK
RK
RK R♦RK R♦
The frame respects condition KP-Fr and therefore validates KP (this can be checked
also directly). On the other hand, the valuation defined by x  P, x  y and z 6 P
shows that x 6 P ⊃ KP.

This result shows that the admissibility statement 5.1 does not hold for intuition-
istic logic. Our proof system gives a confirmation for this semantic argument
through a syntactic criterion, a failed exhaustive proof search.
186
To show that OP is not derivable in G3KP, care is needed with the use of labels.
Consider the following attempt:
y 6 z, x 6 y, yR♦y, yRKz, y : A→ z : A
x 6 y, yR♦y, yRKz, y : A→ z : A ♦K-Tr
x 6 y, yR♦y, y : A→ y : KA RK
x 6 y, y : A→ y : KA Ref♦
→ x : A ⊃ KA R⊃
This would seem to be derivation of OP, in contrast to what we would expect from
the semantic argument above. Here, similarly to what happened in the deriva-
tion of symmetry, the application of ♦K-Tr is not correct because the eigenvariable
(here y) appears also where it should not, namely as a first argument of R♦, in
the preorder atom, and in two labelled formulas. The variable condition expresses
formally that rule ♦K-Tr should consider the most general R♦ accessibility. By ad-
mitting only the reflexivity one, actuality and possibility are conflated with “the
mystery of the disappearing diamond” (Jenkins 2009). Replacing reflexivity with
seriality, the search turns into
....
x 6 y, yR♦z, yRKw, y : A→ w : A
x 6 y, yR♦z, y : A→ y : KA RK
x 6 y, y : A→ y : KA Ser♦
→ x : A ⊃ KA R⊃
Rule ♦K-Tr is no longer applicable because the upper sequent in the attempted
proof does not match its conclusion. The only applicable rule is MonK that adds
xRKw. The search is exhaustive and we do not get what we would need to close
it, namely the relational atom y 6 w. The failed search can be used instead to
extract a countermodel to OP. The accessibilities are xRKw in addition to those
in the antecedent of the upper sequent; A, is forced at x and at y but not at w.
Clearly x 6 A ⊃ KA. By our analysis, the use of intuitionistic logic blocks the
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paradox in general, not only the specific derivation that uses a specific instance of
the knowability principle (see Theorem 5.5.2).
It is only in classical logic that the paradox may arise. The question remains as
to whether the Moore sentence A ∧ ¬KA is an essential ingredient of the paradox
in its classical derivation. It is a natural question, because of the attempts at cir-
cumventing the paradox through a limitation of KP to certain classes of formulas
that exclude seemingly pathological ones such as A ∧ ¬KA (as in Dummett 2001).
Whether Moore sentences are indispensable in the derivation of OP can be deter-
mined by a root-first proof search. The search in our calculus leads to a sufficient
condition for the derivation of OP, starting with the “compulsory” steps
....
yRKz, x 6 y, y : A→ z : A
x 6 y, y : A→ y : KA RK
→ x : A ⊃ KA R⊃
A correct derivation is obtained if the atom y 6 z can be added, that is, if the K-
accessibility implies the 6-accessibility, or, in other words, if we are allowed to use
the following rule:
x 6 y, xRKy, Γ→ ∆
xRKy, Γ→ ∆ Know
The rule is the translation of the frame property
∀x∀y(xRKy ⊃ x 6 y) Know
As a diagram, it takes the form
x
y
RK 6
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We then have
Proposition 5.6.6. Rule Know is admissible in G3CK♦ +RefK + Ser♦ +♦K-Tr.
Proof. Using admissibility of weakening we have the following
x 6 y, xRKy, Γ→ ∆
x 6 y, z 6 x, x 6 z, xR♦z, zRKy, zRKz, xRKy, Γ→ ∆ L-W
z 6 x, x 6 z, xR♦z, zRKy, zRKz, xRKy, Γ→ ∆ ♦K-Tr
z 6 x, x 6 z, xR♦z, zRKz, xRKy, Γ→ ∆ MonK
x 6 z, xR♦z, zRKz, xRKy, Γ→ ∆
Sym6
xR♦z, zRKz, xRKy, Γ→ ∆ ♦K-Tr
xR♦z, xRKy, Γ→ ∆ RefK
xRKy, Γ→ ∆ Ser♦
Observe that two applications of ♦K-Tr, with the same eigenvariable y, are used.
This is a licit use of the block of rules since a double use of ♦K-Tr, followed by a step
of seriality that removes the eigenvariable, corresponds to a multiple discharge of
the minor assumption in the rule of elimination of the existential quantifier in
natural deduction. 
The derivation of OP can be given also directly in the system G3CK♦ + RefK +
Ser♦ +♦K-Tr:
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRKz, y 6 z, z 6 y, yRKw, zRKw, y 6 w, y : A→ w : A
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRKz, y 6 z, z 6 y, yRKw, zRKw, y : A→ w : A ♦K-Tr
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRKz, y 6 z, z 6 y, yRKw, y : A→ w : A MonK
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRKz, y 6 z, z 6 y, y : A→ y : KA RK
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRKz, y 6 z, y : A→ y : KA
Sym6
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRKz, y : A→ y : KA ♦K-Tr
x 6 y, yR♦z, y : A→ y : KA RefK
x 6 y, y : A→ y : KA Ser♦
→ x : A ⊃ KA R⊃
There are no occurrences of Moore sentences in this derivation. Could we then
conclude that it is not necessary the appeal to them for the derivation of OP? Ac-
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tually, the absence of Moore sentences in this derivation is only fictitious, because
KP-Fr has been identified by considering all possible instances of KP and so, a
fortiori, also the instances with Moore sentences. On the contrary, allowing only a
limited type of instances of KP, it could be the case that we are restricting also the
class of frames validating KP and that these particular frames would not validate
OP.
The cut-free derivation indicates that the source of the paradox has to be found
in the joint use of KP-Fr and classical logic. This means that KP is not per se
paradoxical, but it becomes so when used in a classical frame. Moreover, it is
possible to show in classical logic, that if Re f♦ is included from the beginning in
the derivation system, then KP corresponds to the frame condition Know.
Proposition 5.6.7. The frame property Know is necessary and sufficient to vali-
date KP in classical bimodal frames satisfying Re f♦.
Proof. Necessity can be proved by the following chain of implications: Validity of
KP implies the validity of KP-Fr (Proposition 5.6.4); validity of KP-Fr implies the
admissibility of Ser♦ and ♦K-Tr respecting the side condition (Proposition 5.6.1);
Ser♦ and ♦K-Tr respecting the side condition implies the admissibility of Know
(Proposition 5.6.6).
For sufficiency, consider the derivation
y 6 z, yRKz, yR♦y, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦KA, z : A
yRKz, yR♦y, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦KA, z : A Know
yR♦y, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦KA, y : KA RK
yR♦y, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦KA R♦
x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦KA Ref♦
→ x : A ⊃ ♦KA R⊃

As we have seen, in classical logic Know is sufficient for deriving OP and even
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has the collapse of truth and knowledge as a consequence:
Proposition 5.6.8. In G3CK♦ + Re fK + Re f♦ + Know the relations 6 and RK col-
lapse to the same relation.
Proof. To preserve the monotonicity of 6 in the presence of RK we have assumed
the validity of MonK. By reflexivity of RK, MonK implies that ∀x∀y(x 6 y ⊃ xRKy),
i.e., 6 ⊆ RK. The other direction of the inclusion, i.e., RK ⊆ 6, holds by Know. 
We have thus shown that if R♦ is reflexive, truth and knowledge coincide in clas-
sical logic. Therefore, in the standard classical presentation of the Church-Fitch
paradox, the assumption KP is semantically equivalent to OP.
Finally, let us consider the indispensability of the principle of factivity of knowl-
edge in the derivation of the Church-Fitch paradox. Mackie (1980) and Tennant
(1997) have maintained that the principle is not necessary, and that the paradox
arises equally for belief-like notions. That such is the case is confirmed by our
analysis as follows. First it is seen that a knowability principle for belief imposes
the same frame condition as it did for knowledge: The characterization result em-
ploys never the rule of reflexivity for epistemic accessibility. Then it can be shown
that a “belief omniscience” is derivable when reflexivity for knowledge accessibil-
ity replaced by seriality and transitivity for belief accessibility, as the following
proposition shows (the names of the rules that have to respect the proper variable
condition are obtained from those for K):
Proposition 5.6.9. In G3CB♦ + SerB + TransB + Ser♦ +♦B-Tr it holds that:
` → x : A ⊃ BA.
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Proof. By the derivation
y 6 t,w 6 y, y 6 w, x 6 y, yR♦z, zRBw,wRBt, zRBt, yRBt, y : A→ t : A
w 6 y, y 6 w, x 6 y, yR♦z, zRBw,wRBt, zRBt, yRBt, y : A→ t : A ♦K-Tr
w 6 y, y 6 w, x 6 y, yR♦z, zRBw,wRBt, yRBt, y : A→ t : A TransB
w 6 y, y 6 w, x 6 y, yR♦z, zRBw, yRBt, y : A→ t : A MonB
y 6 w, x 6 y, yR♦z, zRBw, yRBt, y : A→ t : A
Sym6
y 6 w, x 6 y, yR♦z, zRBw, y : A→ y : BA RB
x 6 y, yR♦z, zRBw, y : A→ y : BA ♦K-Tr
x 6 y, yR♦z, y : A→ y : BA SerB
x 6 y, y : A→ y : BA Ser♦
→ x : A ⊃ BA R⊃

5.7 Conclusions
In Tennant (2009), the following is written about the prospect of a proof theory
that covers the Church-Fitch paradox: “we are still a long way, of course, from
having a fully adequate proof-theory governing the interaction among [the modal-
ities involved] (let alone a formal semantics, with respect to which one might be
able to establish the soundness and completeness of whatever proof system is de-
vised)” (ibid., p. 237). The proof systems G3IK♦ and G3CK♦ developed in this
chapter, with the analysis of the accessibility relations 6, RK and R♦ and the way
they interact in formal proofs, offer an answer to the first Tennant’s issue. The
completeness theorem with respect to Kripke semantics for these calculi answers
Tennant’s second issue. The results are here formulated for labelled sequent cal-
culi but can be adapted also to proof systems based on natural deduction. Our work
offers a new methodology for a general theory of knowability and, more broadly, of
logical epistemology. We have determined the first-order correspondents of modal
axioms on the basis of a root-first proof search in labelled sequent calculi for bi-
modal logic. The correspondence results have a standing independent of the use of
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labelled calculi. Extending a general Kripke completeness result, we have shown
that the modal logic obtained by the addition of the knowability principle is com-
plete with respect to the class of frames that satisfy the first-order frame condition
which was determined by the procedure. The resulting calculi are complete proof
systems for knowability logic, both in a classical and in an intuitionistic setting.
The strong structural properties of these calculi make it possible to draw con-
clusions not only about questions of derivability, but also about underivability of
the paradox in precisely defined formal systems of intuitionistic and classical bi-
modal logic. The crucial step here is the conversion of a non-geometric axiom, the
frame condition corresponding to KP, into a system of rules so as to achieve full
control over derivations in intuitionistic bimodal logic extended by the knowabil-
ity principle. exploiting the frame property corresponding to KP our work goes a
step further, namely it shows that the use of intuitionistic logic for blocking the
paradox succeeds: Not only OP is intuitionistically underivable from KP instan-
tiated with the Moore sentence, but OP is not even intuitionistically admissible
from KP. On the other hand, the paradox is indeed derivable in classical logic:
the standard proof is reconstructed in our analysis and converted into a cut-free
form. Nonetheless, we claim that this derivation is nothing else than a fallacious
argument in disguise: The reason is that KP and OP are semantically equivalent
in a classical frame. We thus have an argument in favor of the anti-realist posi-
tion, provided that the formalization of the knowability principle corresponds to
KP. If anti-realism is conceived in a strict Dummettian sense, then intuitionistic
logic is already sufficient for blocking Fitch’s argument. Otherwise, if a weaker
anti-realism is embraced and accordingly classical logic is allowed, the paradox
gets reduced to a petitio principii. The conversion of the frame property KP-Fr
into a combination of rules governed by a side condition follows the methodology
of proof analysis in which universal and geometrical axioms have been treated so
far. It is a first successful attempt to extract a general method for transforming a
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much wider type of mathematical axioms into a set of inference rules. From this
perspective, the proof-theoretic analysis KP opens up promising possibilities also
for a more traditional type of foundational study.
Observation. It has been observed3 that in intuitionistic frames the weaker prop-
erty W-Re fK ∀x∃y(xRKy ∧ y 6 x) suffices to characterize factivity of K. In fact, the
sequent → x : KA → A is derivable in the presence of the rule corresponding to
the frame condition W-Re fK
xRKy, y 6 x, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ W-RefK
Rule W-Re fK has the variable condition that y does not appear in Γ,∆. Thus, fac-
tivity of knowledge follows from the weaker frame condition as follows
z : A, yRKz, z 6 y, x 6 y, y : KA→ y : A
yRKz, z 6 y, x 6 y, y : KA→ y : A LK
x 6 y, y : KA→ y : A W-RefK
→ x : KA→ A R⊃
A similar weaker property W-Re f♦ ∀x∃y(xR♦y ∧ x 6 y) characterizes A ⊃ ♦A. We
consider the following rule with y as eigenvariable
xR♦y, x 6 y, Γ→ ∆
Γ→ ∆ W-Ref♦
Thus, the sequent→ x : A ⊃ ♦A can be derived without any application of Re f♦
yR♦z, y 6 z, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A, z : A
yR♦z, y 6 z, x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A R♦
x 6 y, y : A→ y : ♦A W-RefK
→ x : A→ ♦A R⊃
The derivations above show that the conditions are sufficient for KA ⊃ A and
3Pierluigi Minari, personal communication.
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A ⊃ ♦A to be valid. They are also necessary. Suppose that W-Re fK is not satisfied,
that is, let x be such that for all y, xRKy implies y 
 x. It is possible to give a
model in which x  KA but x 1 A, so a countermodel for x  KA ⊃ A. The model
is defined by imposing that for every atom P, y  P if and only if there is an u
such that xRKu and u 6 y. Observe that in this model the monotonicity of  with
respect to 6 is satisfied, that is, it holds that y  P and y 6 y′ implies y′  P. In
this model, for an arbitrary z, if xRKz then xRKz and z 6 z, since 6 is reflexive.
Therefore, there is an u such that xRKu and u 6 z, and we conclude that z  A by
the definition of . Thus, x  KA. On the other hand, suppose by contradiction
that x  A. Then, by the definition of  we have that there is an u such that
xRKu and u 6 x, which is impossible since xRKu implies u 
 x by hypothesis. By a
similar reasoning we can prove that if W-Re f♦ is not satisfied then it is possible to
find a countermodel for A ⊃ ♦A.
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Chapter6
Conclusions and related work
The idea underlying the labelled approach to the proof theory of modal logics is
that the rules encode the explanation of modalities in terms of relational seman-
tics. This allows to exploit the modularity of the relational semantics so that sys-
tems for various modal logics result by extending the basic system with rules corre-
sponding to the properties of the accessibility relations. This idea has been largely
developed: possible worlds semantics has been internalized in the form of tableaux
in Fitting (1983), Catach (1991), Nerode (1991), Goré (1998), Masacci (2000), and
in the form of natural deduction in Fitch (1966), Simpson (1994). Finally, Mints
(1997), Kushida and Okada (2003), Castellini and Smaill (2002), Castellini (2005)
provide an labelled approach based on sequent systems. The survey by Negri
(2011) gives an overview of the method and references to its applications. In this
final part, we compare our systems with the labelled approach of Viganò (2000)
which is one of the most extensive and comprehensive contribution to the topic. In
the first part (Ch. 2, Part I) a labelled natural deduction system N(K) for basic
modal logic is introduced. System N(K) is basically the same system we intro-
duced in the first chapter, with the exception of the falsity elimination rule which
gets formulated as
197
1
[x : A ⊃ ⊥]....
y : A
x : A
⊥E1
Another difference is the formulation of the elimination rules: only special elimi-
nation rules are considered in Viganò’s book, whereas we adapted to labelled sys-
tems the general formulation of von Plato (2001). However, our main goal was
not the analysis of the structural properties of the natural deduction system we
have introduced, but the justification of the corresponding sequent calculus rules.
Although the labelled systems are based on the semantics, it is possible to explain
the meaning of a formula x : A in terms of its use, that is, in terms of the rules
that manipulate it. In fact, in Read (2008) the labelled natural deduction system
of Simpson (1994) is indicated as a possible solution to the problem of finding an
harmonic pair of rules for modal operators. Instead, the structural properties of
derivations N(K) are deeply analyzed in Viganò (2000): the system is proved to be
sound and complete with respect to its semantics, and a detailed proof of the nor-
malization theorem is given. N(K) can be also extended with rules for accessibility
relation: the rules correspond to Horn relational formulas, that is, formulas of
the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xn((s1Rt1∧, . . . ,∧smRtm) ⊃ s0Rt0), where m > 0 and the si and
tj are terms built from labels x1 . . . xn and constant function symbols. Example of
such rules are:
xR f (x)
Ser
xRx
Ref
xRy
yRx
Sym
xRy yRz
xRz Trans
Observe that f (x) in rule Ser is a Skolem function. Correspondence results be-
tween modal axioms and properties of R can be easily obtained by the relational
rules. The proof of the completeness theorem can be extended so that any system
N(L) obtained by extending N(K) with a Horn relational theory N(T ) is sound
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and complete with respect to its semantics. Normalization is proved by consider-
ing several rules for ⊥ (global, universal, local). Therefore, a possible direction for
a future research could be to see how the techniques and results of Viganò’s book
can be adapted to setting of our system of natural deduction, and what kind of
relationship can be stated between them.
In Viganò’s work, labelled sequent systems are introduced because they allow a
finer grained control on the structure of formal derivations, and complexity results
and decidability are more easily established when logics are presented as sequent
systems of rules. The system S(K) introduced in Ch. 6 is strictly related to our
system G0K of the first chapter. Although the rules for the modal operator ♦ and
those for conjunction, disjunction and negation are derived, all the two-premise
rules are formulated as context-independent rules, as in G0K. Initial sequents
have a relational atomic formula xRy as principal, so derivations may start with
sequents xRy → xRy. Like G0K, also S(K) has all the structural rules primitive,
and a partial elimination of contraction is the major issue of the entire second part
of the work, as noted in Negri (2005). An important difference with respect to our
approach is that labelled formulas and the relational atoms occur in a sequent only
separated. A sequent is either an expression of the form ∆ → xRy or Γ,∆ → Γ′,
where Γ and Γ′ are multisets of labelled formulas, and ∆ is a multisets of relational
atoms1. The two possible forms of sequents correspond to the separation of the
the basic system from the relational theory: ∆ → xRy expresses that a relational
atom follows only from other relational atoms, and Γ,∆ → Γ′ expresses that la-
belled formulas may follow from other labelled formulas or relational atoms (see
ibid., p. 139). The rules for the modal operator  are then formulated as follows:
∆→ xRy y : A, Γ,∆→ Γ′
x : A, Γ,∆→ Γ′ L
xRy, Γ,∆→ Γ′, y : A
Γ,∆→ Γ′, x : A R
1We maintain the use of the sequent symbol→ instead of that used by the author ` in order to
avoid confusions.
199
Since in sequent as ∆→ xRy there is at most one relational atom in the succedent,
the system S(K) does not contain rules for weakening and contraction for such
formulas in the succedent. Thus, the structural rules of S(K) are:
Γ,∆→ Γ′
xRy, Γ,∆→ Γ′ L-W
xRy, xRy, Γ,∆→ uRv
xRy, Γ,∆→ uRv L-C
Γ,∆→ Γ′
x : A, Γ,∆→ Γ′ L-W
Γ,∆→ Γ′
Γ,∆→ Γ′, x : A R-W
x : A, x : A, Γ,∆→ Γ′
x : A, Γ,∆→ Γ′ L-C
x : A, x : A, Γ,∆→ Γ′
Γ,∆→ Γ′, x : A R-C
The separation between the basic system and the relational theory (labeling al-
gebra, in the terminology of the author) is maintained in the derivations: in the
relational theory only relational atoms are inferred, whereas in the basic systems
both relational atoms and labelled formulas are used to derive other labelled for-
mulas, “so that a derivation in the base system may depend on a derivation in the
relational theory, but not viceversa” (see ibid., p. 9). Several extensions of S(K) are
then considered. The new rules for the accessibility relation introduce a relational
formula in the succedent, so in our terminology, they follow the schema R-Reg.
Examples of rules in the relational theory are:
→ xR f (x) Ser → xRx Ref
∆→ xRy
∆→ yRx Sym
∆→ xRy ∆→ yRz
∆→ xRz Trans
The admissibility of the cut rule is not given directly by a derivation conversion,
but rather indirectly. It is shown (Theorem 6.3.1., p.149) that the labelled se-
quent and the corresponding natural deduction systems are equivalent, that is,
S(L) = S(K) + S(T ) and N(L) = N(K) + N(T ). Moreover, the subformula prop-
erty is satisfied: in any derivation of a sequent Γ,∆→ Γ′, only labelled subformulas
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of Γ and Γ′ may occur. Observe that here the definition of subformula is restricted
to the labelled formulas and does not include the relational atoms (see Defini-
tion 2.3.10, p. 46). When cut can be dispensed with and the subformula property
holds, derivations can be built from the sequent to be derived, working towards
the initial sequents. However, contraction duplicates formulas and it is always ap-
plicable, with the consequence that the proof-search procedure may not terminate.
The entire second part (Ch. 8–11) is devoted to the problem of bounding the appli-
cation of contraction in order to ensure the decidability of various modal logics. In
fact, a large number of modal logics are known to be decidable and their decidabil-
ity has been established by using model-theoretic techniques as the finite model
property. The elimination of contraction, or, when it is not possible, a bound on its
application, is then required when the question of decidability and complexity for
modal logics is addressed in proof-theoretic terms. Contraction is indispensable for
modal logics stronger than the basic modal logics: the sequent → ¬¬(A ⊃ A)
is not derivable in S(T) without contraction, and so is for→ ¬A ⊃ ¬A in
S(K4). The author also gives a list of sequents derivable in S(T) (S(K4)) with the
specification of the the number of contraction required for its derivability in S(T)
(resp. in S(K4)). Although application of left contraction with a modal formula
x : A as principal cannot be eliminated while retaining the completeness, every
derivable sequent in S(T) has a derivation in which there are no occurrences of
contraction, except for application of left contraction with a modal formula x : A
as principal; however, these applications are not needed more than pbs(Γ,∆ → Γ′)
in each branch, where pbs(Γ,∆ → Γ′) is the number of positive boxed subformulas
of Γ,∆ → Γ′ (Theorem 10.1.4, p. 210). A similar result (Theorem 11.2.5, p. 235)
holds for the systems S(K4) and S(S4). On the other hand, contraction is elim-
inable once and for all from the system S(K) for basic modal logic (Theorem 9.1.1,
p. 187). The problem is strictly connected to that of the admissibility of contraction
for our labelled system with rule L2. As we already said, our conjecture is that
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the system G3K where the standard rule L is replaced by the following
xRy, y : A, Γ→ ∆
xRy, x : A, Γ→ ∆ L2
is cut and contraction free, so it is possible to get rid of the repetition of x : A
without losing the completeness of the system. However, an obstacle to the proof of
contraction admissibility is given by the non-invertibility of L2. The eliminability
result Viganò could cast light on the our problem.
Finally, we summarize our main contributions and discuss the directions for a fu-
ture research. The methodology of the labelled systems has been motivated by
the attempt to give a modular and uniform presentation for dealing with a large
class of modal epistemic logics. Although the presence of the semantics in the
syntax has been considered disputable from a conceptual point of view, it must be
noted that it does not preclude the possibility of reasoning about modal logic in
proof-theoretic terms: none of the proofs of the main results of this work (cut elim-
ination and admissibility of the structural rules) makes appeal to the infinitary
model-theoretic techniques typically used in modal logics, and they have all been
established through the derivation conversion strategy which is essential in the
proof theory studies. Through the use of labels, the relational semantics can be
successfully employed to make formal derivations. Possible states and accessibili-
ties between them play an important inferential role when we reason about modal
logic: When we prove that a modal axiom characterizes a certain class of frames,
we constantly deduce a property of R from another, or conclude that some formula
A is forced at a state x because x is accessible from another state y. In the labelled
systems, the inferential role of the relational semantics is precisely formalized and
made explicit part of the syntax of sequent rules.
Through the chapters we have pointed out the possible developments of our work,
we briefly summarize the most interesting ones. The material covered by the first
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chapter can be used to give a normalizing labelled system of natural deduction
with general elimination rules for a large class of modal logics. The treatment of
non-logical axioms in natural deduction has been recently investigated in Negri
and von Plato (2011) but its application to modal logic is still material for a future
research.
The second chapter should be further developed in order to show that a better re-
sult on the upper bound on cut-free derivations can be achieved: admissibility of
contraction in the presence of non-invertible logical rules remains an open prob-
lem, and the possibility to find a semantic solution to it should be seriously taken
into consideration. It has been also noted that the proof of the cut elimination
theorem (with context-sharing cut) requires a restricted version of contraction ad-
missibility, that is, when cut gets formulated as a context-sharing rule contraction
has to be proved admissible only for atomic formulas. The conjecture, first sug-
gested by Roy Dyckhoff for the intuitionistic system G3ip, is that it is possible to
prove cut elimination without any contraction at all, since contraction is a special
case of context-sharing cut in which is cut formula is principal of an initial se-
quent. It must be interesting to prove this conjecture for the labelled system G3K.
As we already mentioned in the fourth chapter, a possible development of the sys-
tem G3PAL for the logic of public announcements could be to add rules for dealing
with the common knowledge operator. The problem is due to the iterative inter-
pretation of common knowledge like an infinite conjunction or, equivalently, to the
presence of an accessibility relation defined as the (reflexive and) transitive clo-
sure of each Ra. The same question arises for other logics like LTL (Linear Time
Logic) and the results of finitization given in Boretti and Negri (2010) should lead
the further research in this direction.
The style of analysis of the last chapter on the knowability paradox can be var-
iously applied: it is there shown that the importance of the techniques of proof
theory, as normalization and cut elimination, go beyond their immediate applica-
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tions to logical calculi like, for instance, syntactic proof of consistency, disjunction
property for intuitionsitic system, interpolation theorem. Indeed, when a normal
derivation of the paradox is found, every inferential step is explicit and it is clear
where the paradoxical conclusion comes from. This encourages us to consider other
semantic paradoxes in the light of the method presented. From a more philosophi-
cal perspective, that work takes a stand on the revisionary approach to paradoxes:
any revisionary approach to paradoxes should come after (or, at least, reckon with)
the structural proof analysis of its derivation. The requirement of normal deriv-
ability is unavoidable in the presence of non-logical axioms, because such axioms
could make the application of other logical rules problematic. For this purpose,
natural deduction with general elimination rules and sequent systems with non-
logical inference rules will play a central role in the diagnosis of the logical para-
doxes.
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